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Abstract 
For much of the Western theological tradition, divine-human reconciliation has been 
marred with a form of dualism between God’s saving work and the humanity of Jesus 
Christ, claims T.F. Torrance, a manifestation of what he dubbed the “Latin Heresy”. Here 
we examine Torrance’s attempt to recontextualise reconciliation within the constitution of 
the incarnate Son, to recover the soteriological principle of the Eastern Fathers that what 
is “unassumed is unhealed”, and thus move away from external, forensic or juridical 
categories of atonement by threading Christ’s assumption of fallen human nature through 
the very heart of his doctrine of the incarnation. Where contemporary debate of such a 
notion has struggled is in ambiguity of terms - some clarity must be brought to defining 
“fallenness”, particularly in relation to the Classical-Reformed categories of original guilt 
and corruption. The state of Christ's humanity also renders several dogmatic questions 
surrounding, namely, the integrity of His suffering and temptation; the temporal 
consistency of incarnational atonement being instantaneous and continuous; the 
consistency in application of the non-assumptus to human "person" as well as "nature"; 
the success of the non-assumptus in preventing the instrumentality of Christ's humanity; 
and the role of the Spirit in the incarnation. Beyond this, contentious historical work has 
left both “fallenness” and “unfallenness” theologians divided in interpretation of the same 
sources, with both Eastern and Western Fathers, in places, being made subservient to 
later theological structures and vocabulary, and the conceptual schism between the two 
exacerbated. This too, we seek to address. Emancipated from these constrictions, and 
perhaps with some common ground found, the fallenness debate should be able to 
progress more constructively.
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“Man of sorrows!” what a name
For the Son of God who came
Ruined sinners to reclaim!
Hallelujah, what a Saviour!
…
Guilty, vile, and helpless we,  
Spotless Lamb of God was He;  
Full atonement! can it be?  
Hallelujah, what a Saviour!1
Introduction
Alike and unlike us. Suffering yet immutable, dying yet immortal, carpenter yet Creator. 
Such are the widely accepted mysteries of God taking to Himself the human nature He 
created in the incarnation of the Son. However, “fallen yet spotless” remains a point of 
contentious ambiguity. Edward Irving was deposed from the Church of Scotland for such a 
claim,2 Karl Barth adopted the notion but thought of himself departing from the Patristic 
witness,3 while T. F. Torrance regarded this to be the ‘great soteriological principle of the 
early church’.4
The non-assumptus—Latin shorthand for Gregory Nazianzen’s maxim, 'the unassumed 
is unhealed’5—is understood by Torrance to mean that the Son assumed a fallen human 
nature, tainted with the defects of postlapsarian humanity. Though He was without sin, and 
1 P. B. Bliss, ‘Man of Sorrows’ (1875).
2 B. L. Lee, ‘Christ’s Sinful Flesh’: Edward Irving’s Christological Theology Within the Context of His Life and
Times (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013) 112-155; D. W. Dorries, Edward Irving’s 
Incarnational Christology (Fairfax: Xulon Press, 2002) 297-467; G. W. P. McFarlane, Christ and the Spirit: 
The Doctrine of the Incarnation According to Edward Irving (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1996) 142-143.
3 K. Barth, CD I/2, 153-154.
 T. F. Torrance, ‘The Legacy of Karl Barth (1886-1968)’, SJT 39 (1986), 289-308, 306; Karl Barth: Biblical 4
and Evangelical Theologian (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990) 179.
 Gregory Nazianzen, Ep. 101.5. All citations of Gregory’s Ep. from On God and Christ: The Five Theological5
Orations and Two Letters to Cledonius (ed. J. Behr, tr. F. Williams and L. R. Wickham; Crestwood: St. 
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2002).
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thereby unlike us, He was like us ‘in every respect’ in nature (Heb. 2:17), taking ‘our actual 
human existence laden with sin and guilt, our humanity diseased in mind and soul in its 
estrangement or alienation from the Creator’.6
As shall be demonstrated, much is made of this claim, with advocates and critics alike 
staking the very integrity of the gospel on whether or not the Son assumed postlapsarian 
humanity, alongside various contradictory readings of Eastern and Western Fathers alike.  7
The intention of this work is, ultimately, to constructively progress this turbulent debate.8
The thesis begins in chapter one with an appreciative appraisal of T. F. Torrance in his 
contextualisation of atonement to Christ’s humanity,  making the Son’s assumption of 9
fallen humanity a soteriological concern. It shall be argued that redemption is achieved 
“once and for all” at the virgin birth and, concurrently, throughout the incarnation in the 
Son’s “continuous union” with fallen nature. This redemption is then grounded in 
6 T. F. Torrance, The Mediation of Christ (Colorado Springs: Helmers & Howard, 1992) 39. Emphases of
Christ’s fallenness like this became commonplace for Torrance, present even in his earlier work; see The 
Doctrine of Jesus Christ: The Auburn Lectures 1938/39 (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2002) 121; ‘Predestination in 
Christ’, EQ 13 (1941), 108-141, 133; ‘The Atonement and the Oneness of the Church’, SJT 7 (1954), 
245-269, 247; ‘What is the Church?’, Ecumenical Review II (1958), 6-21, 13. The non-assumptus developed
in significance throughout Torrance’s career, particularly in the extent of his claims that Christ assumed
original sin, but works from throughout his life in favour of Christ’s fallen nature can still be cited with good
conscience.
7 There is a wealth of material beyond this study. For Patristic engagement affirming that Christ assumed a
fallen human nature, see H. Johnson, The Humanity of the Saviour: A Biblical and Historical Study of the 
Human Nature of Christ in Relation to Original Sin, with Special Reference to Its Soteriological Significance
(London: Epworth, 1962) 129-177; J. J. Nantomah, ‘Jesus the God-Man: The Doctrine of the Incarnation in 
the Light of the Teaching of the Church Fathers and its Relevance for a Twentieth Century African 
Context’ (PhD Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1982) 259-337; T. Weinandy, In the Likeness of Sinful Flesh: 
An Essay on the Humanity of Christ (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993) 21-72; ‘Cyril and the Mystery of the 
Incarnation’ in T. Weinandy and D. A. Keating (eds.), The Theology of St. Cyril of Alexandria: A Critical 
Appreciation (London: T&T Clark, 2003) 23-54; Athanasius: A Theological Introduction (Farnham: Ashgate,
2007) 31-36, 61-64; Dorries, Christology, 143-296. For more critical appraisals, see W. D. Rankin, ‘Carnal 
Union with Christ in the Theology of T. F. Torrance (PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1997) 146-297; E. 
Hatzidakis, Jesus: Fallen? The Human Nature of Christ Examined from an Eastern Orthodox Perspective
(Clearwater: Orthodox Witness, 2013) esp. 194-211, 353-363. J. E. Van Kuiken provides a well-balanced 
perspective: Christ’s Humanity in Current and Ancient Controversy: Fallen or Not? (London: Bloomsbury,
2017) 91-154.
8 This work is intentionally limited to dogmatic dialogue. For suggestions of areas for biblical study to further
the debate, see appendices 1 and 2.
9 There are several overviews of Torrance’s work significant to this debate; see, for example, P. D. Molnar,
Thomas F. Torrance: Theologian of the Trinity (London: Routledge, 2009); E. Colyer, How to Read T. F. 
Torrance (Downers Grove: IVP, 2001). Of particular note, however, is Kevin Chiarot’s critical, though well-
reasoned, at-length treatment of Torrance on the non-assumptus: The Unassumed is the Unhealed: The 
Humanity of Christ in the Christology of T. F. Torrance (Eugene: Pickwick, 2013).
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Torrance’s restatement of common Christological foundations in the homoousion, 
hypostatic union, and an/enhypostasia; is actualised in Christ’s vicarious humanity; and 
fulfilled in His death and resurrection.
In chapter two, the contemporary criticisms levelled at the fallenness view are explored. 
The intention here is to address the conceptual ambiguity that has marred the debate, 
giving clarity in definition to “fallenness” in relation to the Classical-Reformed categories of 
original guilt and corruption, and the distinction of “fallenness” and “sin” as properties of 
“nature” and “person”. The thesis then examines the integrity of Christ’s temptations and 
sufferings if His humanity is not fallen; the consistency of Torrance’s application of “the 
unassumed is unhealed”; the threat of instrumentalism against his own attempts to depart 
from it; and the role of the Spirit in Torrance’s schema.
Finally, the last chapter turns to the role of Christ’s humanity in redemption in the 
historical corpus, examining the genesis and conclusive perspectives of the Eastern and 
Western Fathers, and the legitimacy of Torrance’s historical reading. From this Patristic 
foundation, some common ground for the contemporary debate shall be sought.  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Chapter 1: T. F. Torrance and the Non-Assumptus
1. Soteriological Context
It is well-noted that one of the defining features of Torrance’s theology is the unity between 
incarnation and atonement.  The context for the Son’s assumption of fallen humanity, 10
thereby, is soteriological. The matters of the redemptive nature of divine-human union, the 
initial extent of this redemption at the virgin birth, and the place of the non-assumptus 
within the building blocks of Torrance’s Christology in the homoousion, the hypostatic 
union and the anhypostatic-enhypostatic couplet shall now be discussed.
1.1 Redemptive Union and the “Latin Heresy” 
That the Son’s assumption of fallen humanity is a soteriological concern arises from the 
contextualisation of atonement to the constitution of the incarnate Son. For Torrance, the 
touch of divinity on fallenness is essentially medicinal; the incarnation is itself an ‘atoning 
and sanctifying union’ where sinful flesh is ‘sanctified and hallowed’ simply by the Son 
assuming it,  and humanity and God are reconciled within Himself.  Atonement is 11 12
actualised when humanity is mediated to God within the Son’s own person.  Thus, for 13
Torrance, atonement is inherently incarnational, and incarnation is fundamentally 
atoning.  14
Torrance argues that Latin theology has largely neglected the place of Christ’s humanity 
within atonement and thereby His redemptive assumption of fallen nature, a manifestation 
 Molnar, Theologian, 137-186; Colyer, Torrance, 84-96.10
 T. F. Torrance, Incarnation: The Person and Life of Christ (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2008) 63.11
 T. F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith: Evangelical Theology of the Ancient Catholic Church (Edinburgh: T&T 12
Clark, 1988) 155.
 T. F. Torrance, Theology in Reconciliation: Essays Towards Evangelical and Catholic Unity in East and 13
West (London: Geoﬀrey Chapman, 1975) 229f; Incarnation, 198f.
 Torrance, Faith, 159. “Incarnational atonement” is thus a popular term for this contextualisation of 14
atonement to the Son’s humanity.
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of what Torrance dubbed the “Latin Heresy”.  Post-Arian controversy, in a reactionary 15
attempt to maintain the integrity of Christ’s divinity,  developed in Latin thought a dualism 16
between the Son’s person and work. Atonement became simply a forensic or juridical 
transaction, an ‘external transference of penalty’,  whereby the Son’s assumption of 17
humanity became more instrumental than essentially redemptive. His human nature 
became merely an implement purposed with reaching the cross to satisfy a penalty or pay 
a ransom, rather than the active centre of redemption,  and for such ends was considered 18
‘humanity in its perfect original state’.  Atonement, in this sense, became what Christ did 19
more than who Christ is, externalised from Christ’s humanity as the redemptive quality of 
divine-human union was forgotten.20
1.2 What is Unhealed if Unassumed?
The soteriological concern is that the separation of the Son’s work from His redemptive 
assumption of fallen nature jeopardises both the redemption of human fallenness and the 
accessibility of salvation for common humanity sharing that fallen state. The unassumed is 
unhealed since, without the intrinsically healing union, we remain ‘untouched’ by 
redemption.21
Torrance details both ontological and epistemological implications of this. Ontologically, 
if the Son did not assume fallen humanity, redemption does not extend to ‘the ontological 
 See T. F. Torrance, ‘Karl Barth and the Latin Heresy’, SJT 39 (1986), 461-482, 476-79; ‘The Atonement. 15
The Singularity of Christ and the Finality of the Cross: The Atonement and the Moral Order’ in N. M. de S. 
Cameron (ed.), Universalism and the Doctrine of Hell (Exeter: Paternoster, 225-256) 238; Mediation, 40. We 
will later consider the position of the Eastern and Western Fathers, examining the legitimacy of Torrance’s 
claims of dualism and the place of internalised atonement. 
 Torrance, Reconciliation, 185-204.16
 Torrance, 'Heresy', 476.17
 Torrance, Mediation, 81; ‘Incarnation and Atonement: Theosis and Henosis’, Society of Ordained 18
Scientists Bulletin 7 (1992), 8-20, 12-13; God and Rationality (London: OUP, 1971) 63; Incarnation, 199.
 Torrance, 'Heresy', 476; cf. Mediation, 40.19
 For Christ’s humanity being integral, not instrumental, in atonement, see Torrance, Theologian, 178-179; 20
Incarnation, 126, 212; Faith, 150; Mediation, 81; Atonement, 182.
 Torrance, Incarnation, 62; cf. ‘Singularity‘, 237-38; Incarnation, 201; Conflict and Agreement in the 21
Church, Volume 1: Order and Disorder (Oxford: OUP, 1959) 175-78; Theologian, 104.
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depths of human being’ and leaves humanity at enmity with God in the ‘underlying 
structures of human existence’.  The substance of human nature would remain corrupt 22
and insurgent. Epistemologically, Torrance regards the root of original and actual sin to be 
‘the dark depths of the mind’,  so if Christ did not assume fallen humanity then not only 23
would human modes of thought and our knowledge of both God and creation remain 
corrupt, but the operative element of sinful agency would go unchecked.
Ultimately, neglecting the non-assumptus disqualifies Christ as the substitutionary 
representative of fallen humanity, making redemption irrelevant for those ontologically and 
epistemologically alien to Himself. How could Christ represent those of a fundamentally 
different nature? If our Saviour wrought redemption within a state different to our own, 
Torrance asks, ‘[W]hat could we have to do with him?’  Such questions set the stakes for 24
Torrance and anchor the question of Christ’s fallenness within its proper soteriological 
context.
2. “Once and For All” Union
In contextualising atonement within Christ’s humanity, redemption, for Torrance, spans the 
entirety of the incarnation. If atonement is isolated to judiciary satisfaction at the cross, 
then the sole significance of Christ’s humanity pre-Calvary is preparation for that singular 
moment. Did Christ live merely to die? “No”, Torrance writes; ‘the whole of Christ’s life and 
ministry were involved in the work of reconciliation as well as His death’.  25
There are, however, distinct dialectic elements within this holistic atonement. Torrance 
references both the ‘once and for all union of God and man’  and ‘the continuous union in 26
22 Torrance, Mediation, 62.
23 Torrance, Theologian, 104. We will see that Torrance most closely follows Gregory Nazianzen here. 
24 Torrance, Incarnation, 62.
25 Torrance, ‘Oneness’, 252. Torrance does not neglect the resurrection here, as shall be seen; death and 
resurrection are two parts of one event.
26 Torrance, Incarnation, 87-104. Torrance’s exclusivist nomenclature is relatively anachronistic to the 
contemporary reader.
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the historical life and obedience of Jesus’.  Chiarot questions how the redemption that 27
occurs in such union—being both “once and for all” and continuous—is not contradictory,  28
as the incarnation itself refers to both the 'unique event when the Word entered time and 
joined human existence’ and ‘the whole human life and work of Jesus, from his birth at 
Bethlehem to his resurrection from the dead’.  Still, he recognises that one can argue that 29
the Son sanctifies fallen humanity both ‘in the very act of assumption and all through his 
holy life lived in it from beginning to end’.  Redemption is “once and for all” since, even at 30
the earliest moments of His temporal life, the Son has united all humanity to Himself, and 
has done so irrevocably.31
2.1 Virgin Birth: Distinction Within the Whole
For Torrance, the virgin birth is the first distinct moment of incarnational atonement. Rather 
than asking biological questions that might render biological answers, Torrance contends 
that the significance of the virgin birth is entirely Christological; that is, rather than 
speaking predominantly to the biological transmission of sin, the event reveals what Christ 
does to human nature from within it.  Here, the incarnation takes ‘meaningful form’ in 32
redemptive terms, revealing that ‘here in the midst of our nature and humanity God is 
recreating humanity’.  33
The soteriological significance of the virgin birth as the beginning of redemption is seen 
in its correlation to the resurrection as the completion of redemption. There takes place, at 
27 Ibid., 105-160.
28 Chiarot, Unassumed, 100-102. This will be addressed fully later.
29 Torrance, Incarnation, 67, here describing the Son’s becoming of humanity (egeneto sarx) in John 1:14.
30 T. F. Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 1996) 155.
31 T. F. Torrance, The School of Faith: The Catechisms of The Reformed Church (London: James Clarke & 
Co, 1959) cxi-cxvi. Despite the universal extent of God’s election and the Son’s redemptive 
consubstantiality with fallen humanity, Torrance consistently refutes universalism (‘Universalism or 
Election?’, SJT 2 [1949], 310-318; 'Heresy', 481-482). Cf. Paul Molnar’s appraisal of Torrance on the 
polarised faults of universalism and limited atonement: ‘Thomas F. Torrance and the Problem of 
Universalism’, SJT 68 (2015), 164-186.
32 Torrance, Incarnation, 95.
33 Ibid.
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the virgin birth, a veiling of the mystery of the redemptive union between fallen humanity 
and God in Christ beneath His flesh. This mystery of redemptive union is then carried 
through the captivity of fallen existence into liberation of new life ‘through our estranged 
estate under bondage into the freedom and triumph of the resurrection’.  The unity of 34
resurrection and virgin birth validates the two of them, as the unveiling in the resurrection 
of what was veiled at the virgin birth points us towards the mystery of the redemption that 
was achieved between those two points:
The empty tomb points to the revelation of the secret of Christ and as such is the 
authentication of the virgin birth; it is the unveiling of what was veiled, the resurrection 
out of our mortality of what was inserted into it and recreated within it. But such a 
resurrection of true man and true God points back to the virgin birth of Jesus as a 
union of true God and true man.35
2.2 Virgin Birth: Soteriological Significance
Torrance expounds the soteriological significance of the virgin birth, further revealing the 
centrality of the non-assumptus to the once and for all union. 
Firstly, the virgin birth reveals the integrity of Christ’s humanity and therein the 
relevance of His redemptive work within it for those sharing fallen nature. As the Son goes 
through the process of physical birth, the reality of His humanity becomes concrete. He 
was ‘really born of Mary, born through all the embryonic processes of the womb as other 
human beings’.  Contra docetic Christologies, the virgin birth reveals Christ to be truly of 36
our own flesh and blood.  By participating in the act of human birth in such a way, Christ 37
34 Ibid., 96.
35 Ibid., 97.
36 T. F. Torrance, ‘The Doctrine of the Virgin Birth’, Scottish Bulletin of Evangelical Theology 12 (1994), 8-25, 
18.
37 Torrance, Jesus Christ, 116.
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can thus bestow upon humanity pneumatological participation in the parentage of God. 
Torrance writes, ‘[B]ecause of his own coming into existence of a woman, as a real man’, 
humanity can proclaim: ‘[W]hen Christ was born I was born a son of God, for I partake of 
Christ in his Spirit of sonship’.38
Secondly, the virgin birth reveals the integrity of Christ’s divine origin. Contra Ebionite 
Christology, Christ’s birth is a solely monergistic act of God. There was no prior foetus for 
Christ to take control of, nor any human agency directing the eternal Son’s incarnation. 
The precise nature of the virgin birth entails God willing human inclusion but denies 
humanity as the causal actor. For Torrance, ‘man is fully involved, but he is the predicate, 
not the subject, not the lord of the event’.39 The virgin birth is a kenotic act where the Son 
empties ‘himself, his very Self, out of a form in which we could not behold God into an 
incarnate form’.40 The Son’s redemptive union with fallen humanity, thereby, is caused 
exclusively by divine initiative. Fallen humanity is incapable of reaching God; we cannot 
empty God out of His transcendence. Kenosis is God’s self-emptying. The redemption 
initiated at the virgin birth is a ‘one directional' movement from God to humanity,41 a truly 
‘supernatural event…a matter of pure grace’,42 unconditioned by ‘the causal-historical 
process of nature or of the world’.43
Thirdly, the virgin birth is a recreation out of the old creation. In Christ’s conception 
within Mary, the matter of the first creation is taken in its fallenness, and in unbroken 
continuity with that first creation there takes place a recreation within the human nature. 
38 Torrance, Incarnation, 93. The non-assumptus is made explicit in Torrance’s reference to Christ’s work in 
the place of humanity under the law: ‘Because Christ came into existence under the law, he can redeem 
those that are under the law’ (ibid., 93).
39 Ibid., 99. To Torrance, the failing of Docetism was its theological foundation of an excessively abstract 
God, which inevitably concluded in the elimination of Christ’s true humanity. Ebionitism, on the other hand, 
failed in its Christology being entirely inductive of Jewish tradition, resulting in an extreme idealisation of 
humanity; see T. F. Torrance, Theological Science (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1969) 45-46.
40 Torrance, Jesus Christ, 110-111. Torrance’s spatial understanding of kenosis ensures no qualitative 
change occurs for the Son in the self-emptying of His incarnation.
41 Torrance, Incarnation, 99.
42 Torrance, Incarnation, 99.
43 Cf. Torrance, Jesus Christ, 118.
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This was, Torrance describes, ‘not a creatio ex nihilo, but a creatio ex virgine, 
presupposing the first creation and beginning the new creation’.  The Son does not 44
assume a new flesh, or even prelapsarian flesh, but enters into the continuity of human 
fallenness in order to establish the matter of new creation 'in the midst of and out of the 
old’.  At the virgin birth we can be assured that the material of old creation is not left 45
unredeemed, but ‘that Christ really comes to us, to our human flesh and assumes it out of 
our fallen condition in order to redeem and sanctify it’.46
Fourthly, though the Son aligns Himself with the continuity of fallenness, the virgin birth 
reveals that sinful human autonomy is set aside, therein facilitating the continuity of fallen 
humanity with God. Where sinfulness should be inevitably actualised from the state of 
corruption that the Son assumes and has been in unbroken continuity for common 
humanity, He discards that trend by bringing His holiness to bear upon the flesh He 
assumes in the virgin birth. Though Christ was born into our condition, ‘far from 
acquiescing in its sin, [he] resists it, sanctifying what sin had corrupted’.  For Torrance, 47
this continuity of sin is broken by the literal setting aside of Joseph as Jesus’ father. 
Fatherhood ‘epitomises the autonomy and sovereignty of sinful man’,  so where Christ is 48
born not by the “will of man” but the will of God (John 1:13), the sovereignty of the father is 
set aside to make room for the sovereignty of God in Christ’s birth.  Therefore, though 49
Christ is continuous with human fallenness, He is discontinuous with sin, as the human 
autonomy that submits to the corrupt propensities of our state is displaced by the perfect 
44 Torrance, Incarnation, 100.
45 Torrance, Jesus Christ, 119.
46 Torrance, Incarnation, 100.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 One might think this setting aside simply extends to ontic sinfulness, as in the immediacy of birth an 
infant simply has no opportunity to sin. However, even at the moment of Christ’s birth Torrance upholds this 
setting aside of sin, as the natural conclusion of fallenness extends even to Christ’s act, not just His being. 
We must see ‘sinful acts as excluded in the birth of Jesus Christ… remembering the nature of sin, as the 
act of human assertion over against God is entirely excluded’ (Torrance, Jesus Christ, 119).
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will of God in the virgin birth.  Christ being born by the will of God, however, enables the 50
subsequent continuity of fallen humanity with God in our spiritual rebirth. At salvation, 
Torrance writes, ‘there takes place in us the birth of Jesus, or rather, we are in a 
remarkable way given to share through grace in his birth… Just as he was born from 
above of the Holy Spirit, so we are born from above of the Holy Spirit through sharing in 
his birth’.51
Here the non-assumptus is what, for Torrance, makes the virgin birth soteriologically 
significant. Had the Son not assumed fallen nature, common humanity could not have 
been considered under parentage of the Father, as Christ would not have partaken in the 
same flesh and blood as His fallen mother. Fallen humanity would have been left helpless 
in our incapability to reach God, and the new would not have been a recreation of the old. 
Had He not aligned Himself with fallen humanity in our history of sin then the continuity 
would remain unbroken.
3. Continuous Union: Building Blocks of the Incarnation
Simultaneous to the “once and for all” union, Torrance details a “continuous” union of the 
Son with fallen human nature by which redemption is actualised, not just at the virgin birth 
but throughout the entire incarnation. Torrance grounds this by reformulating common 
foundations of Christology—namely, the homoousion, the hypostatic union, and the 
 Here, younger Torrance stated that Christ’s ﬂesh was ‘created out of fallen humanity, but without the will 50
of fallen humanity’, and goes on to say the same of His person/personality (ibid., 122 [no human will], 
124-125 [no human person/personality]). Rankin perceives Torrance endangers himself of Apollinarian
denial that Christ had any human will or personality, only divine (Rankin, ‘Carnal Union’, 103-109).
Alternatively, both Baker and Radcliﬀ interpret Torrance to deny a fallen will to Christ without entirely
rejecting Christ’s assumption of human will (M. Baker, ‘The Place of St. Irenaeus of Lyons in Historical and
Dogmatic Theology According to Thomas F. Torrance’, Participatio 2 (2010), 3-43, 23-24; J. R Radcliﬀ,
Thomas F. Torrance and the Church Fathers: A Reformed, Evangelical, and Ecumenical Reconstruction of
the Patristic Tradition [Eugene: Pickwick, 2014] 97, 107). However, what is missed is that this immediate
context of the virgin birth simply suggests that Christ’s ﬂesh was not conceived by the initiative of fallen
human will or persons, not that He was born without them; see Chiarot, Unassumed, 230; Van Kuiken,
Humanity, 36.
 Torrance, Incarnation, 101; cf. 91.51
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anhypostasia-enhypostasia couplet—serving to further contextualise atonement internally 
to Christ’s humanity.
3.1 The Homoousion
When the Council of Nicea undertook the task of conceptualising the Trinitarian economy 
of temporal self-revelation in relation to the transcendent interiority of the immanent divine 
life, the ‘cardinal issue’ at stake, says Torrance, was ‘the unbroken relation in being and 
agency between Jesus Christ and God the Father’—52 the homoousios. The homoousion 
articulated that Jesus of Nazareth is absolutely consubstantial with God the Father and is 
thereby identified as ‘the unique content of God’s saving self-revelation and self-
communication to mankind’.53 It is on this absolute oneness of ‘Being and Act’ between 
Christ and the Father that the integrity of God’s ‘revealing and saving acts in Christ’ 
depend,54 making the homoousion, to Torrance, an essential tenet of the Christian faith.55 
Torrance recognises ontological and epistemological significance of the homoousion, 
which further express the centrality of Christ’s assumption of fallen humanity for 
incarnational atonement.
3.1.1 Oneness of God, Christ and Fallen Humanity
In the homoousion the ontological stakes, for Torrance, are whether or not the immanent 
Trinitarian life becomes in any way transparent to fallen humanity by the Son bringing the 
one divine substance shared to visibly dwell within the fallen human state. Without the 
homoousion the content of divine self-revelation would be empty; that is, if Christ is not 
 Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996) 93; cf. Faith, 121-122.52
 Torrance, God, 93.53
 Ibid.54
 Though not explicit in biblical witness, Nicea penetrated to the ‘interior logic of the apostolic witness’ in 55
the homoousion (Torrance, Reconstruction, 40); cf. Reality and Evangelical Theology (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1982) 111-113; Mediation, 53-54; God, ix-x; ‘The Evangelical Signiﬁcance of the 
Homoousion: Sermon on John 5:17’, Abba Salama 5 (1974), 165-168.
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consubstantial with the Father we cannot not say God is concretely with us in our 
fallenness. For Torrance, Christ is not ‘Emmanuel’ (Matt. 1:23) unless there is absolute 
unity in being and act between the economic and immanent Trinitarian life.  Torrance 56
questions:
What kind of God would we have, then, if Jesus Christ were not the self-revelation or 
self-communication of God, if God were not inherently and eternally in his own being 
what the Gospel tells us he is in Jesus Christ?…It would surely mean that there is no 
ontological, and therefore no epistemological, connection between the love of Jesus 
and the love of God.57
Against this concern, the homoousion secures Christ as the fullness of God within fallen 
humanity in self-revelation to that fallen creation. There is ‘no God behind the back of 
Christ’, as what God is economically He is the same immanently in Himself.  Torrance 58
writes, ‘[T]here is a complete fidelity and reliability between what God is in Jesus Christ 
toward us and what he is eternally in his unchangeable being…what God is toward us in 
Jesus he is inherently and eternally’.  59
This oneness of being and act between Christ and God is what Torrance called the 
‘evangelical significance’ of the homoousion.  When Christ is at work within our fallen 60
humanity in His ministry of teaching, in signs and wonders, in His concretely perfect union 
 This heavily echoes Karl Rahner’s famous statement: ‘The economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity, and 56
the immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity’ (The Trinity [tr. J. Donceel; New York: Herder and Herder, 1970] 
22). Torrance, following Barth, conditionally aﬃrms Rahner’s rule, as long as expressing the unity of 
economic and immanent does not cloud the necessary distinction between the two. Their interrelation is a 
matter of correspondence; the economic is secondary and dependent on the primary and constitutive 
immanent Trinitarian life. The economic cannot therefore be freely read back into the immanent, but it is 
grounded in it. To collapse the economic completely into the immanent would be comparable to collapsing 
the temporal completely back into the eternal. See G. Hunsinger, Evangelical, Catholic, and Reformed: 
Doctrinal Essays on Barth and Related Themes (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans, 2015) 21-22, 27-28.
 Torrance, Faith, 134.57
 Torrance, God, 243.58
 Torrance, God, 243; Faith, 135.59
 Torrance, Faith, 141; ‘Evangelical Signiﬁcance’, 167.60
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with the Father, we see God Himself acting within our fallen state. The acts of Jesus within 
our fallenness are authenticated by this divine ontology; ‘it is in virtue of his Deity that his 
saving work as man has its validity’.61
The ontological significance of the homoousion, for Torrance, extends beyond Christ’s 
consubstantiality with God to Christ’s absolute consubstantiality with humanity in His 
constitution as the incarnate mediator. By the homoousion, it is Christ as a fallen human of 
whom we talk of having absolute consubstantiality with God; the Son’s sharing in the 
substance of divinity cannot be abstracted from His sharing in the substance of fallen 
humanity.  Taking into account the soteriological context from which the homoousion was 62
articulated in the Council of Nicea,  Torrance recognises Christ’s deity cannot be 63
proclaimed in abstraction from His redemptive assumption of fallen humanity.  Just as 64
salvation would be moot if Christ was not ‘true God from true God’ and thereby lacked the 
exclusively divine prerogative to save, if Christ was not an authentically fallen human then 
‘salvation does not touch our human existence and condition’.  Therefore, the 65
homoousion required these two points of contact, ‘both ends of the homoousion, the divine 
and the human, had to be secured’.  66
As such, where one aspect of the homoousion authenticates Christ’s being and act as 
God, the other authenticates His being and act as a human being. In terms of revelation, 
 Torrance, Mediation, 54-55; cf. Faith, 141; ‘Evangelical Signiﬁcance’, 166; Christian, 91.61
 Torrance, Faith, 135-136.62
 Ibid., 146-147; T. F. Torrance, Space, Time and Incarnation (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1969), 3; Divine 63
Meaning: Studies in Patristic Hermeneutics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995) 344.
 Torrance, Christian, 94; Faith, 8, 146-149.64
 Torrance, Faith, 149. This human end of the homoousion is a matter of grace over ontic necessity. Where 65
the Son is consubstantial with the Father in a manner inherent to the Trinitarian life, Christ is consubstantial 
with humanity by choice. As with all God's acts of election this ‘choice or decision…guarantees to us the 
freedom of God. His sovereignty, His omnipotence is not one that acts arbitrarily, nor by necessity, but by 
personal decision’ (‘Predestination’, 117).
 Torrance, Faith, 146. This is not to confuse the homoousion with the hypostatic union. Where the 66
homoousion grounds the authenticity of Christ’s two natures (as shall be discussed), the hypostatic union 
grounds their unity. As Torrance states, ‘[T]he two natures of Christ himself on the horizontal level, must be 
interpreted in light of the vertical or cross-level reference in the homoousion’ (The Ground and Grammar of 
Theology: Consonance Between Theology and Science [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1980] 172).
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where fallen humanity fails to respond positively as the recipient of divine revelation, 
Christ, though very God, is able to provide an authentically human response in 
consubstantiality with fallen nature. Revelation, though entirely divinely initiated as God’s 
self-revelation, includes within it a ‘fully human response as part of its achievement for 
us’.  In redemption, Christ’s work is not, as with the “Latin Heresy”, a work of God on or to 67
our instrumental humanity, but, as Torrance often said, ‘an act of God as man’.68
Bringing these two poles together, we see the ultimate ontological significance of the 
homoousion is that Christ is not a “third party” mediator between God and estranged 
humanity, but, in dual consubstantiality with the estranged parties, is divine-human 
mediation within His incarnate constitution. Christ represents God to humanity and 
humanity to God, not simply on behalf of both sides, but as both sides.  It is upon this 69
foundation that atonement as continuous union is built. God and fallen humanity are 
reconciled throughout Christ’s entire life, as Christ, representing both sides of the conflict, 
took divine-human enmity into His own flesh and ‘bore it until the very end’ where 
atonement was completed at the cross.70
3.1.2 Growing in Wisdom
The epistemological significance of the homoousion concerns, again, authenticity, of the 
knowledge of God that the Son brings to creation. Consubstantial with the Godhead, 
knowledge of God enters into our fallen state with the incarnation of the Son, making 
Jesus ‘the one place in space and time where we may really know the Father’.  This 71
 Torrance, Reconstruction, 131-132; cf. Rationality, 145; Science, 50.67
 Torrance, God, 40-41; Mediation, 56; Incarnation, 195. It shall be demonstrated that in Christ’s vicarious 68
humanity, this authenticity of His human being and act has implications for justiﬁcation: not only is it 
objectively realised in Christ’s authentic divine action, but subjectively realised by Christ’s response as an 
authentically fallen human; cf. Torrance, ‘Justiﬁcation: Its Radical Nature and Place in Reformed Doctrine 
and Life’, SJT 13 (1960), 225-246, 233.
 Torrance, Incarnation, 111; cf. Conflict, 1:243.69
 Torrance, ‘Oneness’, 251; Incarnation, 110-112; Mediation, 82; Conflict, 1:244-245. Bearing in mind the 70
simultaneity of atonement, it shall later be shown that the cross is the climax of redemption.
 Torrance, Ground, 40.71
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knowledge is not imparted second-hand to Christ as a prophet or teacher external to God; 
as one who, in divine consubstantiality, shares in the intimate communion of knowledge 
interpenetrative within the Godhead, He brings first-hand knowledge of the divine life into 
the midst of fallen humanity.72
However, in consubstantiality with fallen humanity, Christ also shares the depths of 
human ignorance, where knowledge of God is lacking or corrupted. Maintaining the 
soteriological context of the homoousion, Torrance details the Son’s continuous kenotic 
economy, wherein He empties Himself out of the place of divine wisdom into our place of 
ignorance, and vicariously achieves within the fallen state the attainment of knowledge of 
God. Had Christ’s ignorance not been genuine by lacking fallenness, this condescension is  
emptied of redemptive reality. In epistemological exchange, Christ genuinely shares ‘our 
human ignorance, so that we might share his divine wisdom’.73
For Torrance, Christ’s vicarious attainment of knowledge of God for common humanity 
rests on the notion of prokope, meaning progress by the removal of obstacles, used in the 
Lukan account of the infant Christ’s growth in wisdom (Luke 2:52). This is, to Torrance, an 
internalised struggle against fallenness; having assumed fallen ignorance, Christ ‘cut his 
way forward’ against it towards knowledge of God.  Consubstantial with the wayward 74
mind of humanity, He bends it into epistemic communion with the Father.
As Christ grows in wisdom while consubstantial with fallen humanity, the path is carved 
for common humanity to follow. He sanctifies the route the fallen conscience must travel to 
arrive at knowledge of God, providing ‘in his own obedient sonship within our nature the 
Way whereby we are carried up to knowledge of God the Father.’  Consubstantial with 75
‘human modes’ of thought and speech, Christ has appropriated knowledge of God for 
 Torrance, Meaning, 248.72
 Torrance, Faith, 187.73
 Torrance, Reconstruction, 38; cf. Incarnation, 64, 106.74
 Torrance, Reconstruction, 38; cf. Reconciliation, 240; Meaning, 230.75
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those in solidary nature, and thereby ‘perfected in the humanity which he took from us 
man’s knowing of God and speaking of him’.76
But why, for Torrance, is it necessary that epistemological redemption occur within fallen 
modes of thought and speech? To know a being transcendently beyond what humanity 
could naturally perceive, such knowledge must rest ‘upon the reality and grace of the 
Object known’.  As such, we can only conceive of God within the modes He has created 77
for the sake of making Himself known. If the content of our thought and speech is to be 
properly of and towards God, Torrance says, ‘it can only be on the ground of his interaction 
with the world He has created and within the relation that He has established between it 
and Himself’.  Despite God’s transcendence, it is thus from God’s activity within the 78
created structures of space and time that knowledge of Him must be wrought, as this 
‘continuum of relations’ are given ‘in and with created existence and as the bearers of its 
immanent order’.79
However, if knowledge of God is to be of any substance there must be a unity of divine 
revelatory activity from a place of transcendence and these modes of thought and speech 
within which such activity is to be perceived. Our talk of God must ‘point beyond the spatial 
and temporal limits of the contingent world in a relation of transcendental reference, yet 
not in such a way that they are detached from the contingent world out of which that 
reference is made’.  These two points must intersect, for if our language of God is 80
abstracted from either of those points, we either lose the content of our speech, or we lose 
the frame of reference from within which we can speak. 
 Torrance, Meaning, 250-252; Karl Barth: An Introduction to His Early Theology (1910-1931) (Edinburgh: 76
T&T Clark, 1962) 104-105; Faith, 187. Pneumatologically, the epistemic prokope of the believer by the Spirit 
is not a separate work within a diﬀerent humanity, but a pneumatic participation in the prokope of Christ 
achieved within our same modes; ‘we have a true and faithful knowledge of God when through union with 
Christ by the power of the Spirit we receive the mind that was remade and renewed in him’ (Torrance, 
Meaning, 250).
 Torrance, SpTI, 54.77
 Ibid., 55.78
 Ibid., 61.79
 Torrance, SpTI, 56.80
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As such, the incarnation establishes the intersection of God’s self-revelation and the 
modes of thought and speech within which we receive it, unified in Christ by His 
consubstantiality with both. It is in this dual consubstantiality that the incarnation is ‘the 
great axis in God’s relation with the world of space and time, apart from which our 
understanding of God and the world can only lose meaning’.  81
The homoousion, in these points of ontological and epistemological significance, 
ultimately serves as a foundation for Christ’s redemptive work in the continuous union, 
without which His being and act as both God and fallen human would lack grounding.
3.2 The Hypostatic Union
The hypostatic union—the unity of the Son’s two natures within His hypostasis—is 
significant for the redemption of continuous union, being the test for Torrance’s 
aforementioned claims that Christ’s very assumption of fallen substance is essentially 
redemptive. The linchpin of an atonement contextualised to Christ’s humanity, in the 
restorative relation of divinity to humanity, is their unity within the Son’s theandric person.  82
For Torrance, hypostatic union and this restorative relation must be ‘held together as the 
obverse of one another’,  as atoning union is actualised by the hypostatic union bringing 83
divinity into restorative contact with humanity. Therein, the hypostatic union substantiates 
Torrance’s refutation of dualism between Christ’s person and work in atonement. He 
asserts, '[S]ince Jesus Christ is himself God and man in one Person, the atoning 
 Ibid., 68; Torrance, Meaning, 251.81
 The hypostatic union here has implications for Christ’s sinlessness. As the union of divinity to fallen 82
humanity is a redemptive one, Christ creates the reality of sinlessness within this nature in a way never 
previously accomplished. In this sense, ‘[i]n the concrete likeness of the ﬂesh of sin, he is unlike the 
sinner’ (Torrance, Atonement, 63). The Church’s union with Christ is also diﬀerentiated from the union of 
divinity and fallen human nature within the Son’s hypostasis; though the Church is constituted by Christ’s 
very act of ‘self-consecration’, our restoration upon union with Christ echoing the restoration of Christ’s 
fallenness in union with divinity, the Church remains a sinful entity in a sanctifying process until the 
eschaton (ibid., 371). The matter of Christ’s sinlessness will be addressed fully later.
 T. F. Torrance, Scottish Theology: From John Knox to John McLeod Campbell (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 83
1996) 15; Faith, 181.
 19
mediation and redemption which he wrought for us, fall within his own being and life as the 
one Mediator between God and man’.84 It shall be seen that Torrance’s reformulation of 
the understanding of hypostatic union common to Chalcedonian Christology developed the 
material content of dyophysitical interrelations within Christ’s person.
3.2.1 Dynamic Restatement: The Mystery of Christ
Despite its significant value, insufficient credence was given by Chalcedonian Christology 
to the inseparability of incarnation and atonement in the redemptive office of Christ’s 
humanity, and thereby His fallenness was neglected.85 Approaching Chalcedon, the 
influence of the “Latin Heresy” had come to the fore, making widespread the assumption 
that Christ’s humanity was either prelapsarian, or at least hamartiologically neutral (not 
identical to Adam’s initial state but simply untouched by the fall). In either case, Christ’s 
humanity is distinctly unlike ours.86
The judiciary and instrumental focus of the "Latin heresy" led, Torrance contends, to a 
static approach to the hypostatic union—one that fails to move beyond Christ’s initial 
moment of assumption, and neglects Christ’s ongoing redemption of fallenness wrought by 
the union between God and humanity within Himself throughout His entire temporal 
existence. Simply, Torrance calls for a dynamic formulation of the hypostatic union,87 one 
that contextualises atonement within the continuous union of Christ’s divine and fallen 
human natures.88
Torrance restates the hypostatic union as the tri-faceted “mystery of Christ”. In other 
words, the unity of God and humanity in Christ is not simply the interrelation of two natures 
 Torrance, Faith, 155; see Mediation, 56, 63, 66; ‘The Divine Vocation and Destiny of Israel’ in D. W 84
Torrance (ed.), The Witness of the Jews to God (Edinburgh: Handsel, 1982) 85-104, 100; Reconciliation, 
229; ‘Legacy’, 305-306.
 Torrance, Incarnation, 183.85
 Ibid., 201; Torrance, Theologian, 103-4; ‘Legacy’, 306; Conflict, 1:240.86
 Torrance, Incarnation, 201; Conflict, 1:243.87
 Torrance, Incarnation, 208.88
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(mustērion) but is the setting forth of this union into the fallen condition (prothesis) and the 
drawing of fallen humanity into participative communion with God (koinōnia).89 Each term 
of these elements holds distinct significance for the hypostatic union.
Mustērion primarily refers to God’s unity with humanity within Christ’s person. It is the 
mysteries of the kingdom of God that are revealed to have their content in Christ, the great 
‘I Am’ in revelatory union with the flesh of the Nazarene, the transcendent holiness of God 
united to the fallen flesh of humanity.90
Prothesis, in turn, firstly refers to the eternal election of God not to be without humanity. 
We can trace backwards from the incarnation to the place in eternity from which God 
elected to be unified with us within the person of His Son.91 As such, we can recognise 
that the loving reconciliation found in the hypostatic union between God and humanity in 
Christ is a love entirely consistent throughout the eternal life of God.92 However, prothesis 
is also the ‘setting forth’ of this decision into the midst of fallen humanity.93 Christ’s 
assumption of fallen nature, here, becomes a moment of revelatory redemption—God’s 
decision to be harmoniously united with His estranged creation now actualised within 
fallen humanity.94
Finally, koinōnia is, primarily, the pneumatological participation of the believer into the 
union of God and humanity within Christ.95 For Torrance, divine-human reconciliation is 
complete within the unity of Christ’s person: no further reconciliation is necessary. Yet, 
koinōnia is the believer's participation in the finished work.96 Subsequently, yet 
 Ibid., 164; T. F. Torrance, Conflict and Agreement in the Church, Volume 2: The Ministry and the 89
Sacraments of the Gospel (Oxford: OUP, 1960) 82.
 Torrance, Incarnation, 166. Still here Torrance aﬃrms the inseparability of mustērion from prothesis and 90
koinōnia, as the mystery of God in Christ can only be seen in relation to the giving of kingdom mysteries to 
the disciples and the advancement of such in apostolic teaching at the foundation of the church (ibid., 
167-168).
 Ibid., 169.91
 Torrance, Incarnation, 174.92
 Ibid.93
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inseparably, koinōnia entails the fellowship of fellow participants in the mystery of Christ. 
Thus, the setting forth (prothesis) of the divine-human union (mustērion) has social 
implications; ‘it acts critically and creatively in the midst of our life and society’.97 As the 
hypostatic union within the incarnate Christ works atonement throughout His entire 
temporal existence, it becomes in its setting forth the initial act of creating ecclesial 
community.
The “koinōnial” aspect of this mystery of Christ holds both epistemological and 
ontological implications for any atonement, which occurs since the mystery of unity 
between God and humanity is set forth into our fallen nature.
Firstly, the union of God and humanity is inserted into our knowledge. Citing Matthew 
11:25-27, Torrance contends that the “koinōnial” aspect of the divine-human union within 
Christ is the participation of the believer in the inter-Trinitarian self-knowledge.98 This is 
predominantly outworked through Christ’s teaching office, as the knowledge of divine-
human union flows from the mouth of the Son to penetrate the sinful ignorance of 
humanity. As teacher, Christ spoke against human ignorance to create a community of 
those positively respondent to this vocal revelation of divine-human unity.99
Secondly, as the union of God and humanity in Christ is set forth into our being as 
creatures estranged from their creator, the actualisation of that union in the face of sin is, 
in a very real way, atonement:
The inserting of the Oneness of God and Man into the deepest depths of man’s 
existence in his awful estrangement from God, and the enactment of it in the midst of 
 Ibid., 172.97
 Ibid., 172f.98
 Torrance, Conflict, 2:90; Incarnation, 173. The insertion of the mystery of this union causes two-way 99
division, in which humanity respond either as children, truly receptive of this divine revelation, or remain 
ignorant in supposed human “wisdom”. Israel, in part, exemplify this in their ‘reaction of resentment which 
culminated at the cross’ (ibid.). For Israel’s place in incarnational atonement as the ‘pre-history of the 
incarnation’, see Colyer, Torrance, 61-70; Chiarot, Unassumed, 23-86.
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sin in spite of all that sin can do against it, is atonement. In a profound sense 
atonement is the insertion of the hypostatic union into the very being of our estranged 
and fallen humanity.100
This insertion of the hypostatic union into our estranged being, though consistent 
throughout Christ’s life from the moment of his birth, is most explicit in His death. 
Reconciliation is wrought by the hypostatic union undergoing the strains of fallenness, 
even death itself, and remaining unbroken. Even when placed under the mortal 
punishment of divine judgement, the bond of God and humanity within Christ’s person is 
maintained, where Judge and judged are reconciled to each other.101
3.2.2 Dynamic Restatement: Uniting the “Two Ends” of the Homoousion
Torrance’s dynamic restatement of the hypostatic union continues, in the actualisation of 
the revelatory and redemptive significance of the dual consubstantiality of the 
homoousion. Where the homoousion authenticates Christ as the content of both divine 
and fallen human being and act, the elements of such authentication remain abstract from 
each other without these “two ends” being brought together in the Son’s theandric person. 
Torrance writes, ’the humanity of Christ has no revealing or saving significance for us 
apart from his deity, and his deity has not revealing or saving significance apart from his 
humanity’.102 What, then, is this revealing and saving significance?
As stated in the homoousion, for divine revelation to be comprehensible to humanity, it 
must be expressed ‘in the language and life of man’,103 that is, grounded in Christ’s fallen 
100 Torrance, Conflict, 2:90; Incarnation, 173-174; Mediation, 65.
101 Torrance, Atonement, 149. In this manner, the resurrection itself ‘means that this union did not give way 
but held under the strain imposed not only by the forces that sought to divide Jesus from God, but the 
strain imposed through the inﬂiction of the righteous judgement of the Father upon our rebellious humanity 
which Christ had made his own’ (ibid., 216).
102 Torrance, Incarnation, 191.
103 Ibid., 185; Torrance, Jesus Christ, 133-134.
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humanity. Concurrently, Christ is the content of divine self-revelation as He is Himself 
God, ‘for only through God may we know God’.104 However, what constitutes the 
incarnation as the axis of divine revelation and creaturely receptivity wherein the words of 
Jesus are the words of God is not the Son’s dual consubstantiality, but the union of these 
two concrete substances in the ‘hypostatic relation between his creaturely language and 
God’s own godly language’.105
Reconciliation, in turn, requires Christ’s authentic representation of fallen humanity, ‘for 
only as one with us would God be savingly at work within our human existence’.106 
Concurrently, reconciliation must be grounded in Christ’s divine prerogative to save; if 
Christ were merely a sinless man and not God in action then He would be ‘annihilated in 
judgement - the cross would prove a fiasco’.107 Yet, it is within the unity of this dual 
consubstantiality within Christ’s theandric person that reconciliation is actualised. 
Atonement is wrought not just in Christ’s offering ‘a perfect sacrifice to God’ as fallen 
humanity, nor even that God has ‘descended into bondage’ for our emancipation, but that 
working ‘from the side of God as God, and from the side of man as man’ the Son has 
established a ‘real and final union between God and man’.108 Torrance writes, 
The unassumed is the unhealed, but in the hypostatic union God the Son has 
sinlessly assumed our flesh of sin into oneness with himself…and so has worked 
the hypostatic union right through our alienation into the resurrection where we have 
the new humanity in perfect union with God.109
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The juridical categories of atonement in judgement and expiation of guilt are still present 
here for Torrance as achievements of Christ within the union. The expiation of guilt is not, 
however, the telos of atonement. If the ‘ultimate achievement’ of reconciliation is the union 
of God and fallen humanity, divine-human ‘at-onement’, then as this unity is ‘already being 
worked out between estranged man and God’ internally to the Son’s own theandric 
person, the hypostatic union is thus ‘the mainstay of the doctrine of atoning 
reconciliation’.110
3.2.3 Dynamic Restatement: Dyophysitical Interrelations
Torrance's dynamic restatement of the hypostatic union continues with the interrelation of 
Christ’s united natures. Taking several of the key Chalcedonian adverbs, the hypostatic 
union is to ‘undergo no confusion, no change, no division, no separation’ (inconfuse, 
immutabiliter, indivise, inseparabiliter).111 Each is restated to contextualise atonement in 
Christ’s humanity in His redemptive assumption of fallen nature. 
Torrance first details the distinctiveness of both Christ’s divine and human natures. On 
inconfuse (“without confusion”), within the unity of Christ’s theandric person, internal self-
distinction is retained as His human nature is not lost in divinity and divinity is not tainted 
by humanity. Restorative dyophysitical interrelations do not necessarily require one nature 
be swallowed by the other. However, as the humanity that Christ assumes is indeed a 
fallen humanity, inconfuse must be dynamically restated as the divine nature of Christ 
remaining untainted in its unity with the fallenness of humanity, while at the same time 
sanctifying and transforming that which it is united to. Torrance states, ‘[I]n freely uniting 
himself to our fallen nature, and in savingly taking its sin and corruption upon himself in 
 Torrance, Incarnation, 196.110
 N. P. Tanner, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils 1 (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1990) 111
86.
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order to work out our salvation, the divine nature of Christ suffered no change, but 
remained truly and fully divine’.112
On immutabiliter (“without change”), Torrance applies the non-assumptus to the 
suffering of human fallenness; that is, suffering itself is redeemed by the Son’s very 
assumption of it. Christ internalises the tortuous reality of fallenness, thereby healing the 
pain and temptation of this state, sanctifying it within Himself.  In dyophysitical unity 113
suffering is never external to the Son's hypostasis, becoming in His internal consistency an 
authentic experience for God Himself.  In full force of the communicatio idiomatum, 114
Torrance proclaims, ‘God crucified! That is the startling truth of the gospel’.  Here the 115
dialectic between the Son’s impassibility and His suffering becomes apparent. In 
redemptively assuming suffering, the Son’s constancy is never overwhelmed. Rather, in 
atoning exchange, fallen humanity comes to share in divine immutability as the Son shares 
in our passion, wherein He ‘masters and transmutes it within the embrace of his own 
immutable peace and serenity’.  Torrance writes, 116
[Christ bore] our passion, our hurt, our violence, our condition under divine 
judgement, even [our] utter dereliction, “My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken 
me?,” but in such a profoundly vicarious way that in the heart of it all, he brought his 
eternal serenity or ἀπεθεια to bear redemptively upon our passion.117
Torrance next details the unbreakable unity of Christ’s two natures. On indivise (“without 
division”) and inseparabiliter (“without separation”), Torrance restates the inseparability 
and inextricability of Christ’s two natures to contextualise atonement to the Christ’s 
 Torrance, Incarnation, 208.112
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humanity. It is not prelapsarian nor neutral humanity but fallen nature in Christ cannot be 
divided from His divinity (indivise), and it is from the continuous redemptive union across 
the entirety of His temporal existence that Christ’s divine nature cannot be separated 
from His humanity (inseparabiliter). Since these redemptive acts belong to the elements 
of the Son’s very constitution in incarnational atonement (that is, they are acts united 
within His own person), to place distance between any one point of His divine and 
human life would be to place distance within the Son’s own eternal self:
The act of the Son in humbling himself to take upon himself our humanity in the 
likeness of the flesh of sin and in the form of a servant, without of course sinning 
himself, and the act of perfect obedience of the Son to the Father in the whole course 
of his life in human nature, his whole participation in the life of God, are not two 
independent acts or events separated from one another. In all their distinctiveness, 
they are fully and finally and irrevocably united in being the acts of the one person of 
the incarnate Son of God.118
The hypostatic union, as with the homoousion, serves to actualise the atonement of the 
Son’s continuous redemptive union with fallen humanity. Where the authenticity of Christ 
as the content of revelation and reconciliation is secured in the homoousion, the hypostatic 
union renders its actualisation in the interrelations of divinity and humanity in Christ, 
providing the mechanism by which humanity might be continuously redeemed throughout 
his entire temporal existence. It is this actualisation of redemption in dyophysitical 
interrelation that refutes any dualism between Christ’s person and work, that atonement 
becomes who Christ is, not only what Christ has done.
 Torrance, Incarnation, 208.118
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3.3 An/Enhypostasia
The anhypostatic-enhypostatic couplet defines Torrance’s understanding of exactly what 
has, and has not, been assumed by the Son, and is therefore key to the non-assumptus. 
Anhypostasia, defined by Torrance, is the negative articulation that Christ’s humanity 
has no existence outside of the Son’s hypostasis; it does not exist ‘in and for itself—hence 
an-hypostasis (“not person,” i.e. no separate person)’.119 Jesus had no existence as a 
human person prior to the Son’s incarnation, and would not have existed apart from it.120 
Moreover, no persons existed within Jesus externally or independent of the hypostasis of 
the eternal Son. Torrance contends, ‘[If] there had been a human person to whom a divine 
person was added, there would have been an independent centre of personal being in 
Jesus over against the person of the Son of God’.121 Anhypostasia thus entails the Son’s 
assumption of generic fallen substance, ‘the general humanity of Jesus’,122 His universal
solidarity with common humanity. As it is humanity with no personhood apart from the Son,
anhypostasia can refer to humanity distinct from His person.
On the other hand, enhypostasia, defined by Torrance, is the positive articulation that 
Christ's human nature is given existence exclusively in the Son’s hypostasis; that is, He is 
a ‘real human person in the person of the Son’.123 The Son personalises human nature, 
giving the human person 'reality in the Person of the Son of God become man’.124 As such, 
Christ is considered a genuine human person with full human capacities in every respect, 
yet this human personhood is grounded exclusively in the hypostasis of God the 
Son.125 Enhypostasia instantiates the personal individuality of the Son’s humanity, not in 
the generic anhypostatic sense of universal solidarity with common humanity, but rather 
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the ‘particular humanity of the one man Jesus, whose person is not other than the person 
of the Son’.126
It is imperative, for Torrance, that the anhypostatic-enhypostatic couplet remain 
inseparable, in their respective correlation to both Christ’s assumption of fallen humanity, 
and His life of perfect obedience.  The couplet nuances the hypostatic union, with 127
anhypostasia ensuring the relation of divinity to humanity in Christ envelops the entire 
collective of human fallenness, and enhypostasia entailing the Son’s personal wrestling of 
the fallen human nature into perfect obedience and communion with the Father. They are 
directly correlative, Torrance writes, to both ‘the great divine act of grace in the incarnation, 
and…the dynamic personal union carried through the whole life of Christ’,  respectively. 128
As such, the anhypostasia and enhypostasia are inseparable, as both ends of the couplet 
are directly dependent on, and are conditioned by, the inseparable unity of the Son’s 
hypostasis.
Having defined our terms, this thesis now addresses the soteriological significance of 
the anhypostatic-enhypostatic couplet in relation to revelation and reconciliation, Christ’s 
sinlessness, and the ontologically generic and epistemologically personal union of God 
and fallen humanity within Christ.
3.3.1 Soteriological Significance of the Anhypostatic-Enhypostatic Couplet
The anhypostatic-enhypostatic couplet, firstly, details both the generic and personal 
actualisation of revelation and reconciliation within fallen humanity.
Torrance details both anhypostatic and enhypostatic elements of revelation. Revelation, 
as it is anhypostatic, entails divine self-communication to all humanity in Christ’s universal 
solidarity with common human nature. Yet, revelation, as it is enhypostatic, also entails 
 Torrance, Incarnation, 230; Conflict 1:242-43.126
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within it the perfect human response to itself actualised in Christ’s personal vicarious 
obedience.129
Regarding reconciliation, the anhypostatic-enhypostatic couplet necessitates that 
atonement be understood as both a genuine act of humanity, yet also a pure act of God. If 
atonement were achieved through anhypostasia in abstraction from enhypostasia, it would 
lack any concrete point of personal ontic contact to the exclusion of the Son’s individual 
instantiation of human involvement. This is neglected in the manifestation of the “Latin 
Heresy” in exclusively ransom, judiciary or satisfactory atonement, where God acts over 
and above those He seeks to redeem, conquering sin in cosmic warfare or satisfying a 
judiciary or honour-debt far beyond the incorporation of humanity in the actual redemptive 
event.  On the other hand, if atonement were achieved through enhypostasia in 130
abstraction from anhypostasia, then it would not be a pure act of God but a Pelagian act of 
salvific human assistance.  Anhypostasia secures the full inclusion of humanity in 131
reconciliation as Christ acts as a fallen human, while enhypostasia secures the authenticity 
of Christ as the personal act of the Son of God to reconcile fallen humanity to Himself. 
Secondly, the anhypostatic-enhypostatic couplet secures Christ's sinlessness within the 
depths of human fallenness. Where anhypostasia affirms Christ’s universal solidarity with 
human fallenness, yet denies Christ’s assumption of an individual human person, Christ 
can be genuinely counted amongst Adam’s postlapsarian progeny, yet at no point be a 
sinful person. In anhypostatic union, Torrance writes, the Son 'set aside that which divides 
us men from one another, our independent centres of personality…to assume that which 
unites us with one another, the possession of the same or common human nature’.132
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Concurrently, enhypostasia articulates that as Christ lives in personal perfect 
communion with the Father, the person of the eternal Son disrupts the continuity of sinful 
persons in estrangement from God. Aligning Himself with the unbroken line of fallenness, 
the Son enters the same context in which other persons would sin, in personal ‘solidarity in 
terms of the interaction of persons within our human and social life’,  yet remains 133
obedient where other persons fail to be so.
Uniting the couplet secures Christ’s full inclusion in the postlapsarian continuity of 
common human nature and the personal breaking of that sinfulness in His victorious 
condemnation of sin from within the flesh he assumed:
The doctrine of anhypostasia and enhypostasia (put together as one concept) helps us 
also to understand or express how God the Son was made in the likeness of our flesh 
of our flesh of sin, and yet was not himself a sinner; how he became one with us in the 
continuity of our Adamic and fallen existence in such a way as to make contact with us 
in the very roots of our sinning being, and yet did not himself repeat our “original sin” 
but vanquished it, and broke its continuity within our human nature. He assumed our 
corrupt and estranged humanity, but in such a way as at the same time to heal and 
sanctify in himself what he assumed.134
Thirdly, the anhypostatic-enhypostatic couplet is the ontologically generic and 
epistemologically personal union of God and fallen humanity within Christ.  The 135
inseparability of the couplet itself extends to the Son's ontic and noetic union with fallen 
humanity, as each correlate to anhypostasia and enhypostasia respectively.
 Ibid.133
 Torrance, Incarnation, 231-232. Younger Torrance denied that original sin was assumed by the Son, as 134
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Anhypostasia, in this ontologically generic union, entails the union between God and 
humanity in the depths of common fallen being. The necessity of ontic union has been 
recurrently stated, so the inseparability of anhypostasia from enhypostasia may be 
recognised here, since if there were only anhypostasia—if there were only ontic union—
there would be only redemption of human ontology. In the logic of the non-assumptus, a 
redemptive assumption of only one aspect of humanity would leave all other aspects 
unredeemed.136 
Enhypostasia, in this epistemologically personal union, entails a noetic bond—
evidenced in Christ’s temporal obedience—between God and humanity in the depths of 
fallen ignorance, included and predicated in the ontic union of God and humanity within 
Christ. It is such that reconciliation ‘was carried through [Christ’s] conscious personal 
relations as well as his union in being with God’.137 Consequential to this noetic union, 
Christ’s vicarious personal positive response to God achieves within fallen humanity the 
paradigm for doing so, thus enabling our personal positive response.138 Again, this is 
inseparable from anhypostasia, since if there were only the enhypostasia—if there were 
only noetic union—the good news of Christ would simply be ‘the clearing up of a 
misunderstanding’ in neglect of the redemptive assumption of human being.139
The  enhypostatic-anhypostatic couplet, alongside the homoousion and the hypostatic 
union, ultimately, constitute the foundation for the Son’s continuous redemptive union with 
fallen humanity, wherein atonement is wrought throughout the entirety of the incarnation. 
While each notion in itself shows Torrance’s implicit and explicit use of the non-assumptus 
throughout contextualisation of atonement to Christ’s humanity, their further soteriological 
 Torrance, Incarnation, 231. If only a union of being is required, redemption would be complete in the 136
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significance is their grounding of Christ’s redemptive obedience in vicarious humanity and 
the cross as the culmination of the continuous redemptive union.
4. Continuous Union: Actualisation in Vicarious Humanity
This thesis has detailed Torrance’s restatement of the common Christological foundations, 
serving to ground Christ’s continuous redemptive union of God and fallen humanity. To see 
this redemption actualised, however, Torrance’s doctrine of Christ's vicarious humanity is 
now discussed, detailing the soteriological significance of Christ’s perfect obedience with 
the same fallen state in which others would sin. In Christ, sin is condemned in the flesh 
where it would commonly arise, creating a paradigm of communion with the Father within 
which common humanity may participate.140
4.1 Defining “Vicarious” Humanity
For Christ’s humanity to be “vicarious”, it must be viewed within the context of the Son’s 
intervention in the expected response of humanity to divine revelation. As stated, 
revelation is not simply the outgoing Word from God, but the divine provision of human 
 The focus here is on the basic notion of Christ’s vicarious obedience. However, this is developed into 140
distinct nuances of redemption for each element of Christ’s atoning life and work. For vicarious faith see T. 
F. Torrance, ‘One Aspect of the Biblical Conception of Faith', The Expository Times 68 (1957), 111-114;
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and Scientific Thinking (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994) 31-32; Conflict, 2:78-82. For baptism: Conflict,
2:108f, 165f; Reconciliation, 84-85; Faith, 293. For Spirit reception: Reconstruction, 246-247; Incarnation,
135-136; Faith, 61f. For repentance: Atonement, 69-70; Mediation, 95-97; Royal Priesthood: A Theology of
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response where we fail to positively respond.141 Christ’s humanity is considered “vicarious” 
by Torrance, as, in providing this response, the Son acts on behalf of fallen humanity in 
‘every aspect’ of our interactions with God from within the same fallen state, ‘such as 
trusting and obeying, understanding and knowing, loving and worshipping’.142 The Son’s 
assumption of fallen humanity is central to this, as it is from within our same fallen 
humanity that the Son holistically acts in every instance of response to divine revelation 
and responds positively where we fail to do so, thereby bringing our fallen humanity into a 
communion with God which has been unattainable since Adam. On our behalf and for our 
redemption, ‘[He] shared all our experiences, overcoming our disobedience through his 
obedience and sanctifying every stage of human life, and thereby vivified and restored our 
humanity to communion with God’.143
Questions arise here as to the exclusion of genuine human involvement in this definition 
of “vicarious”. Donald Macleod criticises Torrance’s ambiguity as to whether Christ acting 
on our behalf is a matter of substitution, representation, or simply solidarity with human 
actions, as it is used in all three of these senses in different areas of his theology.144 
Macleod contends that, despite popular opinion, Torrance surely must intend “vicarious” to 
mean solidarity, since for Christ to give a vicarious response to divine revelation in either 
 Torrance, Rationality, 145. One might ask exactly how the signiﬁcance of the Son’s temporal existence 141
extends beyond His spatio-temporal boundaries in providing a human response to revelation suﬃcient for 
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an exclusively substitutionary or representative manner would be to deny our genuine 
involvement in acts of response; Christ would act instead of us, not just with us.145
However, to read Torrance’s definition of “vicarious” merely as Christ’s solidarity with us, 
so to resolve an apparent impasse of human exclusion in substitution and representation, 
does not quite grasp Torrance’s intentions to present substitution and representation as 
the obverse of each other. Habets rightly points out that Torrance surely intends to unite 
these two poles, that Christ be both our substitute and representative.  As Lee 146
comments, if we isolate Christ’s work of representation then Christ is simply a moralistic 
example of human behaviour before God, ‘this would mean that Jesus is only our leader 
representing our act of response to God’.  Correspondingly, if we isolate Christ’s work of 147
substitution then we fall into the trappings of the Latin Heresy as ‘his response would be 
“an empty transaction over our heads” with no ontological relation with us’.  Torrance 148
contends that we must embrace the concept of substitution in defining the “vicariousness” 
of Christ’s humanity but on the condition that we recognise that it is with Christ as 
representative of our fallen nature that such substitution occurs—that it is ‘as man that 
Jesus Christ takes our place’.149
Indeed, this is the significance of the homoousion: as Christ is absolutely secure in both 
divine and human nature, in the incarnation God acts from the side of humanity. So too in 
the anhypostatic-enhypostatic couplet, in the Son’s enhypostatic assumption of fallen 
human nature, atonement may remain a pure act of God while still including within it the 
Son’s genuinely personal agency as a human individual. In this sense, the Son providing 
our positive response to divine revelation is not to define “vicariousness” as substitution to 
 See K. W. Lee, Living in Union With Christ: The Practical Theology of Thomas F. Torrance (New York: 145
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the exclusion or instrumentalisation of humanity, where He acts over and above our heads, 
but the Son substituting for us as representative of our same fallen human nature. The 
“vicariousness” of Christ’s life the substitution of regular human response to revelation with 
a divinely provided human response, as the Son represents us as one genuinely 
consubstantial with fallen humanity.
4.2 Active and Passive Obedience
For Torrance, the non-assumptus truly comes to the fore within vicarious humanity in the 
Reformed formula of the active and passive obedience of Christ. By active obedience, 
Torrance contends that Christ ‘took our place in all our human activity before God the 
Father’.  In each instance within which sin would regularly arise for any other fallen 150
human, the Son actively obeys the Father in each of these moments: ‘From the very 
beginning to the very end, he maintained a perfect filial relation to the Father in which he 
yielded to him a life of utter love and faithfulness’.  In this, the Son sets the paradigmatic 151
precedent for the perfect reception of divine revelation within fallen humanity; it is, 
Torrance writes, His ‘appropriation of the Father’s word and will in our name and on our 
behalf’.152
By passive obedience, Torrance means that Christ ‘submitted to the divine judgement 
on us’.  In this, the Son willingly takes on our fallen humanity, knowing it to be cursed to 153
bear the wrath of the Father, graciously bowing to the Father’s judgement of our sin from 
the state within which it arose though He had not committed it Himself, to bear the curse 
‘in our name and on our behalf’.154
150 T. F. Torrance, ‘The Distinctive Character of the Reformed Tradition’ in C. D. Kettler and T. H. Speidell 
(eds.), Incarnational Ministry: The Presence of Christ in Church, Society, and Family (Colorado Springs: 
Helmers & Howard, 1990) 9.
151 Torrance, Reconstruction, 154; cf. Incarnation, 80.
152 Torrance, Reconstruction, 154; cf. Incarnation, 80.
153 Torrance, ‘Character’, 9.
154 Torrance, Reconstruction, 154; cf. Incarnation, 80.
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There is a necessary coherence of passive and active obedience in which atonement is 
expanded beyond the isolated event of the cross. The cross is the climactic end of passive 
obedience in which Christ accepts the judgement of human sin for Himself, while Christ’s 
active obedience is the positive conquering of sin in everyday action throughout His 
perfect temporal existence, creating a paradigm of righteousness within which we share. In 
the unity of the two, ‘justification means not simply the non-imputation of our sins through 
the pardon of Christ, but positive sharing in his divine-human righteousness’.155
The soteriological efficacy of active and passive obedience rests on the Son’s 
assumption of fallen human nature. Without the Son’s unity of divinity and fallen humanity 
within himself, there is no ontological framework for salvation; active obedience would lack 
the necessary point of contact to the fallen state to condemn the sin that arises within it 
and we would be left with simply the passive acceptance of judgement. Without the non-
assumptus, Torrance writes, ‘the active and passive obedience fall apart…[and] we are 
unable to understand justification in Christ as anything more than a merely external 
forensic non-imputation of sin’.156
It is the active and passive obedience of Christ that actualises the redemption of the 
Son’s continuous union with fallen nature. However, it is in the distinction yet inseparability 
of continuous union with the once and for all union that actual and original sin are 
redeemed by each, respectively. In the continuous union, through His active and passive 
obedience, the Son continuously accepts the Father’s judgement on His own fallenness 
and actively brings holiness to bear upon instances of sin that would arise from the fallen 
state, thereby conquering sin as it occurs in actuality. In the “once and for all” union, as the 
Son’s divine holiness sanctifies human fallenness in his initial union with it, original sin is 
redeemed:
155 Torrance, Reconstruction, 155; cf. Incarnation, 81. 
156 Torrance, Incarnation, 82; cf. Reconstruction, 156.
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If we are to think of the active and passive obedience of Christ as dealing with our actual sin 
and its penalty, we are to think of the Incarnational union of the Holy Son with our unholy 
nature as dealing with our original sin, or sanctifying our human nature, through bringing it 
into a healing and sanctifying union with his own holy nature.157
4.3 Condemnation of Sin in the Flesh
The concept of the Son’s vicarious obedience is developed in Paul’s phrase to the 
Romans, that the Son “condemns sin in the flesh” (Romans 8:3). To Torrance, it is only 
when the Son’s active obedience to the Father and passive submission to divine 
judgement is placed in the context of the Son’s assumption of fallen human nature that this 
condemnation of sin in the flesh can be said to occur.  When the Son comes to us in ‘the 158
likeness of sinful flesh’ (Rom. 8:3), this is not just a likeness of identity or a docetic 
appearance of sinful flesh, but a ‘concrete likeness of sinful flesh’;  the Son actually 159
bears our sin by assuming our same nature.
The crucial difference, however, between our “sinful flesh” and Christ’s “sinful flesh” is 
what is done in the flesh. Though completely identical with us in fallenness, still Christ 
differs from us in the perfection of His active obedience. In the most crucial of distinctions 
between us and the Son, where we sin in our flesh, Christ condemns sin in His:
[H]e was completely unlike us in that by taking our fallen human nature upon himself, he
condemned sin in it; he overcame its temptations, resisted its downward drag in alienation 
from God, and converted it back in himself to obedience toward God, thus sanctifying it… In 
 Torrance, Reconstruction, 156; Incarnation, 82.157
 Torrance, Incarnation, 63. He here cites Romans 8:3. The passive and active obedience ‘fall apart’, when 158
removed from the context of the Son’s union with fallen nature (Torrance, Reconstruction, 156).
 Torrance, Incarnation, 63. Chiarot does highlight that Torrance is in the minority of interpreters here 159
(Unassumed, 169).
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all this the Son is wholly like us, in that he became what we are, but also wholly unlike us, in 
that he resisted our sin, and lived in entire and perfect obedience to the Father.160
The condemnation of sin in the flesh by active obedience in this manner is inseparable 
from Christ bearing the judgement of God in passive obedience. Torrance, as with 
Athanasius, seeks to properly emphasise that Christ bore the judgement intrinsic to being 
made sin, became genuinely accursed for our sake, that the Son ‘bore upon himself and in 
himself for our sakes “the whole inheritance of judgement that lay against us”’.  However, 161
under the Father’s judgement, where we would be found guilty in the sin that occurs in our 
flesh, Christ is found innocent as He lives within that same flesh in perfection, bringing 
holiness to bear upon fallen humanity. The Son bears this curse ‘in such a way that 
instead of being overcome by evil he overcame it, instead of sinning in the flesh he 
condemned sin in the flesh through his self-sanctification on our behalf’.162
Beyond this, the condemnation of actual sin within the Son’s flesh by vicarious 
obedience extends to the transformation of the fallen human will into conformity with the 
Father’s. The Son grasps the human will which, by our rebellion ‘we had alienated from 
the Father in disobedience and sin’, and through perfect obedience from within that will He 
‘bent our human nature in himself into obedience to the Father’.  This condemnation of 163
sin by vicarious obedience is emotively depicted by Torrance as a battle in the flesh that all 
humans face, yet only Christ won. The agony of such a battle is seen most explicitly in 
Gethsemane. Painfully, yet victoriously, the Son conquers the waywardness of the human 
will to say “Not my will, but yours”.  Recalling the notion of prokope, Torrance contends 164
that Jesus learnt obedience perfectly, but did so in weakness and tears.  Christ ‘beat his 165
 Torrance, Incarnation, 205; cf. Incarnation, 62, 73; Faith, 161.160
 Torrance, Reconciliation, 153; cf. Mediation, 41.161
 Torrance, Reconciliation, 153; cf. Mediation, 41.162
 Torrance, Reconstruction, 126, 157.163
 See Torrance, Mediation, 79-80.164
 Torrance, Incarnation, 64; Reconstruction, 132.165
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way forward by blows’,  striking out a way from within fallen nature towards the Father.  166 167
In this agonising process, Christ learnt obedience through the trials of suffering and 
temptation.  However, despite internalising the pain of human alienation, the Son 168
wrestles the fallen will into conformity with the Father’s will. Torrance writes, ‘[H]e bent the 
will of man in perfect submission to the will of God, bowing under the divine judgement 
against our unrighteousness, and offered a perfect obedience to the Father, that we might 
be redeemed and reconciled to him’.169
Torrance’s contextualisation of atonement to Christ’s humanity rests on the Son’s 
vicarious life and work within our fallenness. His vicarious humanity must be viewed 
within the context of divine revelation that requires positive response from fallen humanity. 
In our inability to provide such response, Christ answers for us from within our same 
fallenness, not to human exclusion but in uniﬁed substitution of our failures and 
representation of our actual nature. He passively accepts the Father’s judgement in our 
place, actively condemning sin in every instance that it tempts to arise in the fallen 
humanity He assumes, thereby sanctifying fallenness on our behalf throughout His 
continuous union with our nature.

5. The Cross & Resurrection 
The cross has long been the focal point of atonement, and the centre of ransom, penal 
substitution, or satisfaction. Torrance, in contextualising atonement to Christ’s humanity, 
and expanding redemption to the entirety of the incarnation, does not seek to detract 
from that centrality. In the Son’s continuous union with fallen humanity, the cruciﬁxion and 
 Torrance, Incarnation, 64, 106.166
 Torrance, Reconstruction, 38.167
 Ibid., 132.168
 Ibid.169
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resurrection are the fulﬁlment of atonement—they are the climax of His temporal work.  170
The signiﬁcance of Christ’s humanity being fallen for incarnational atonement at the cross 
and resurrection is now discussed.

5.1 Crescendo of the Non-Assumptus 
The place of the cross within the non-assumptus is the crescendo of what has been 
building throughout the Son’s temporal existence. Indeed, our fallen nature is redeemed 
once and for all as the Son assumes it at the virgin birth, and our fallen nature is 
redeemed continuously in union with the Son as He condemns sin in the ﬂesh through a 
life of perfect obedience. That said, it is not until the Son extends His healing touch into 
the darkest part of our fallenness that this redemptive union is complete. The non-
assumptus only truly comes to fruition at the cross where the Son assumes the ﬁnal 
aspect of our fallenness, our very Godforsakenness in death. At the cross, no element of 
human fallenness is left unassumed. Obversely, the resurrection serves as a sign that 
Christ’s temporal work of assumption is complete. As nothing has been left unassumed, 
the resurrected Christ is a picture of humanity living in pure redemption, humanity for 
whom the humiliation of fallenness has been exhausted as it has been bound to Christ, 
and all that remains is pure exaltation:

That assumption of our fearful and lost condition reaches its supreme point in the cross 
where the Son freely assumes our damnation and ﬁnal judgement, freely assumes our God-
forsakenness in the Eli, Eli, lama sabachthani of death on the cross under judgement. And 
 Though Christ’s death and resurrection may be referenced distinctly, for Torrance they are theologically 170
inseparable. The cruciﬁxion and the empty tomb are not two events occurring one after another but are the 
obverse of each other—the New Testament does not present us with ‘a message of Good Friday and then 
with a message of Easter’; rather Christ’s humiliation and exaltation are entirely intertwined. As two sides of 
the same event, the cruciﬁxion is validated and made sense of by the resurrection; ‘we really discern the act 
of God in the cruciﬁxion of Christ when we penetrate through to the other side of it, and see it not only in its 
dark and terrible side, but also in its light and glorious side’ (Torrance, SpTR, 47-49; Atonement, 210-212). 
Thus, when talking of the cruciﬁxion as the climax of Christ’s work, this thesis is not referencing an event 
separate to the resurrection; nor when talking of the resurrection as the climax of Christ’s work is it 
referencing an event separate to the cruciﬁxion—it is talking of two aspects of the same climactic event.
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so he achieves our assumption into oneness with himself, and because that assumption is 
maintained even in the hell into which the Son descended, it achieves its end in the 
resurrection of man out of hell and the exaltation of man in Christ to the right hand of 
God. 
171
As the climactic peak of the non-assumptus, the cross is both a revelatory and validating 
act of the soteriological signiﬁcance of the Son’s work within our fallen humanity 
throughout the rest of the incarnation. If the cross is the perspective from the end of the 
road, from here we see where and how steps have been taken to reach this point. The 
Son’s condemnation of sin in the ﬂesh ‘takes places supremely on the cross, but the 
cross reveals what was taking place all the time in the incarnate life of the Son’. 
172
The cross, in turn, is the climax of the Son’s work of reconciliation, in mediating fallen 
humanity and God into divine-human communion. Here, the cross brings together the 
personal resistance of fallen humanity against God, and the personal resistance of God to 
sin. There is a genuine enmity from God towards humanity in the judgement of sin; in fact, 
‘sin gains part of its character as sin from the divine resistance to it’.  Christ bears this 173
divine enmity on our behalf. However, In assuming the ultimate instance of human 
fallenness in our death, Christ internalises within Himself the full force of human rebellion 
against God.  Though this mutual divine-human enmity is present throughout the 174
incarnation in God’s disdain towards sin and human rebellion to God, this relationship is 
most strained at the moment of the cross, where ‘the discontinuity between humanity and 
God was…widened to an abysmal depth’.  Thus, again, it is from the perspective of the 175
cross that the signiﬁcance of the non-assumptus within divine-human reconciliation is 
 Torrance, Atonement, 150.171
 Torrance, Incarnation, 112.172
 Torrance, Atonement, 110.173
174 That this rebellion permeates our very humanity makes the cross an excruciating event, as our 
rebellious nature is itself cruciﬁed (Torrance, Jesus Christ, 161-163).
175 Torrance, Atonement, 111; Doctrine, 158.
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seen; as fallen humanity is truly forsaken by the God against whom it rebels, it is clear 
how necessary it has been for Christ to assume this rebellious ﬂesh and reconcile our 
enmity with God on our behalf. Torrance contends,

[The] New Testament speaks of the ﬂesh of Jesus as the concrete form of our human nature 
marked by Adam’s fall, the human nature which seen from the cross is at enmity with God 
and needs to be reconciled to God…that is the amazing act of gracious condescension…
that God the Son should assume our ﬂesh…enter the situation where the Psalmist cried, Eli, 
Eli, lama sabacthani…’ 
176
Hence, the resolution of this mutual resistance is the focal point of the cross, as this 
‘essential and root personal relation’ of divine-human enmity must be reconciled.  177
Humanity must be redeemed in the depths of their fallen being so to be reconciled to God 
in this ‘onto-personal’ relation,  wherein this enmity can be settled.178 179
The place of Christ’s death and resurrection in this reconciliation is the telos of the 
Son’s work throughout the incarnation, to lift humanity from personal resistance to God—
that is, away from being isolated in sin that God is Himself resistant to—and into personal 
divine-human communion. At the cross, ‘sin’s isolation of humanity is eﬀectively 
overcome…because here we are set on a new and acutely personal relationship to God, 
that is, reconciled to God in Jesus Christ’.  The resurrection, obversely, is in itself that 180
life in Christ as second Adam—life not lived in mutual enmity with God as with the ﬁrst 
Adam, but in true divine-human communion without the relational restriction of sin. For 
Torrance, ‘Christ is the living atonement, atonement in its glorious achievement not only in 
 Torrance, Incarnation, 61.176
 Torrance, Atonement, 158.177
 Ibid., 159.178
 Ibid., 153.179
 Ibid., 166.180
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overcoming the separation of sin…but in consummating union and communion with God 
in such a way that the divine life overﬂows freely through him into mankind’. 
181
5.2 Resolving Enmity: Death and Resurrection on Theological Foundations 
If the climax of the non-assumptus is Christ’s death and resurrection, in which He fully 
lays hold of divine-human enmity to fulﬁl His mediatorial oﬃce, then the question must be 
asked: What constitutes the material content of this reconciliation? This resolution in 
Christ’s death and resurrection can be best understood in terms of our common 
Christological foundations that undergird the reconciliatory work of the incarnation as a 
whole.

5.2.1 Enhypostatic and Anhypostatic Reconciliation 
In resolving divine-human enmity, Christ gives voice to both sides of the relationship; He 
is ‘propitiation acutely personalised’ on behalf of both God and humanity.  He does not 182
do so as a third party; in the Son’s anhypostatic union with fallen humanity, the cross is a 
genuine work of God as the eternal Son Himself takes our death for His own. Yet, in 
enhypostatic union, it is also a genuine work of humanity as Christ does not go to the 
cross docetically, nor simply on behalf of humanity, but as a fallen person. The cross is a 
divine initiative translated into the genuinely human agency of the fallen man Jesus.  183
The resurrection, in turn, is also both a divine and human act. In anhypostatic union, the 
resurrection is a pure act of God raising helpless fallen humanity out of the grave. Yet, in 
enhypostatic assumption, God is operative within human nature, meaning it is divine 
initiative ‘translated into the perfection of a human act which is made to issue freely and 
 Torrance, SpTR, 55; Atonement, 217.181
 Torrance, Atonement, 69. Even at the cross, Christ is the question asked of humanity by God in the 182
provision of divine revelation and also the provision of positive human response (Reconstruction, 117-127).
 Torrance, Atonement, 76-77, 121-122, 151.183
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fully out of human nature, in which man is made to stand up before God as his beloved 
Son in whom he is well pleased’. 
184
5.2.2 Incarnational Reconciliation 
Divine-human enmity is resolved within the context of the incarnate Son’s constitution in 
the homoousion and hypostatic union. It must be remembered that reconciliation is not 
merely a legal transaction of penalty, nor a transferral of guilt and subsequent forgiveness, 
but even in the death and resurrection of Christ there is an incarnational atonement within 
the constitution of the divine-human mediator. In the homoousion and hypostatic union a 
unique framework is provided within which fallen humanity can be both Godforsaken in 
death at the cruciﬁxion and resurrected in union with the very life of God, all within Son’s 
theandric person. The cross and resurrection are the fulﬁlment of the Son’s internalised 
work:

He condescended in great humiliation to unite himself with us in our weakness…in such a 
way as to resurrect in himself our human nature in union and communion with the Father. 
The resurrection is to be regarded not only as the completion of that saving work but as 
belonging to the ontological structure of the mediator himself who stood in the gap of the 
Eli, Eli, lama sabacthani and bridged it in his own personal existence and supplied for all 
men the living way from death to life. 
185
Though the “two ends” of the Son’s consubstantiality are concretely united within His one 
hypostasis throughout the entirety of the incarnation, this is most fully seen on the cross; 
that ‘on the cross, the oneness of God and man in Christ is inserted into the midst of our 
being, into the midst of our sinful existence and history’.  Further still, at the cross this 186
 Torrance, SpTR, 56; Atonement, 218.184
 Torrance, SpTR, 49-50; Atonement, 212.185
 Torrance, Incarnation, 246.186
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union is inserted into the darkest moment of our sinful existence and history, where the 
divine-human bond in Christ is placed under the attack ‘by the forces that sought to 
divide Jesus from God’ in sin, in the broadest division of divine-human discontinuity in 
mutual enmity.  Concurrently, at the cross this union is strained by the judgement of the 187
Father in absolute condemnation of sin in the Godforsakenness of the Son within our 
fallen state.  However, on the other side of this twofold tension, the resurrection reveals 188
that the hypostatic union has withstood this struggle; that is, Christ has borne the entirety 
of the divine “no” to sin, and in His resurrection has attained on our behalf the divine 
“yes” to us in the divine ‘aﬃrmation of Jesus as Son of Man and all that he has done for 
us in our nature’. 
189
5.2.3 Passive and Active Reconciliation 
This mutual enmity is also reconciled as Christ’s death and resurrection fulﬁl Christ’s 
passive and active obedience. In passive obedience, Christ willingly accepts the Father’s 
ultimate act of judgement; as fallen humanity is deserving of death, the Son bears the 
ﬁnal consequence of the humanity in which He has come to share. In active obedience, 
the Son chooses to follow even the most diﬃcult command of the Father even to death 
on a cross, in so doing turning back the fallen human will into conformity and fulﬁlment of 
the Father’s will for us.  The resurrection, in turn, is Christ’s passive obedience in relying 190
exclusively on the Father to commission the Spirit to raise Him from the grave; despite 
being very God He refuses to raise Himself, instead restricting Himself to the 
helplessness of our fallen condition.  In active obedience, the resurrection is the sign 191
that death had no hold on the one who had condemned sin within our fallen nature to 
 Torrance, SpTR, 54; Atonement, 216.187
 Torrance, SpTR, 54; Atonement, 216.188
 Torrance, SpTR, 52; Atonement, 214-215.189
 Torrance, Atonement, 154; Incarnation, 111.190
 Torrance, SpTR, 50-52; Atonement, 214.191
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such an extent that, when he took the death worthy of such fallenness, fallen humanity 
was so redeemed that no sin was found to keep him in the grave.192 
6. Summary
This chapter has served to detail Torrance’s framework for contextualising atonement to 
Christ’s humanity, the signiﬁcance of doing so for the unassumed is unhealed, and the 
soteriological role of the Son’s assumption of fallen human nature. It has been 
demonstrated that Christ’s fallenness is not an abstract assertion but is properly set 
within a soteriological context, where, against the instrumental role of Christ’s humanity in 
the “Latin Heresy”, fallen humanity is assumed to be healed internally in an essentially 
redemptive divine-human bond. In such incarnational atonement, fallen humanity is thus 
redeemed in the Son’s “once and for all” union with our nature at the virgin birth, and 
concurrently throughout the incarnation in His continuous union. This contextualisation of 
atonement to Christ’s humanity is grounded in Torrance’s restatement of the common 
Christological foundations of the homoousion, hypostatic union and anhypostatic-
enhypostatic couplet, therein actualised in Christ’s vicarious life of perfect obedience, and 
fulﬁlled at His death and resurrection. The next chapter explores some common criticisms 
and defences of the Son’s assumption of fallen humanity in the contemporary debate.
 Torrance, SpTR, 53; Atonement, 216.192
 47
Chapter 2: Criticisms & Defences of the Son’s Assumption of Fallen Human Nature 
Much of what has hindered discussion of whether Christ assumed a fallen human nature 
is a basic ambiguity in terms. Torrance has fallen foul of this, with Chiarot not unfairly 
criticising his ‘lack of a crisp deﬁnition of "fallen human nature”’.193 While such 
ambiguity stands, this makes any aﬃrmation of one side or the other a fruitless exercise. 
Kelly Kapic writes, 
[The] issues at hand are less clear than sometimes acknowledged, requiring more than 
simply an aﬃrmation of whether the Son assumes a fallen or unfallen nature. Given the lack 
of clear and agreed deﬁnitions, claiming one position or the other does not actually convey 
much of theological substance. 
194
Beyond this ambiguity, there are several other dogmatic concerns in Christ assuming a 
fallen human nature that must be addressed. In this chapter, these concerns will be 
addressed, and by doing so clear terminology will be established to resolve this 
ambiguity, in the hope of progressing much of what is constructive of Torrance’s 
framework while perhaps leaving behind some level of ambiguity.

1. Defining Fallenness
All orthodox Christianity would maintain that Christ is utterly sinless, but, what is less
clear of proponents of Christ being fallen, is what this fallenness actually entails. To
deﬁne fallenness with clarity, the following must be established: (i) whether fallenness is
 Chiarot, Unassumed, 199.193
 K. M. Kapic, ‘The Son’s Assumption of a Human Nature: A Call for Clarity’, IJST 3 (2001), 154-166, 194
163-164.
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an essential or contingent property of human nature, and, (ii) whether fallenness can be 
deﬁned apart from sinfulness.195 
1.1 Essential and Contingent Anthropological Properties 
Crisp recognises that, traditionally, humanity has been said to hold essential and 
contingent properties. Contingent properties may change while the deﬁnition of a human 
being remains the same. For example, one may lose an arm, and remain the same 
person.196 As, in Adam, there has been one individual existing prior to fallenness without 
the very constitution of his humanity being compromised;197 fallenness is merely a 
contingent rather than constitutive or essential property.198 As with Anselm, ‘neither 
corruptibility or incorruptibility…belongs to the integrity of human nature’.199 
McFarland accepts this premise, that postlapsarian humanity is damaged, but 
damage is consequential not constitutive of that nature. Thus, contra Torrance, it is not 
necessarily a requirement that these contingent properties or eﬀects be assumed in order 
to be redeemed.200 However, it is possible, McFarland suggests, that the Son assume 
contingent fallenness, not by necessity, but by free choice. As Aquinas contends that God 
saw it ﬁtting rather than necessary to save by means of Christ’s Passion,201 could the 
same not be said for extending atonement to the Son’s redemptive union with fallen 
humanity?202 That fallenness is a contingent property does not disqualify it from such 
 O. D. Crisp, Divinity and Humanity (Cambridge: CUP, 2007), 114. Kapic also contends that ‘To speak of 195
fallen man is to speak of man the sinner…To try and separate these two can be perceived as artiﬁcial, 
leading only to further debate’ (Kapic, ‘Assumption’, 163). This does not necessarily mean that Christ’s 
assumption fallenness is completely inconceivable, but this conceptual unity requires us to speak of His 
redemption of sin whenever we talk of His redemption of fallenness.
 Crisp, Divinity, 94.196
 R. L. Stamps, “Thy Will Be Done”: A Dogmatic Defence of Dyothelitism in Light of Recent Monothelite 197
Proposals (PhD Thesis, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 2014) 169.
 Crisp, Divinity, 95.198
 Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, 2.11 (tr. S. N. Deane; Fort Worth: RDMc Publishing, 2005).199
 I. A. McFarland, ‘Fallen or Unfallen? Christ’s Human Nature and the Ontology of Human Sinfulness’, 200
IJST 10 (2008), 399-415, 406.
 Aquinas, Summa., 3.1.2, 3.46.1-4.201
 McFarland, 'Fallen', 407.202
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assumption; rather, it is included in the free decision of God in His self-deﬁnition as 
Redeemer. 
1.2 Defining Fallenness Apart From Sin: Original Corruption 
In deﬁning fallenness apart from sin, though fallenness advocates deny Christ committed 
actual sin, what is less clear is Christ’s assumption of original sin.  Taking the Classical-203
Reformed distinction within original sin between original guilt and original corruption,  204
Crisp recognises that this distinction is largely used when deﬁning fallenness to qualify 
Christ being fallen while remaining sinless; that is, that Christ may hold ‘a propensity or 
proneness to actual sin, [which] is not the same as actual sin’.  The Son assumes our 205
corruption, but does not accrue guilt for personal transgression.  However, for Crisp, 206
Christ assuming fallenness—even with this distinction of guilt and corruption—is 
untenable.

Speaking hypothetically, Crisp provides two options of fallenness as either a ‘strong 
original corruption’ where Christ will inevitability sin (non posse non peccare) ‘unless 
prevented from doing so by divine intervention’, which Crisp perceives to contradict that 
 As cited, Torrance rejected Christ’s assumption of original sin in his earlier work only to claim the 203
opposite in his mature theology. Macleod perceives of Edward Irving that original sin is a central tenet to his 
deﬁnition of fallenness, that his mechanism of atonement ‘requires that original sin be ascribed to Christ; for 
original sin is a vice of fallen human nature; and the doctrine that our Lord’s human nature was fallen 
means, if it means anything, that it was tainted with original sin’ (D. Macleod, The Person of Christ 
[Leicester: IVP, 1998], 228-229). Much to the further ambiguity of terms in this debate, common orthodoxy 
lacks any consensus in deﬁning original sin; see R. Sturch, The Word and the Christ: An Essay in Analytic 
Christology (Oxford: OUP, 1991) 262.
 Here some nuances must be recognised of fallenness theologians. Torrance, answering the “Latin 204
Heresy”, more commonly cites Eastern Fathers, for whom the fall was ‘not at all a juridical matter’ (J. 
Romanides, The Ancestral Sin [Ridgewood: Zephyr, 2008] 112; cf. G. Bray, ‘Original Sin in Patristic 
Thought’, Churchman 108 [1994], 37-47). The need to defend the fallenness view in juridical categories is 
certainly less signiﬁcant for the Orthodox and those following the Eastern Fathers; see C. N. Tsirpanlis, 
Introduction to Eastern Patristic Thought and Orthodox Theology (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1991) 
52; J. Meyendorﬀ, Byzantine Theology: Historical Trends and Doctrinal Themes (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 1974) 133. Guilt, however, should still be addressed, unless one would disregard the West 
entirely; Torrance still includes some element of inherited guilt and other signiﬁcant fallenness theologians 
such as Barth still articulate atonement in forensic categories; see Torrance, 'Heresy', 477; B. L. 
McCormack, ‘For Us and Our Salvation: Incarnation and Atonement in the Reformed Tradition’, Studies in 
Reformed Theology and History 1, (1993), 281-316, 307; Barth CD IV/1, 274. 
 Crisp, Divinity, 97. 205
 Ibid., 106.206
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Christ’s sinlessness is intrinsic to His humanity (Heb. 4:15).207 Alternatively, fallenness is a 
‘weak original corruption’, in which Christ may only potentially sin (posse non peccare), 
yet is prevented from doing so by either His own divinity or pneumatological 
intervention.208

However, for Crisp, even this weak corruption would render the Son sinful. Even the 
mere propensity to sin is morally reprehensible to God, a genuine ‘deformity of soul’, and 
for the Son to unite Himself to such without marring Himself in sin would be 
‘metaphysically impossible’.209 Stamps asks, ‘[H]ow could a human being in this state not 
be condemnable in the eyes of a holy God?’210 The Westminster Confession declares that 
even our corruption must be ‘pardoned’ in Christ, as ‘both itself, and all the motions 
thereof, are truly and properly sin’.211 

To Crisp, since this corruption alone is suﬃcient for our condemnation, even without 
actual sin or original guilt, the only way in which fallenness advocates can proceed is to 
abandon Chalcedonian Christology, so that corruption is attributed to some Nestorian 
second subject, not the Son Himself.212 Bearing this corruption, the Son could not be 
impeccable as historical orthodoxy would have it and His divinity would be tainted by 
sin.213

This said, even if Christ could be originally corrupt while sinless, any conceptual 
separation of original corruption from original guilt and actual sin can never be more than 
hypothetical. Much of Reformed Scholasticism has asserted that Adam’s guilt is imputed 
to his descendants as a result of his sin; as a matter of cause and eﬀect, sinfulness and 
 Crisp, Divinity, 95–96, 109–110.207
 Ibid., 111, cf. 96; O. D. Crisp, God Incarnate: Explorations in Christology (London: T&T Clark, 2009) 122–208
136.
 Crisp, Divinity, 112. For an extended treatment, see ibid., 109–16.209
 Stamps, Will, 170.210
 Westminster Assembly of Divines, Westminster Confession of Faith, 6.5 (London: Longman & Company, 211
1863).
 Crisp, Divinity, 113-114; Stamps, Will, 170; Chiarot, Unassumed, 162, 220.212
 Stamps, Will, 170.213
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corruption cannot be separated.214 As such, Crisp denies that fallenness may be 
considered apart from sinfulness, as this is not how fallenness has been ‘traditionally 
understood’.215 
The imputation of guilt, however, is not without its logical or moral issues. It is these 
that shall now be explored, before addressing these criticisms more extensively. 
1.3 Defining Fallenness Apart From Sin: The Logical Conundrum of Guilt 
For much of Classical theology, original guilt was transferred biologically from Adam to his 
progeny, whereas the Reformed tradition brought the distinction of imputation from Adam 
to each individual.216 In either sense, logical and moral questions arise as to exactly how 
and why this guilt is to be transferred, questions answered with ambiguity in the tradition. 
Just as in Reformed theology, the mediation or imputation of guilt has been presented by 
Hodge as simply the obligation to satisfy punishment (reatus poenae),217 whereas Murray 
contends that such reatus must be consequential of (and grounded in) prior personal 
‘involvement in the culpa of Adam’s transgression’.218 
Logically, it is problematic to ascribe guilt to someone who has not committed a 
crime. The punishment of a crime may be borne by a substitute, but the substitute can 
never be said to have been guilty of committing a crime. Wainright asserts, 
[L]iability must be distinguished from guilt. Although it is sometimes reasonable to hold a
person liable for the deeds of another, our legal and moral practice provides no situation in
which a person can reasonably be judged guilty of another's oﬀence...Thus, even though
 Crisp, Divinity, 99-104, 107–108; cf. Kapic, ‘Assumption’, 160-163.214
 Crisp, Divinity, 93.215
 L. S. Chafer, Systematic Theology, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids: Kregel Publications, 1993) 315.216
  C. Hodge, Systematic Theology, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1970) 194, cf. 149-256.217
 J. Murray, The Imputation of Adam's Sin (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1959) 84.218
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liability can be transferred from one person to another, guilt cannot. Adam's posterity cannot 
be guilty of Adam's fault unless Adam's act is somehow literally their own. 
219
Edwards, confronted with this problem of alien guilt, described it as '[t]hat Great 
Objection against the Imputation of Adam’s Sin to his Posterity considered, that such 
imputation is unjust and unreasonable, inasmuch as Adam and his Posterity are not one 
and the same’.  Against such an objection, Edwards sought to resolve these issues of 220
imputation by way of our solidarity with Adam. 

Firstly, even though a sinner may be distinct from Adam as the root of sin, they are still 
held accountable to the same ‘law of nature’ for which God has created both. Just as a 
fully-grown tree is distinct yet one with the sprout from which it grew, there is 
development yet continuity between Adam and his progeny, by which we are considered 
distinct yet one in guilt.  
221
Secondly, guilt is transferrable to Adam’s progeny by our personal ‘participation in 
Adam’s ﬁrst sin’.  Our propensity for sin in inherited corruption of nature cannot be 222
isolated from any actual sin that follows, thus our bearing Adam’s guilt is not simply the 
inheritance of our nature but the consequence of our ‘consent and concurrence’ of his sin 
in our own sinful acts.  There is a ‘co-existence’ between Adam’s corruption and our 223
own, where, with Adam, our sin is antecedent and ‘the charge of guilt consequent’.  The 224
imputation of original guilt is earned through our primal participation in Adam’s sin.

This, however, still leaves the intrinsic moral status of fallen nature ambiguous. Though 
Edwards insists that the imputation of guilt through our sharing in the same substance of 
Adam is inseparable from imputation by our personal consent to his sin, there is certainly 
 W. Wainright, ‘Original Sin’, in T. V. Morris (ed.), Philosophy and the Christian Faith (Notre Dame: 219
University of Notre Dame Press, 1988) 31-60, 47.
 J. Edwards, The Works of Jonathan Edwards, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1974) 220.220
 Ibid., 222.221
 Ibid., 221.	222
 Ibid.223
 Edwards, Works, 221.224
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a logical distinction here, a distinction generally utilised to substantiate sinful acts—that 
actual sin is the inevitable consequence of corrupt nature. This may be true of our 
common humanity, that a corrupt nature inevitably actualises consent to Adam’s ﬁrst sin, 
but such distinction (all the while maintaining inseparability) of being and act begs the 
question: Would one still be rendered guilty if that actualisation were not so inevitable, as 
Torrance suggests, by the Son’s anhypostatic solidarity with Adamic corruption and 
concurrent enhypostatic setting aside of sinful centres of personality? If our corrupt 
nature is only considered morally reprehensible when considered in union with our 
concurrence of Adam’s sin, would it not be possible that Christ may assume our corrupt 
nature, and yet, without such concurrence, be without guilt? More work must be done to 
consider how (or whether) guilt is attributed to Christ’s nature in such a way.

1.4 Defining Fallenness Apart From Sin: Attributes of Nature and Person 
Deﬁning fallenness apart from sinfulness is certainly a signiﬁcant conceptual hurdle for 
Christ assuming a fallen human nature. Of particular note is (i) the apparent intrinsic moral 
reprehensibility of corruption that constitutes most working deﬁnitions of fallenness, 
which requires fallenness to be attributed to a Nestorian second subject, and (ii) the 
logical conundrum of the transferral of guilt. We shall seek to resolve these issues, and 
more broadly bring further clarity to “fallen human nature”, by deﬁning “nature” and 
“person”, and how fallenness and sin relate to such categories.
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1.4.1 Defining Nature and Person 
The distinction between nature and person is, again, historically ambiguous.  “Nature”, 225
or ousia, has generally been described as a “concrete” or an “abstract”.  The concrete 226
nature is described by Plantinga as ‘a creature with will and intellect’.  Crisp contends 227
that the Son assumes this ‘concrete particular’ in either two or three parts distinct from 
His own divine nature, ‘perhaps a human body, but, traditionally, a human body and 
human soul distinct from the Word’.  Conversely, an abstract human nature is ‘a 228
property…necessary and suﬃcient for being a human being’.  A set of attributes or 229
qualities conceptually abstracted from a speciﬁc individual holding these properties.

In either sense, this variety signiﬁes a (generally Western) dualism that Torrance was 
persistently critical of, dividing nature unnecessarily.  Following Athanasius and Cyril of 230
Alexandria, he was keen to ensure that the Alexandrian physis (in distinction to the 
Antiochene natura) be understood as the whole reality of human substance. For Cyril, 
Christ had ‘one nature’; that is, the divine-human union within His theandric person 
constituted one singularity rather than a ‘schizoid being’ of two separate realities.  For 231
 That Chalcedon proclaims Christ’s one person and two natures, while failing to clearly deﬁne these 225
terms, is perhaps its greatest grievance; cf. O. D. Crisp, Christology, Ancient and Modern: Explorations in 
Constructive Dogmatics (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2013) 27.
 Against the inﬂuence of naturalism on deﬁning nature, Alan Torrance highlights the naturalists’ failure, in 226
exclusively deﬁning nature by direct experience of the natural order, to explain positive morality and the lack 
of explanatory power in the broader philosophical framework. With theistic evolutionists’ rebuttals to 
naturalism having continued with phenomenological emphases, the categories to distinguish between 
humanity as an object of positive divine will and dysfunctional (fallen) beings have been found wanting. He 
rightly appeals to a Christological, and thereby eschatological approach, which deﬁnes human nature solely 
by relation to the purposes of the Creator within the order of initial creation and ongoing (moving towards 
ﬁnal) restoration. See A. J. Torrance, ‘Is There a Distinctive Human Nature? Approaching the Question From 
a Christian Epistemic Base’, Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 47 (2012), 903-917.
 A. Plantinga, ‘On Heresy’, Faith and Philosophy 16 (1999), 182-193, 184.227
 Crisp, Divinity, 41.228
 Plantinga, ‘Heresy’, 183, cf. Crisp, Divinity, 41.229
 Torrance, Ground, 127; E. Gergis, ‘T. F. Torrance and the Christological Realism of the Coptic Orthodox 230
Church of Alexandria’ in M. Baker and T. Speidell (eds.), T. F. Torrance and Eastern Orthodoxy: Theology in 
Reconciliation (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2015) 267-285, 271-272.
 Torrance, Ground, 61. This unitary deﬁnition of “nature”, encompassing divinity and humanity as a 231
singular reality in the unity of Christ’s theandric person, was continued by John Philoponos in the Arbiter, 
and greatly inﬂuenced Torrance (Gergis, ‘Torrance’, 276ﬀ); cf. U. M. Lang, John Philoponos and the 
Controversies over Chalcedon in the Sixth Century: A Study and Translation of the Arbiter (Leuven: Peeters, 
2001) 48.
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Athanasius, Torrance claims physis to be essentially synonymous with aletheia, so to 
speak of an object’s nature is to speak of the true reality of it.  In his own words, 
232
[T]o know and understand something involves a way of thinking strictly in
accordance with what it actually is, that is, in accordance with its nature…and thus
in accordance with what it really is, or in accordance with its reality…and allow its
nature…or reality…to determine for us how we are to think and speak appropriately
of it’.233
Nature is still referred to with some element of substantialism, as a material that the Son 
can “take on” into union with Himself, but what is taken on? Rather than a concrete 
individual or a set of properties, Christ aligns Himself with the true reality of humanity. 
234
“Person”, when initially employed in Patristic discourse to clarify the Trinity and the 
incarnation, was somewhat distorted between philosophical and theological usage.  235
The Classical understanding of person was largely shaped by Boethius as ‘the individual 
substance of a rational nature’.  The concept developed most signiﬁcantly through 236
naturalist-epistemology with Descartes, through Locke to Hume, as an agent possessing 
(i) continuous consciousness and (ii) the capacity to develop and act upon perceptions of
232 Torrance, Meaning, 211.
233 Torrance, Frame, 100. The nature of an object holds its own inherent rationality and thus must determine 
its own manner of examination (Torrance, Rationality, 89). No pre-determined rational structure may be 
imposed onto a particular object without marring our knowledge of it (Torrance, Science, 71-72).
234 Torrance’s teacher, H. R. Mackintosh, explicitly denied substantialist understandings of “nature”, instead 
describing divinity and humanity as ‘two aspects of a single concrete life’ (The Doctrine of the Person of 
Jesus Christ [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1913] 295); cf. ibid., 213-215, 288-303.
235 See J. Marenbon, Boethius (Oxford: OUP, 2003) 71; T. Williams and J. Bengtsson, ‘Personalism’, 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy website (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/personalism; accessed 1st 
July 2018).
236 Boethius, OS, 5.3; cf. Marenbon, Boethius, 71. Augustine recognised that the Greeks used the term 
“essence” to denote ousia and “substance” for hypostasis and so described the Trinity as 'one essence, 
three substances'. Given the common Latin synonymity of substance with essence, however, Augustine 
utilised “person” in place, to say ‘one essence or substance and three persons’ (Trin., 5. 8.9-9.10). Despite 
signiﬁcant developments since the ﬁfth century, many parallels have been maintained in the twenty-ﬁrst 
century; see G. O’Collins, Incarnation (London: Continuum, 2002) 73. Although “substance” has also varied 
in philosophical and theological usage, this Augustinian synonymity of substance with essence has been 
employed elsewhere in this thesis to refer to the human nature as a material assumed by Christ.
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the world.  However, deﬁning personhood by such ‘performance criterion’ can be 237
problematic,  with relationality-centred models forming the largest sustained theological 238
criticism in the latter half of last century for deﬁning the individual in isolation from its 
dynamic relation to other existents.  However, personhood cannot be constituted 239
entirely by relationality,  as some level of pre-relational ontology must explain 'what it is 240
about persons that enable them to have such relationships which no other thing is able to 
  C. Taylor, ‘The Concept of a Person’, Philosophical Papers 1 (1985), 97-114.237
 Taylor, ‘Concept’, 98-102. Socio-ethically, deﬁning personhood qualitatively by the autonomy of 238
performance leads to the exclusion of those incapable of matching the criteria; the mentally disabled, for 
example. See S. Patterson, ‘Disability and the Theology of 4-D Personhood’ in A. Picard and M. Habets 
(eds.), Theology and the Experience of Disability: Interdisciplinary Perspectives From Voices Down Under 
(London: Routledge, 2016) 9-20; I. A. McFarland, ‘Personhood and the Problem of the Other’, SJT 54 
(2009), 204-220.
 A. J. Torrance, ‘What is a Person?’ in M. Jeeves (ed.), From Cells to Souls (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2004) 239
199-222, 199-211. Zizioulas has taken this to perhaps its furthest extent, claiming that ‘the substance of
God, “God", has no ontological content, no true being, apart from communion’, and that ‘it is communion
which makes beings “be”; nothing exists without it, not even God’ (J. D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion:
Studies in Personhood and the Church [Crestwood: St Vladimir’s Theological Seminary Press, 1985] 17).
Notable within the extended corpus is Zizioulas, Being, 27-122; ‘Human Capacity and Human Incapacity: A
Theological Exploration of Personhood’, SJT 28 (1975), 401-447; Communion and Otherness: Further
Studies in Personhood and the Church (London: T&T Clark, 2006) 99-177; J. Moltmann, The Trinity and the
Kingdom of God: The Doctrine of God (London: SCM, 1981) 148-150;  C. Gunton, The One, The Three and
the Many: God, Creation and the Culture of Modernity (Cambridge: CUP, 1993) 214-231; ‘Trinity, Ontology
and Anthropology’ in C. Schwöbel and C. Gunton (eds.), Persons: Divine and Human (Edinburgh: T&T Clark,
1991) 47-64; A. J. Torrance, Persons in Communion: Trinitarian Participation and Human Description
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996) 213-306; S. J. Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self (London: John
Knox, 2001) 23-57.
 Though the accounts cited of this relational-personhood have signiﬁcant value, the Social-Trinitarianism 240
from which many of them are birthed has come under ﬁre of late, with doubts as to the legitimacy of 
Patristic engagement; namely, that the triplicity of divine personhood is the primordial ontology of the 
Godhead, not an extension of a singular divine substance. It should therefore be considered the primary 
constitutive factor of the Trinity itself and, subsequently, the starting point of Trinitarian theology. Such 
‘divine community’ or an ‘ontology of persons in relationship’ has been said to be ‘a simple departure 
from…the uniﬁed witness of the entire theological tradition’ (S. R. Holmes, The Quest For The Trinity 
[Downers Grove: IVP, 2012], 195). Cf. S. Coakley, ‘“Persons” in the “Social” Doctrine of the Trinity: A 
Critique of Current Analytic Discussion’ in S. T. Davis, D. Kendall, and G. O’Collins (eds.), The Trinity: An 
Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Doctrine of the Trinity (Oxford: OUP, 1999) 123−44; K. Kilby, 
‘Perichoresis and Projection: Problems with Social Doctrines of the Trinity’, New Blackfriars 81 (2000), 
432-445; L. Turcescu, ‘“Person” vs “Individual” and other Modern Misreadings of Gregory of Nyssa’,
Modern Theology 18 (2002), 527-539; M. C., Rea, 'Relative Identity and the Doctrine of the Trinity’,
Philosophia Christi 5 (2003), 431-445. Moreover, whether person-language can be used to describe the
intra-Trinitarian life with such certainty has also been called into question. Though, as mentioned, Augustine
employed the term person, he only did so to maintain the basic unity and distinction of the Godhead to
combat heresy; see L. Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity (Cambridge: CUP, 2010) 217-221; Nicaea and Its
Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: OUP, 2004) 357-358. One cannot
extend too far beyond “person" as the best oﬀering from our poverty of human language for divine triplicity,
employed ‘not in order to give a complete explanation by means of it but in order that we might not be
obliged to remain silent’ (Augustine, Trin., 5.9.10).
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have’.241 Philosophical emphases on personhood have shifted towards deﬁnitions of 
“subjects”, individuals with personal agency, free operation encompassing attributes such 
as morality, rationality and relationality.242 This is not far from the Eastern deﬁnition of 
hypostasis inﬂuential to much of Torrance’s work. For Gregory of Nyssa, where ousia 
essentially operates as a common noun describing generic human nature,243 hypostasis is 
the proper noun denoting the individual within that commonality. However, this is not to 
place our twenty-ﬁrst century understanding onto Gregory, where the proper noun 
describes the individual simpliciter, but rather the qualities and attributes that set the 
individual apart from others sharing the common nature.244 Although there may be some 
overlap of qualities between individuals, some level of uniqueness is inevitable in the 
nuances of each person, so ‘the deﬁnition by which each is known will no longer tally in 
all particulars with the deﬁnition of another’.245 Thus Gregory writes, ‘[This] is the 
hypostasis: not the indeﬁnite notion of the substance, which ﬁnds no instantiation 
because of the commonality of what is signiﬁed, but that conception which through the 
241 A. Loke, 'On the An-Enhypostasia Distinction and Three-Part Concrete-Nature Christology: The Divine 
Preconscious Model’, Journal of Analytic Theology 2 (2014), 101-116, 105.
242 Williams and Bengtsson, ‘Personalism’. For some, it is precisely this “free will” of agency, operative 
through attributes, that is constitutive of personhood; see H. G. Frankfurt, ‘Freedom of the Will and the 
Concept of a Person', The Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971), 5-20, 5-7. The socio-ethical implications are 
resolved here, as one is an agent by holding the mere potential to operate these traits, thus status as a 
person is not withheld to those who lack the capacity to match a speciﬁc criterion (G. J. DeWeese, ‘One 
Person, Two Natures: Two Metaphysical Models of the Incarnation’ in F. Sanders and K. Issler [eds.], Jesus 
in Trinitarian Perspective [Nashville: B&H Academic, 2007] 114-155, 139-140.
243 ‘The commonality of what is signiﬁed extends alike to all ranked under the same name, and requires 
some further distinction if we are to understand not “man" in general, but Peter or John’ (Gregory of Nyssa, 
Ep. 35 in A. M. Silvas, Gregory of Nyssa: The Letters, Introduction, Commentary and Translation [Leiden: 
Brill, 2007] 247-259, 2a).
244 Ibid., 2c.
245 Ibid.
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manifest individualities gives stability and circumscription in a certain object to the 
common and uncircumscribed’.246 
Torrance forms this instantiation of the individual more broadly, where the common 
ousia is “personalised” within individual hypostasis. Nature is given life by person, the true 
reality of humanity animated by the individual agent. Torrance deﬁnes this by what Christ 
has achieved with our humanity, where Christ is ‘personalising person’.247 In the case of 
fallen humanity, our nature has been depersonalised—that is, disconnected—in 
‘estrangement from the personalising source of our being’.248 Taking this humanity into 
union with Himself, Christ personalises this depersonalised nature within His own 
hypostasis where our hypostases have failed to do so, not in a way that human persons 
are overwhelmed or overcome, but healed and restored in relationship to His own 
person.249 
 Ibid., 3b. Behr summarises this nuance—that for Gregory, ‘[a] term such as “man” can be applied to 246
many objects and, therefore, denotes the common nature that they share. But the common element is an 
abstraction, indicating something general, an “indeﬁnite concept.” This common element, the nature or the 
essence does not exist by itself; it is not a thing (πρᾶγμα), an entity, that actually exists. Nature or essence 
only subsists in particular entities denoted by particular names. Thus, the common element needs to be 
further delimited if it is to be “given-standing” as a subsisting being, if, that is, we are to understand not 
simply “man in general,” but speciﬁcally Peter or Paul. A term such as “man” indicates what kind of being 
something is, the ousia, while a particular name denotes a concrete, speciﬁc object (“thing,” πρᾶγμα), 
the ousia subsisting in a particular manner, delimited and denoted by the hypostasis. The term hypostasis, 
therefore, for Gregory, refers not so much to the particular entity itself (for which, at least in the created 
realm, he uses πρᾶγμα), but the particularizing properties by which it is made known’ (J. Behr, The 
Formation of Christian Theology: Volume 2, The Nicene Faith, Part 2: One of the Holy Trinity [Crestwell: St 
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2004] 467). Πρᾶγμα (pragma) is commonly understood to denote a created 
object, a “thing”.
 Torrance, Mediation, 67. In this element of deﬁning fallenness, Western and Eastern theology can be 247
diﬀerentiated into two strands, each loosely attributed to Augustine and Maximus the Confessor. The 
Augustinian strand contends that prelapsarian humanity held a natural orientation towards God, which was 
simply lost at the fall. For those following Maximus, this positive propensity remains even in postlapsarian 
humanity, but each individual hypostasis is disconnected from such, or in Torrance’s term “depersonalised”, 
thus loses the capacity to naturally choose God. See R. King, ‘Assumption, Union and Sanctiﬁcation: Some 
Clarifying Distinctions’, IJST 19 (2017), 53-72, 55. For more on these two strands, see I. A. McFarland, In 
Adam’s Fall: A Meditation on the Christian Doctrine of Original Sin (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010) 61-140; 
‘“Naturally and by Grace”: Maximus the Confessor on the Operation of the Will’, SJT 58 (2005), 410-433; P. 
Blowers, ‘Maximus the Confessor and John of Damascus on Gnomic Will (γνώμη) in Christ: Clarity and 
Ambiguity’, Union Seminary Quarterly Review 63 (2012), 44-50.
 Torrance, Mediation, 68-69.248
 Ibid., 68; Torrance, Trinitarian, 230; ‘The First-Born of All Creation’, Life and Work (1976), 12-14, 14; ‘The 249
Goodness and Dignity of Man in the Christian Tradition’, Modern Theology 4 (1988), 309-322, 318; ‘The 
Soul and Person in Theological Perspective’ in S. R. Sutherland (ed.), Religion, Reason and the Self: Essays 
in Honour of Hywel D. Lewis (Cardiﬀ: Cardiﬀ University Press, 1989) 103-118, 116; ‘Predestination’, 117, 
123-125; Christian Theology and Scientific Culture (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 1980) 70-71.
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1.4.2 Fallen Natures, Sinful Persons 
These categories of nature and person will provide a useful framework within which to 
deﬁne fallenness apart from sinfulness, as each relates to fallenness and sinfulness 
respectively.

Concerning the place of the will within human nature, Ian McFarland diﬀerentiates the 
renewal of physical damage to nature (tiredness, hunger etc.) through bodily resurrection 
with the redemption of the will, which occurs solely in the deiﬁcation of its mode of 
operation; that is, its restoration to operating within divine-human relationship. To 
McFarland, this diﬀerence highlights the will as the peculiar element of human nature that 
renders within it an element of ‘indeterminacy’,  not in that we have the capacity to 250
determine our own natures in the power of personal willing—the will exercises our 
desires, and humanity cannot determine its desires—but that ‘[the will] identiﬁes the fact 
that we live out of our nature as agents’.  In other words, a human being is a who as 251
opposed to merely a what—“nature” is indeterminate in the sense that in isolation from 
“person” it is proven insuﬃcient to fully deﬁne humanity. The will, though a created part of 
what we are, makes manifest that who we are as personal agents is integral to the 
determination of human being.  Thus, as we will to sin, we manifest in our personal 252
agency who we are—that is, sinners. 

Sin, therefore, cannot be attributed to nature. Through the will, it is made manifest 
within our nature that sin is an operation of agency, thus responsibility for it must lie in this 
hypostasis, and its redemption in the restoration (that accompanies bodily resurrection) of 
divine-human relationship. McFarland writes,

 McFarland, 'Fallen', 410.250
 Ibid.251
 This who/what distinction is borrowed from S. Jones, ‘What’s Wrong With Us?’ in W. C. Placher (ed.), 252
Essentials of Christian Theology (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003) 141-157, 149.
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[T]he reason that human beings sin is that their desires are perverse. But when it
comes to explaining why those desires are perverse, the only answer that can be
given is, “because we are sinners"…the will is the feature of my nature that, as the
place where my status as an agent is revealed, discloses a limit to my ability to
account for my being solely in terms of my whatness.253
It could be that original sin accounts for why our desires are perverse, that our human 
nature is tainted with hereditary guilt and corruption. However, as with Edwards, even 
hereditary sin entails personal concurrence by the individual agent. Thus, both original 
and actual sin are attributed to hypostasis. Positively stated, our sinful identity as agents 
(we are “sinners”) renders desires that are subsequently actualised within human nature in 
our willing. Negatively stated, since the will is incapable as a category of indeterminate 
nature to change or control those desires rendered in hypostasis, nature cannot hold 
ultimate responsibility for sin if it is not the primary cause of determination, despite any 
damage or consequence of sin it might well hold.  In this sense, fallenness and 254
sinfulness are as ‘incommensurable’ as nature and hypostasis (as respective categories of 
each),  yet remain interrelated through the manifestation of hypostasis within nature 255
through the will. McFarland writes,

[Because] the will’s fallenness—even though formally a matter of nature—is 
experienced by the individual human being hypostatically as one’s own sin rather 
than as damage that exists apart from or independently of the individual’s own 
agency, in this case the fallenness of nature correlates with the sinfulness of 
hypostasis. 
256
 McFarland, 'Fallen', 411.253
 Ibid.254
 Ibid., 413.255
 Ibid.256
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Applying this to Christ’s humanity, it is entirely possible for Christ to be sinless while still 
assuming our fallen human nature. While we sin because our hypostatic identity is that of 
“sinner”, which is then made manifest within human nature through our will, Christ’s 
hypostatic identity is that of the second Trinitarian person, perfect in divinity, which is then 
made manifest within human nature through His will as sinlessness.  Meyendorﬀ takes a 257
similar line, stating that ‘He—being God—could not commit sin, a personal act, which 
only a created hypostasis can commit’.  If Christ’s will is damaged in need of 258
redemption, its deiﬁcation, in this sense, would be to describe the manifestation of who 
He is as the eternal Son within what He is, incarnate in fallen humanity. Christ, in 
assuming our damaged humanity, is ontologically identical to us in nature, yet crucially 
diﬀerent in the operation of hypostasis within that fallen nature. Where our nature and 
hypostasis are entirely inseparable—who we are has always been bound to what we are 
as human beings—Christ’s hypostasis pre-exists His human nature.  Therefore, for us, 259
Crisp’s statement that fallenness logically follows sinfulness is correct; we are fallen 
because we are sinners and have sinned. Sin, both original and actual, is made manifest 
in our nature as our sinful agency operates through the will. Yet, for Christ, He has 
graciously elected to assume a fallen humanity from the position of pre-existent sinless 
hypostasis, and therefore even within our damaged state, He is not held to the same 
 This is similar to Aquinas’ notion of Christ’s sinlessness, without the Aristotelian biology. Christ’s 257
sinlessness is grounded in His divine hypostasis, regardless of whether His Father is human; this ‘is not a 
biological but an ontological fact’ (J. Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity [New York: Sudbury Press, 1968] 
208).
 J. Meyendorﬀ, ‘Christ’s Humanity: The Paschal Mystery’, St Vladimir's Theological Quarterly 1 (1987), 258
5-40, 24.
 Writing against Irving, Marcus Dods rejects such a notion, contending that, as nature only ever exists as 259
the nature of a particular person, if Christ’s nature is fallen then His person is fallen. See M. Dods, On the 
Incarnation of the Eternal Word (London: R. B. Seeley & W. Burnside, 1831) ch7. Dods is correct that nature 
is only instantiated within person, but it would be problematic to say either (i) that fallen nature is 
constitutive of personal fallenness because the Son’s hypostasis pre-exists His human nature, or (ii) that 
only a fallen person can only instantiate a fallen nature, when God assuming humanity already precedents a 
person assuming nature diﬀerentiated from their own substance, fallen or not.
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inevitability of sin being made manifest in nature. Edwards’ primal concurrence with 
Adam’s sin never occurs; rather, it is divine perfection that is manifest. 
260
1.5 Resolving Ambiguity of Fallen Human Nature

The implications of the above answer Crisp’s criticisms of the intrinsic morally 
reprehensibility of corrupt human nature and the logical conundrum of the transferral of 
guilt. 

Firstly, rather than fallen human nature being seen to be so intrinsically morally 
reprehensible that the Son is incapable of assuming it unless through some Nestorian 
second subject, the attribution of sin to hypostasis shows nature, despite its damage, to 
be intrinsically good. Barth, echoing this in an earlier statement, contends that even 
damaged nature, proving our creatureliness before Creator, only exists as God continues 
to sustain it, so its mere existence testiﬁes to God’s dedication to divine-human 
relationship and is thereby of unchangeable value.  Christ’s assumption of fallen nature 261
is thereby clearly not a matter of God’s disgust at our damage, but a reinforcement of 
God’s love towards His creature and the intrinsic goodness of Creator-creature relations; 
‘no aspect of our nature stands in the way of or in any way mitigates God’s love; on the 
contrary, every such aspect is during the course of our existence a constantly renewed 
testimony to that love’. 
262
Secondly, attributing sin to person renders a more ontological hamartiology, 
vindicating nature of being generative of guilt. McFarland contends that sin is certainly (i) 
separation from God, (ii) unnatural to our being, and (iii) something in which we personally 
participate and are thus morally responsible for. However, sin, in the Augustinian sense, is 
fundamentally ontological, not moral. Sin stretches beyond our very agency—an ontic 
 McFarland, 'Fallen', 412.260
 Barth, CD IV/1, 492ﬀ.261
 McFarland, 'Fallen', 414.262
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state from within which one acts in a morally negative way, ‘the ground of all our acts 
apart from the transforming power of grace’.263 Thus, as this ontic state of sinfulness is 
‘logically prior’ to personal agency, our judiciary culpability extends beyond the morality 
of individual acts.264 This removes the logical conundrum of how guilt, rather than just 
penalty, may be transferred to an innocent party. If guilt is an ontological matter, the larger 
question transcends this of the cause of this ontological state of sin. Why are we sinners? 
Here, McFarland appeals to mystery. Though our identity as sinful hypostases is made 
manifest within human nature through the will, when seeking the cause of such an 
identity, while still denying that God has made us in such a state, ‘there is simply no 
answer…a function of who I am that ﬁnally resists explanation’.265 What can be known is 
that this sinful identity is met with divine mercy, and such mercy is grounded in 
something far less mysterious: God’s love (which, even if undeserved, is certainly 
revealed). Christ assuming our fallen nature actualises this love, and in turn, even amidst 
the mystery of sin's causation, both ‘reveals and qualiﬁes’ our identity as sinful 
hypostases.266

Thirdly, elaborating on McFarland, even if human corruption were to be intrinsically 
morally reprehensible, it must be remembered that human nature is entirely alien to divine 
nature. That the Son assumes a state alien to Himself is an act of sheer grace, it is not 
His to bear until He elects to bear it. Thus, if the Son is to become morally reprehensible 
before the Father, it is a choice of divine freedom.267 Crisp, in declaring the Son “morally 
reprehensible” for assuming damage alien to Himself, has articulated the very essence of 
what the Son elects to achieve and is the very content of our good news. As corruption is 
 McFarland, 'Fallen', 414.263
 Ibid.264
 Ibid., 415.265
 Ibid.266
 Against Anselm’s contention that it would be inherently inappropriate for God to forgive without 267
retribution, Barth contends that, as sin is constituted as that which God freely chooses to reject, and the 
scale of our subsequent debt is constituted entirely by God’s free judgement, then our means and manner 
of acquittal must also be entirely constituted by God’s free choice of grace (CD IV/1, 486-490). If God elects 
to expiate our corruption by assumption, that is His prerogative.
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alien to Christ, it is right that we should be uncomfortable describing the Son as morally 
reprehensible. Yet, to truly articulate the sheer grace in Christ assuming our state, we 
must say with Luther that, though Christ had no sin of his own, He is ‘the greatest 
transgressor, murderer, adulterer, thief, blasphemer that ever was or ever could be on 
earth’.268 In terms of guilt, Christ is not guilty of His own volition in assuming this 
corruption, as He elects to assume alien guilt. Edwards is correct in describing the guilt of 
Adam’s common progeny, where the corruption of common humanity inevitably leads to 
sin, by which we primally concur to Adam’s sin and thus share his guilt. However, where 
Christ breaks this inevitable concurrence, any guilt He assumes is not His own. He is truly 
one who knew no sin, but became sin (2 Cor. 5:21). 
Fourthly, Crisp’s contention that this moral reprehensibility of corruption requires that 
the Son assume it with a degree of separation through some secondary Nestorian subject 
surely must extend to the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in fallen humanity. One could argue 
that, at the indwelling of the Spirit, the fallen nature is so sanctiﬁed that it is acceptable 
for divine-human communion, but this is exactly what fallenness advocates claim to 
occur in the Son’s assumption. Alternatively, it could be said that the Spirit is not bound 
to humanity in the same way as the Son—certainly, the Spirit does not hold two natures 
as Christ does—and as such can be united to fallenness without bearing any moral 
responsibility for our humanity. However, Christ’s promise of the Spirit certainly seems to 
be of something more than an external revelation, rather, one that is hidden to the world 
yet revealed to believers precisely through such an internalised bond (Jn. 14:17). How 
would such internal union be possible if divine nature could be so tainted and marred by 
any meaningful intimacy with our corruption? Such a sweeping generalisation is simply 
untenable.  
 M. Luther, The Epistle to the Galatians (tr. T. Graebner; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1949) 114-115.268
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Finally, Crisp’s contention that the Son can only assume corruption through some 
Nestorian second subject, though intended to preserve the sanctity of divinity, does more 
harm than good to such a cause. By neglecting the essentially redemptive quality of 
divinity, Crisp presents a divinity neutered and powerless against corruption, a God who
—should He condescend to take the fullness of our fallen condition—is overwhelmed by 
human corruption, a divinity tainted from below. Torrance, conversely, presents a God 
triumphant over corruption, divinity not capable of being corrupted, leaving sin that seeks 
to destroy sanctiﬁed at a mere touch.

In these defences, hopefully, some progress has been made in reaching a clearer 
deﬁnition of fallen human nature. A brief and summative deﬁnition of Christ’s assumption 
of fallen human nature that encapsulates the core components of this discourse so far 
would entail the perfect hypostasis of the Son instantiating in taking our nature the full 
reality of humanity marred with original corruption and the damage of postlapsarian 
humanity. In this corruption, He is judged as a genuinely fallen being. However, as this 
state is in itself entirely alien to the Son’s hypostasis, assumed vicariously to be redeemed 
within Himself, He is considered spotless and blameless as the perfection of His person is 
made manifest within His fallen nature, wherein guilt is never accrued by primal 
concurrence with Adam nor by actual sin. This can be carried forwards into Torrance’s 
framework of atonement contextualised to Christ’s humanity. With clearer deﬁnitions 
established, further conceptual contestations can now be addressed.

2. Integrity of Suﬀering & Temptation
One central concern of the Son not assuming fallen human nature is for the integrity of 
His suﬀerings and solidarity with common humanity had He not internalised the 
weaknesses of fallen nature (Heb. 2:18). 
269
 Dods denies that Christ was ever purposed to be a moral exemplar in the sense of resisting weaknesses 269
internal to His humanity in exactly the same manner as we do (Incarnation, 380-382). 
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2.1 Symptoms Without Sickness 
Crisp contends that Christ would not necessarily have to be fallen to share the inﬁrmities 
of common humanity, but could treat the eﬀects of fallenness without assuming the 
cause.270 Just as if the symptoms of measles are recreated in a patient, without ever 
infecting them with the actual bacteria—they may have spots or a fever, but never have 
the illness, in the same sense—Christ may age, get tired, be sad, hold all of the 
symptoms of our fallenness, without assuming the nature that produces them. It is in this 
sense, Crisp writes, that ‘Christ takes on the inﬁrmities of a fallen human nature, but did 
not take on the condition of fallenness’.271 When we ask what we could have to do with a 
Saviour whose humanity is diﬀerent to our own, Christ’s solidarity with our symptoms 
without their cause is suﬃcient. Stamps, similarly, contends that Christ may have the fully 
authentic ‘fallen experience’, simply by virtue of living within fallen creation.272 He is our 
sympathetic High Priest (Heb. 4:15) simply by entering the fallen realm of our struggles 
without making His own nature complicit in it.

King, developing this, suggests that the Son is unfallen, but has powers of fallenness 
operative in His humanity that require sanctiﬁcation. The two aspects of our fallenness 
that require redemption are (i) our restoration from rebellion to Edenic communion with 
God and (ii) our internal propensity to sin.273 These, to King, can be sanctiﬁed within 
Christ’s humanity without the assumption of fallenness.

Firstly, though it would be morally reprehensible for Christ to break communion with 
God,274 Christ must be tempted to do so with internal integrity so to sanctify our 
270 Crisp, Divinity, 107. Perhaps of most signiﬁcance to Torrance, his mentor Mackintosh denied that 
Christ’s genuine human development, lack of omniscience, necessary dependence on the Father, nor 
battles with temptations, were anchored in any internal weaknesses: ‘[N]o corrupt stain existed in His 
nature to which temptation could appeal’ (Mackintosh, Doctrine, 79; cf. 11-14, 26, 35-38, 79-80, 100-102, 
104-107).
271 Crisp, Divinity, 107-108.
272 Stamps, Will, 170-171.
273 King, ‘Assumption’, 57.
274 King, ‘Assumption’, 58-59. As Leftow contends, the external assault of temptation includes, even for 
the Son, an internal arousal of desire for wrong; see B. Leftow, ‘Tempting God’, Faith and Philosophy 31 
(2014), 3-23, 4-6.
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rebellion.275 King seeks to resolve this by contending that it is suﬃcient, in maintaining 
this internal integrity, for Christ to only be indirectly united to the state of our humanity 
rebellious to God. Just as a bridge directly unites two realms but not every region of the 
realm must be directly connected to be considered part of the union, so too was there a 
direct union between divinity and unfallen humanity and an indirect union 'between the 
divine nature and all of the humanity of Christ’.276 The inherent moral reprehensibility of 
human rebellion is so great, that this power of fallenness must be sanctiﬁed indirectly.277 
The second power of fallenness, the pull towards actual sin, as with Torrance, is 
conquered throughout Christ’s life of obedience in the sanctiﬁcation of the new Adamic 
humanity.278 This work is completed at the cross where the internal desire for evil that 
arises at temptation—indirectly present throughout Christ’s life—was ripped out of his 
humanity entirely. King contends that this pull to sin must necessarily be removed, 
despite only being indirectly present, so to remove any blockades for the transferring 
union of the new Adamic life to others.279 Following the removal of what is unnatural to 
our humanity, Christ can now be said to be directly united to our whole nature. At this 
direct union with what is left of humanity, this nature is ﬁnally one that can be resurrected, 
with no pull to sin to draw it back to the grave. King writes, 
Before, there was a direct union with his human nature, with all the natural 
elements of his humanity (but not the unnatural); now there could be a direct union, 
or alignment, with the whole of his humanity. Without this, Christ could not be 
resurrected, because he would have elements in his soul which God could not be 
 Ibid., 57.275
 Ibid.276
 Ibid.277
 Ibid.278
 Ibid., 58.279
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united to. Unless these elements were removed from his soul on the cross, Jesus 
seemingly would not have won the victory over sin and evil. 
280
2.2 Internal Damage 
So must Christ’s suﬀerings be internalised to His humanity to be borne with integrity? 
What is most striking of the Son merely assuming our symptoms and not their cause is 
that this still leaves us with a disease. This argument is certainly more palatable when 
considering Christ’s association with our guilt, and is, in that sense, an understandable 
conclusion. However, this is, to use McFarland’s phrase, ‘quasi-Docetic’;  not fully 281
Docetic in the sense that Christ’s suﬀerings are entirely illusory, but certainly not 
grounded in His actual humanity either. His suﬀerings are external assaults and are thus 
only the appearance of our suﬀerings; for Christ to suﬀer and be tempted as we do, He 
must share in the struggles that are internal to our damaged nature. This is an example of 
substitution in isolation from representation. Christ does take our place in our inﬁrmities, 
ultimately taking our place at death on the cross. However, for this external exchange to 
be able to take our place, surely He must be representative of our mortal condition? 

With King, similarities must be recognised with Torrance, as the sanctiﬁcation of 
human fallenness occurs internally to Christ’s own humanity.  However, where Torrance 282
structures this around the non-assumptus, with the Son assuming our humanity to 
operate on it from within, King’s “indirect union” presents a sanctiﬁcation at arms’ length. 
King takes the logic of the non-assumptus, that Christ must assume a humanity with the 
powers of fallenness operative within it so to redeem it, but separates the surgeon 
operating on our nature from direct contact with the patient. 

Having said this, King’s form of internalised atonement is inconsistent in this respect. 
If Christ’s indirect union with humanity is suﬃciently proximate to our fallenness that the 
 King, ‘Assumption’, 58.280
 McFarland, 'Fallen', 408.281
 King, ‘Assumption’, 71.282
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internal propensity to sin needs to be torn from His human nature at the cross to clear the 
path for resurrection, surely this is suﬃcient to say His nature is actually fallen? If Christ is 
so united to fallenness that it acts as a blockade of transferring union requiring removal, it 
is far more logical to say He is simply fallen. If this “indirect union” is to be used to place 
suﬃcient distance between Christ and our fallenness that He can be called “unfallen”, 
then logically there should be suﬃcient distance for there to be no blockade for transferral 
of the new Adamic life from Him to us. Both cannot be correct.

An “indirect union” also raises worrying questions for the level in which the ‘whole 
fullness of deity dwells bodily’ (Col. 2:9) in the humanity of Christ. If a bridge that 
connects two realms can be said to be only indirectly united to some regions of one 
realm, this must be true for the realm on the other side of the bridge. If the Son is only 
directly united to some select regions of our humanity, then is what is dwelling bodily in 
Christ only select regions of divinity? The motive of this denial of Christ’s substantive 
weaknesses shall be addressed in the next chapter as potential grounds for mutual 
understanding and progress in this debate.

3. Temporal Turmoil: Sequential Redemption 
Chiarot, in an excellent recent survey of Torrance on the non-assumptus, questions 
Torrance’s intelligibility in the dubious extent and nature of the “continuous” sanctiﬁcation 
of Christ’s humanity throughout the incarnation if it is supposedly sanctiﬁed “once and for 
all” at the virgin birth  and culminating its progression at the cross.  If the virgin birth is 283 284
to be upheld as a sanctifying event, surely this is either an absolute redemption whereby 
humanity would no longer need sanctiﬁcation for the rest of Christ’s temporal existence, 
or a merely partial sanctiﬁcation at this moment. This raises the question as to whether 
the virgin birth is soteriologically signiﬁcant at all. 

 Chiarot, Unassumed, 100-102.283
 Ibid., 161, cf. 202.284
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If, as with Torrance, atonement is internalised to the constitution of the incarnate 
mediator (that is, the eternal Son assuming ﬂesh bound to temporality), to examine the 
status of redemption within temporal sequence is, fundamentally, a question of the 
interrelation between eternity and temporality. 

Barth’s doctrine of eternity makes sense of this. For Barth, God is not simply 
atemporal in the negation of created temporality  but maintains a divine temporality of 285
pre, supra and post-temporality, as He is before time, above time, and beyond time.  286
The fallen temporality of the created order, though deriving its past, present and future 
from the prototypical categories of divine temporality,  is characterised by its 287
inescapable sequence of procession in which the past is unreachable, the present is a 
ﬂeeting experience, and the future is a reality yet to exist.  Divine temporality, on the 288
other hand, is characterised by absolute simultaneity in which God is before, above, and 
after time at once, without exclusion nor contradiction.  
289
Applying this to the Son’s redemption of fallen human nature, the being and act of 
God within human temporality must be considered in relation to eternity, since, in the 
incarnation, eternity has taken time to itself.  Torrance adopts something of this, that as 290
the Lord of time within time, the Son’s atoning life and work extends beyond temporal 
sequence. In an 'indivisible continuum’ the risen and ascended Christ is ‘consistently and 
indissolubly one’ with the boy in the manger.  Chiarot’s concerns of temporal ordering 291
are moot; the sanctiﬁcation of fallen humanity once and for all at the virgin birth and the 
 Barth, CD II/1, 610, 617-618. 285
 Ibid., 621-6286
 Ibid., 610.287
 Ibid., 608; cf. CD I/2, 47; CD III/2, 511ﬀ; Torrance, SpTR, 97. 288
 Barth, CD II/1, 610-611. God is thus only atemporal by lacking the separation that plagues created 289
temporality, eternity ‘does not possess beginning, succession, and end...to the extent that it is not 
“possessed," qualiﬁed, dominated, and separated by them as by a general principle of being foreign to 
itself’ (ibid.).
 Barth, CDII/1, 616; cf. CD I/1, 120; CD I/2, 49; CD III/1, 73f. The Son’s incarnation does not mean God’s 290
limitation by time, but as humanity is bound to it, it is aﬃrmed as a reality to God in the actualisation of 
divine-human relations (Torrance, Incarnation, 67).
 Torrance, SpTR, 169-172.291
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progressive condemnation sin in the ﬂesh up to the cross, though contradictory in the 
sequence of created temporality, are entirely simultaneous without exclusion or 
contradiction as it occurs in the being and act of the eternal God.
4. Inconsistency of Assumption 
Another matter of contention against Christ’s assumption of fallen humanity is the 
consistency of what is said to be left unhealed if not assumed by Christ. Chiarot criticises 
Torrance, arguing that if it is a soteriological necessity that Christ assume fallen human 
nature, what is left to be said of human persons? Torrance’s use of enhypostasia is 
‘devastating for the non-assumptus’, since ‘no concrete personal instance of fallen 
humanity is assumed’, simply fallen nature abstracted from fallen persons.  Ho, 292
similarly, criticises that the non-assumptus, taken literally, would leave everyone but 
Christ condemned. Only an instance of fallen humanity is assumed in the incarnation, not 
all of it. The Son assumed a speciﬁcally male, speciﬁcally Jewish humanity, incarnate as 
Jesus of Nazareth, not Paul. 
293
Here, it is crucial to recognise that Torrance has not limited salvation to simply 
physical redemption of nature.  Though the sanctiﬁcation of fallen nature, the 294
submission to the Father’s judgement and juridical ruling of innocence and the 
reconciliation of humanity to God are grounded within Christ’s humanity, these blessings 
are still attained by common humanity through participation.  The telos of Torrance’s 295
soteriological participation is not, as with Calvin and much Reformed theology, simply our 
justiﬁcation and sanctiﬁcation, nor that we are simply healed physically, but ‘lifted up to 
 Chiarot, Unassumed, 163.292
 M. K. Ho, A Critical Study on T.F. Torrance’s Theology of Incarnation (Bern: Peter Lang, 2008) 75.293
 Torrance, Trinitarian, 156; Meaning, 84.294
 For the theological signiﬁcance of participation and Torrance’s distinct contribution to the notion, see D. 295
O. Eugenio, Communion with the Triune God: The Trinitarian Soteriology of T. F. Torrance (Cambridge: 
James Clarke & Co., 2014) 175-198.
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participate in the very light, life and love of the Holy Trinity’.  The inclusion of distinct 296
persons is central to this end. Far from being soteriologically neglected, ontological 
relationality hinges on unique contributions of distinct persons in any communion.  297
Conversely, this participation does not risk the 'manysidedness of our humanity’ into an 
‘undiﬀerentiated union of the whole’;  rather, soteriological participation of human 298
persons in the divine life renders ‘a new and paradoxical conception of united separation 
and separated unity’.  Sinful persons may not have been assumed by the Son, who did 299
merely become, literally, an individual Jewish male from Nazareth, but to the ends that the 
divine life be mediated to human persons sharing that common fallen nature and those 
persons participate in the divine life. In participation, distinct personhood is neither 
soteriologically neglected in the non-assumptus, nor does it become indistinct in the 
body of Christ.

5. Continued Instrumentalism 
Chiarot’s critique of Torrance’s non-assumptus continues to his assertion that the Son’s 
assumption of a “neutral” human nature, as in Westminster Reformed (“Federal”) 
theology, would remain merely soteriologically instrumental. Torrance’s conviction that 
Christ remains sinless in His divine nature even while incarnate in fallen human nature 
threatens to topple his own view into instrumentalism. Chiarot contends that Federal 
theology is not as “instrumental” as Torrance perceives, as Christ’s active obedience 
occurring within humanity is relevant for believers, even if imputed within a forensic 
framework. Chiarot questions whether Christ’s assumption of such fallen humanity would 
be ‘even more instrumental’ than Federal theology, as His damaged will requires even 
 Torrance, Mediation, 66.296
 M. Volf, ‘The Trinity is Our Social Programme’, Modern Theology 14 (1998), 403-423, 407-411.297
 C. Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997) 86.298
 Gunton, Promise, 94.299
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further external support, ‘the only nature (or will) which can act freely to save it would be 
divine’. 
300
Here, Chiarot misrepresents instrumentalism. What Torrance criticises of Federal 
theology is that atonement is achieved without reference to our actual humanity, salvation 
is ‘done upon and for us’,  lacking our genuine human involvement. Chiarot, in accusing 301
Torrance of instrumentalism, is confusing the absolute helplessness of humanity with a 
lack of involvement in God’s grace. Christ’s fallenness does require the touch of divinity to 
heal and restore it and this is an exclusively divine action. Yet, as Chiarot himself 
appreciates of Torrance, salvation is ‘a human action within the divine action’.  Fallen 302
humanity may not be worthy of being involved in the Son’s work of redemption, certainly 
being helpless on its own merit, but rather than salvation being wrought upon us or to us, 
God involves human action within His soteriological work. It is not instrumental that 
Christ’s humanity required restoration but God’s grace to operate from the ontological 
depths of fallenness.

6. Pneumatological Clarification
Our ﬁnal concern with the non-assumptus is pneumatological, with two extremes to be
avoided. Firstly, it could be argued that if it is exclusively the Son’s divine nature that
redeems human fallenness rather than the Spirit, the Spirit cannot achieve the same work
within our humanity. Secondly, if it is exclusively the Spirit that sanctiﬁes the Son’s fallen
humanity, then a divorce is created between the Son and His humanity. It is particularly
concerning to Crisp that the agency of the Spirit becomes necessary in upholding the
hypostatic union, denying the intrinsic integrity of the Son’s person.  Crisp denies this303
 Chiarot, Unassumed, 157.300
 Torrance, Incarnation, 212.301
 Chiarot, Unassumed, 112.302
 O. D. Crisp, Revisioning Christology: Theology in the Reformed Tradition (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011) 92, 303
100-101; Chiarot, Unassumed, 177.
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pneumatological separation of the Son’s agency from being immediate to all incarnate 
activity,  asserting, ‘[T]here appears to be no metaphysical room for the interposition of 304
another divine person between the intentions of God the Son (i.e. his agency) and the 
intentional actions brought about in his human nature’.


305
Is this correct? Does the Son’s sanctiﬁcation of fallenness by His divine nature exclude 
the role of the Spirit and the same work to be achieved pneumatically within our nature? 
Conversely, though it cannot be denied that the Spirit mediates the Son’s incarnation to 
some extent—His very conception being pneumatological—does the Spirit’s agency in 
the incarnation exclude the agency of the Son from His own humanity?  
306
Myk Habets oﬀers a nuanced perspective. To deny that the Son’s incarnation is 
pneumatologically mediated is to deny the deﬁnition of incarnation; as with Athanasius, 
this would be ‘God as man [not] God in a man’.  However, the Spirit’s personal agency 307
in Christ’s human acts is not to the exclusion of the Son’s personal agency, but their 
perichoretic interpenetration renders an intricate work of cooperation between the 
Father’s two hands. Though ‘the Word is the subject who wills and acts…he works by or 
through the Holy Spirit’ in the pneumatic mediation of His person to humanity.  308
McFarland, perhaps, goes too far in suggesting of Chalcedonian Christology that, though 
'the Word is the subject of Jesus’ thoughts and actions’, it is the Spirit that is the cause of 
these actions.  Crisp’s fears of the Son’s separation from His humanity are somewhat 309
substantiated in the denial that He is the causal operator for His own nature. However, 
when the Son’s causal agency is pneumatologically mediated to humanity in a more 
 Crisp, Revisioning, 103-107.304
 Ibid., 105.305
 Ibid., 107. 306
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nuanced act of Christo-pneumatic cooperation,  then the sanctiﬁcation of fallen 310
humanity involves the Spirit without neglecting the Son.

On the other hand, neither is the Spirit neglected from the Son’s work of redemption, 
excluding the pneumatic actualisation of that redemption within our same fallen state. The 
Spirit’s mediation of the Son’s redemptive work to His own humanity is a point of 
solidarity between Jesus and common humanity. As McFarland states, ‘[T]he role of the 
Spirit in Jesus’ life is parallel with other human beings rather than something which 
distinguishes him from them. Whether the person in question is Jesus, the Word made 
ﬂesh, or the least distinguished of the saints, it is the gift of the Holy Spirit rather than any 
intrinsic property of human nature that makes possible human life active in faith and 
love’. 
311
7. Summary 
This chapter has detailed several conceptual issues with the Son assuming fallen human 
nature. The lack of clear deﬁnitions of key terms has been addressed, with fallenness 
being attributed to nature and sinfulness to person. With regards to Christ’s suﬀering and 
temptations, it has been shown that it is diﬃcult to maintain their integrity without His 
internalisation of such by assuming fallen humanity. Beyond this, several apparent issues 
with the consistency of Torrance’s use of the non-assumptus have been resolved, in the 
simultaneity of redemption, the participation of human persons in Christ’s work, 
Torrance’s refutation of instrumentalism, and the interpenetration of the Spirit in the Son’s 
incarnation. From here, the contextualisation of atonement to Christ’s humanity in the 
historical corpus shall now be examined. 
 Habets, ‘Fallen’, 43.310
 McFarland, ‘Spirit’, 155.311
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Chapter 3: Incarnational Atonement in the Historical Corpus 
Returning to Torrance’s “Latin Heresy”, this thesis now examines whether it can truly be 
said that the Western Fathers externalised atonement from the constitution of the 
incarnate Mediator, separating Christ’s humanity from our own fallen nature. 

It is Tertullian and Augustine who are charged by Torrance to be the main propagators 
of the “Latin Heresy” beginning as a matter of revelation, where, in an odd dialectic, 
revelation is essentially separated from the being of God, formalised in static dogmas 
which are ’regarded as identical with the truths which they were meant to express’.  312
Tertullian, while still rejecting Arianism, thought of the Word not as ‘eternally generated’ in 
God, ‘but as an emanation from his Mind which became Word only when God spoke it in 
creating the world’.  Subsequently, Tertullian taught of a Rule of Faith (regula fidei), a set 313
of dogmatic propositions that were ‘logically deduced from divine Revelation’ but 
ultimately abstracted from ‘the substance of the Faith’.  In other words, dogma was 314
held to be truthful, apart from God as living Truth. Augustine took up this ‘semi-
detach[ment]’ of God from the Word by distinguishing between the Word as 'formable but 
not yet formed' and ‘the external Word’ in the Incarnation.  Thus, when Christ takes on 315
human nature, He is not in the ﬂesh what He is in eternity. It is this semi-detachment that 
Torrance claims trickles into reconciliation (see chapter one), manifesting in the separation 
of reconciliation from the locus of Christ’s humanity into external, juridical, forensic 
categories. 
316
With such a generalising perspective regarding the Western tradition, it is only right to 
examine whether the “Latin Heresy” is a legitimate historical critique and whether 
Torrance’s move towards internalising atonement within the constitution of the incarnate 
 Torrance, 'Heresy', 468.312
 Ibid.313
 Ibid.314
 Ibid., 468-479.315
 This, as we shall see, is most fully realised in the Medieval period, exempliﬁed in the moralistic and 316
satisfaction theories from Anselm, Lombard and Aquinas.
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Son is as strongly emphasised in the East or as neglected in the West as he claims. 
Though, for Torrance, Gregory Nazianzen’s ‘the unassumed is the unhealed’ is most 
commonly cited,  alongside Cyril of Alexandria’s ‘what Christ has not assumed, he has 317
not saved’,  his historical work is extensive.  This chapter turns primarily to the 318 319
genesis and conclusive perspectives on the matter of both East and West, with Irenaeus 
and Cyril, and Tertullian and Augustine, respectively, and then to the signiﬁcances of 
Torrance’s Patristic reading, before asking whether any common ground can be found 
from this for the ongoing debate of whether Christ assumed a fallen human nature.

1. Eastern Fathers
1.1 Irenaeus 
Irenaeus (c.120-140—c.200-203) was originally of Asia Minor before his mission to Gaul. 
Though providing a genesis of Greek theology, he also brings valuable insight that 
precedes the Eastern-Western ecclesial (and to some extent, theological) schism. 
320
 Cited in Torrance, Theologian, 103-104, 161, 179, 202, 231-232; ‘Singularity’, 237; The Christian Frame 317
of Mind: Reason, Order and Openness in Theology and Natural Science (Colorado Springs: Helmers & 
Howard, 1989) 9; Mediation, 39; Preaching, 58; Incarnation, 62, 201; Atonement, 441; God, 250-251.
 Cited in Torrance, ‘Singularity’, 237; Theologian, 104, 202; Preaching, 58; Atonement, 441.318
 For Torrance’s fullest historical engagement on this, see Faith, 146-90, drawing mainly on Basil of 319
Caesarea (153); Gregory of Nyssa (153f.); Athanasius (161-162); Hilary of Poitiers (162f). For Torrance’s 
further historical work on this see Reconciliation, chs4-5; Meaning, chs4-5; ‘Athanasius: A Reassessment’, 
Abba Salama 5 (1974), 171-187; ‘The Relation of the Incarnation to Space’ in A. Blance (ed.), The 
Ecumenical World of Orthodox Civilisation III, Russia and Orthodoxy: Essays in Honour of Georges Florovsky 
(The Hague: Mouton, 1973) 43-70; ‘Karl Barth and Patristic Theology’ in J. Thompson (ed.), Theology 
Beyond Comparison: Essays on the Centenary of the Birth of Karl Barth (Alison Park: Pickwick, 1986) 
215-239; ‘Alexandrian Theology’, Ekklesiastikos Pharos 52 (1970), 185-189; The Doctrine of Grace in the
Apostolic Fathers (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1948).
 See G. P. Wingren, ‘Saint Irenaeus’, Encyclopædia Britannica website (https://www.britannica.com/320
biography/Saint-Irenaeus; accessed 12th August 2018).
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Writing against Gnosticism, Irenaeus regarded human nature to be a material creation 
of God.321 This material was intrinsically good, derivatively of its Creator,322 yet in the 
qualitative diﬀerence between Creator and a freshly-formed immature creation,323 it was a 
material that still needed development before bearing the image of the eternal and perfect 
God in full maturity.324 Immortality and incorruptibility, in particular, belong to the ‘glory of 
the uncreated One’ and are only maintained in humanity conditionally on their continued 
participation in the divine life through obedience.325 With such immaturity, humanity was 
unable to resist Satan’s temptation,326 thus human development was delayed and 
mortality and corruptibility were no longer simply possible, but inescapable.327 As we 
 Irenaeus’ rebuttal to the ‘high spirituality’ of his gnostic opponents was to emphasise the ‘material, 321
ﬂeshly dimensions’ of humanity, that, by nature, we are moulded from the earth. This materialism catches 
Irenaeus’ sense of our solidarity in Adam, and of Christ with us (D. Minns, Irenaeus: An Introduction 
[London: T&T Clark, 2010] 70-11; Irenaeus, Haer., 1.9.3; 5.1.3). Our material is constituted in body, soul and 
spirit, without any which of which substance we are incomplete (Irenaeus, Haer., 5.6.1; M. C. Steenberg, 
Irenaeus on Creation: The Cosmic Christ and the Saga of Redemption [Leiden: Brill, 2008] 131ﬀ).
 In the inseparability of body from spirit and soul, even the physical ﬂesh constituted humanity bearing 322
the imago Dei: ‘But man He formed with His own hands, taking from the earth that which was purest and 
ﬁnest, and mingling in measure His own power with the earth. For He traced His own form on the formation, 
that that which should be seen should be of divine form’ (Irenaeus, ApP, 11).
 Irenaeus, Haer., 2.26.1, 3.22.4, 3.23.5; ApP, 12, 14; A. N. S. Lane, ‘Irenaeus on the Fall and Original Sin’ 323
in R. J. Berry and T. A. Noble (eds.), Darwin, Creation and the Fall: Theological Challenges (Nottingham: 
Apollos, 2009) 130-149, 131-133, 136-137; T. G. Weinandy, ‘St. Irenaeus and the Imago Dei: The 
Importance of Being Human’, Logos 6 (2003), 15-34, 22.
 Irenaeus, Haer. 4.5.1, 4.11.1, 4.38.1; M. C. Steenberg, ‘Children in Paradise: Adam and Eve as "Infants" 324
in Irenaeus of Lyons’, Journal of Early Christian Studies 12 (2004), 1-22; E. Osborn, Irenaeus (London: T&T 
Clark, 2010) 75; Weinandy, ‘Irenaeus', 22-26; S. O. Presley, The Intertextual Reception of Genesis 1-3 in 
Irenaeus of Lyons (Leiden: Brill, 2015) 158-164. Irenaeus’ contention that the Father created through the 
Son in witness of the Spirit (Haer., 5.6.1.) results in the Spirit proleptically orientating creation (and humanity 
as its highest form) towards the humanity of the Son through whom we are created. The prelapsarian 
progression of humanity is thus not directionless, as the Christ-shaped seed of growth is already planted 
within our ﬂesh. See Irenaeus, Haer., 5.16.2; ApP, 22; Osborn, Irenaeus, 74; S. H. Webb, Jesus Christ, 
Eternal God: Heavenly Flesh and the Metaphysics of Matter (Oxford: OUP, 2012) 48; G. P. Boersma, 
Augustine’s Early Theology of Image: A Study in the Development of Pre-Nicene Theology (Oxford: OUP, 
2016) 7ﬀ.
 Irenaeus, Haer., 4.38.3; cf. 4.38.1, 4.39.2, 5.29.1; ApP, 14. Immortality and incorruptibility are only fully 325
borne by reception of the Spirit who brings the germ of the Son’s glory within our ﬂesh into maturity of the 
imago Dei (Irenaeus, Haer., 5.6.1, 5.7.2, 5.8.1). For the signiﬁcance of mortality as natural to prelapsarian 
humanity, see Steenberg, Creation, 117-123. For its pedagogical role in human development, see Irenaeus, 
Haer. 3.20.2, 5.2.3; J. Behr, Asceticism and Anthropology in Irenaeus and Clement (Oxford: OUP, 2000), 
50-52.
 Irenaeus, Haer. 4.40.3; ApP, 12; H. Zimmerman, Evolution and the Sin in Eden: A New Christian326
Synthesis (Lanham: University Press of America, 1998) 157f; J. Behr, Asceticism, 50.
 Irenaeus, Haer., 5.10.2, 5.23.2; ApP, 31.327
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are seen to have ‘oﬀended’ God alongside Adam,  we are thus ‘bound up with death 328
through his disobedience’. 
329
What characterises Irenaeus’ atonement is his notion of recapitulation.  Simply 330
deﬁned, fallen matter is restored to its original divine intent through a correspondent 
instance of redemption. A later fulﬁlment of something ‘reflecting, perfecting, or 
correcting the earlier’.  The incarnation, within this economy, entails the Son's 331
recapitulation of the same material as Adam and his oﬀspring by assuming it for His own. 
Had Christ's ﬂesh been formed of the dust in the same sense as Adam then He would not 
have been able to sum up the Adamic race in Himself, but would be ‘another formation 
called into being’.  For Christ to free humanity from the bondage of sin and death it was 332
imperative for Him to become ‘that very same thing’ that we are so that our same 
substance could ‘go forth from death’.  It was not a prelapsarian ﬂock that Christ 333
sought, but ‘the sheep which had perished’, so that He might ‘ascend to the height 
above, oﬀering and commending to His Father that human nature (hominem) which had 
been found’. 
334
In this sense, Irenaeus seems to share Torrance’s contention that a redemptive 
exchange occurred within the Son’s theandric person that requires assumption of our 
corruption, that He must ‘become what we are, that He might bring us to be even what 
 Irenaeus, Haer., 5.16.3. This is an early form of original sin, which, for Irenaeus, may well have included 328
original guilt. See Lane, 'Irenaeus', 141-142; Osborn, Irenaeus, 216-219. However, Bray contends that 
though guilt is suggested, our broader inheritance of death is more likely Irenaeus’ central concern (Bray, 
‘Sin’, 42-43).
 Irenaeus, ApP, 31.329
 For the place of recapitulation in Irenaeus’ work, see Osborn, Irenaeus, 97-140; Minns, Irenaeus, 330
108-110; Presley, Intertextual, 103-106. For the origin of Irenaeus’ recapitulation in Justin Martyr, see J.
Lashier, Irenaeus on the Trinity (Leiden: Brill, 2014) 22-26; Osborn, Irenaeus, 84.
 Van Kuiken, Humanity, 95. Osborn details the variables of Irenaeus’ recapitulation, which can be referred 331
to distinctly but overall constitute a singular totality of postlapsarian matter and correspondent divine 
response, ‘because everything that God does is part of his economy and every part of his economy is 
deﬁned in relation to its recapitulation’ (Irenaeus, 98; cf. 115-116).
 Irenaeus, Haer. 3.20.10.332
 Ibid., 3.18.7; cf. ApP, 31.333
 Irenaeus, Haer., 3.19.3.334
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He is Himself’.  Indeed, for Irenaeus, what has perished in Adam, Christ brings to 335
immortality within His own person.  When our corruption is joined to Christ it is 336
redeemed and the path is cleared for our reception of incorruption and immortality,  337
sanctifying each age of human existence as He passes through it,  until death is 338
swallowed in victory.  The logic of the non-assumptus appears to be present: that 339
human fallenness remains unredeemed unless brought into healing union within the 
person of the Son. Thus Irenaeus writes,

For by no other means could we have attained to incorruptibility and immortality, 
unless we had been united to incorruptibility and immortality. But how could we be 
joined to incorruptibility and immortality, unless, ﬁrst, incorruptibility and 
immortality had become that which we also are, so that the corruptible might be 
swallowed up by incorruptibility, and the mortal by immortality? 
340
However, Irenaeus does not appear to regard Christ as corrupt in the same sense as 
common humanity. Though assuming ﬂesh from Mary places Christ ﬁrmly within Adamic 
continuity, His formation from the virgin’s womb recaptures the prelapsarian humanity 
formed from virgin soil.  Moreover, in Christ’s wrestling with temptation, where Wingren 341
interprets Irenaeus’ emphasis on Christ’s recapitulation of Adam’s disobedience as a 
‘lengthy struggle’ of internal conﬂict,  without which He cannot have ‘endure[d] the 342
same struggle against evil that we have’,  it may be that the will, or the soul, was not 343
 Ibid., 5.Pref.335
 Irenaeus, Haer. 5.14.1.336
 Ibid., 5.12.6.337
 Ibid., 2.22.4; cf. 3.18.7.338
 Ibid. 3.23.7.339
 Ibid., 3.19.1; cf. 4.38.4.340
 Ibid., 5.1.3; Van Kuiken, Humanity, 98.341
 G. P. Wingren, Man and the Incarnation (tr. R. Mackenzie; London: Oliver & Boyd, 1959) 116. It can 342
therefore be truly said that ‘it is in the man Jesus that God’s victory is to be achieved’ (ibid.).
 Wingren, Incarnation, xiv, 46, 112ﬀ.343
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what Irenaeus perceived to be the battleground of Christ’s moral victory. Though 
choosing the good against the experience of evil was necessary for human development 
of maturity in bearing the imago Dei, Christ came in full maturity of divine intention for 
humanity so had no will to be led astray.344 
Where this battle does take place, however, is in Christ’s ﬂesh, being weak and 
subject to the corruption of our mortality.345 Citing Romans 8:3, Irenaeus does not 
understand Christ’s “likeness” of sinful ﬂesh to be genuinely sinful, but it is not Docetic 
either.346 It is in the ﬂesh that the exchange of immortality and mortality takes place, that 
in our own development we may ‘become like Him…for He, too, “was made in the 
likeness of sinful ﬂesh,” to condemn sin, and to cast it, as now a condemned thing, away 
beyond the ﬂesh’.347 Christ's weakness and temptations are thus genuine as Christ He 
allows mortality in His ﬂesh, to overcome it in divinity. To Irenaeus, ‘as He became man in 
order to undergo temptation, so also was He the Word that He might be gloriﬁed…
the human nature being swallowed up in it (the divine), when it conquered, and endured…
and rose again’.348 It is in this sense that Irenaeus considered Christ’s ﬂesh “fallen”, 
unfallen in divinity, but in ‘voluntary restraint of his divine inﬂuence over the ﬂesh’ bearing 
the mortality so inescapable to postlapsarian humanity for the purpose of resurrecting it in 
Himself.349 Irenaeus writes, ‘He manifested the resurrection, becoming Himself the first-
begotten of the dead, and in Himself raising up man that was fallen…as God promised by 
the prophet, saying: And I will raise up the tabernacle of David that is fallen, that is, the 
ﬂesh that was from David’.350 
 Minns, Irenaeus, 106; Van Kuiken, Humanity, 99.344
 Irenaeus, Haer., 3.18.6; Minns, Irenaeus, 107.345
 Van Kuiken, Humanity, 100f.346
 Irenaeus, Haer., 3.20.2347
 Ibid., 3.19.3. Signiﬁcantly, mortality was absorbed, the reality of humanity was not collapsed into divinity 348
(Van Kuiken, Humanity, 103).
 Van Kuiken, Humanity, 103.349
 Irenaeus, ApP, 38.350
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1.2 Gregory Nazianzen 
Gregory Nazianzen (c.330-c. 389), a central ﬁgure of Cappadocian theology writing 
predominantly against Apollinarius and Arius,  sits at the very heart of the debate. Thus 351
his maxim, ‘the unassumed is the unhealed’,  must be understood contextually. 
352
It is against Apollinarius’ suggestion that Christ had a divine mind in a human body 
(since one person cannot have two minds) that the non-assumptus is set, that Gregory 
responds that the incarnation would be incomplete without Christ’s absolutely solidarity 
with every element of human nature. He writes, ‘Godhead with only ﬂesh, or even with 
only soul, or with both of them, is not man if lacking mind which is the even better part of 
man’.  But why is this so? Gregory’s answer is soteriological, since, as Torrance adopts, 353
the shape of atonement is the incarnation, and incarnation is atonement. The enmity 
between God and humanity is appeased in the mediation that occurs within Christ’s 
theandric person. Redemption is achieved by the sanctiﬁcation (or divinising) of the 
humanity the Son’s divinity comes into contact with. As Winslow puts it, ‘The unity of 
Christ’s person, for Gregory, is theosis’. 
354
It should be recognised that Gregory is certainly not writing a treatise on whether or 
not Christ assumed fallen humanity, as the contemporary debate would have it. Indeed, 
the emphatic attributions of human weakness to God—that God is ‘passible for our 
sake’,  that the ‘blood of God’ was shed,  that Christ unites the ‘immortal with the 355 356
 E. R. Hardy, ‘Gregory of Nazianzus’, Encyclopædia Britannica website (https://www.britannica.com/351
biography/Saint-Gregory-of-Nazianzus; accessed 19th August 2018). For Gregory’s inﬂuence and the 
historical signiﬁcance of the Cappadocians, see A. Louth, ‘The Cappadocians’ in F. Young, L. Ayres and A. 
Louth (eds.), The Cambridge History of Early Christian Literature (Cambridge: CUP, 2004) 289-301.
 Gregory Nazianzen, Ep. 101.5. All citations of Or. 27-31 from On God and Christ. All other orations from 352
‘Select Orations of Saint Gregory Nazianzen’ (NFPF(2) 7, ed. P. Schaﬀ, tr. C. G. Browne and J. E. Swallow; 
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1961) 203-422.
 Gregory Nazianzen, Ep. 101.6353
 D. F. Winslow, The Dynamics of Salvation: A Study in Gregory of Nazianzus (Cambridge: Philadelphia 354
Patristic Foundation, 1979) 87; cf. C. A. Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the Knowledge of 
God: In Your Light We Shall See Light (Oxford: OUP, 2008) 146-148. For the role of theosis in Gregory’s 
Christology, see F. W. Norris, Gregory Nazianzen's Doctrine of Jesus Christ (New Haven: Yale, 1971) 
128-166.
 Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 30.1355
 Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 45.22356
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corruptible’357—must be read in line with Gregory’s hermeneutical method. Though such 
statements describe the interrelation of divine and human natures, in reality this is little 
more than the cooperation of two distinct substances, with their own distinct properties 
remaining proper to each. The interpreter should, rather, ‘predicate the more sublime 
expressions of the Godhead, of the nature which transcends bodily experiences, and the 
lowlier ones of the compound, of him who because of you was emptied, became 
incarnate and (to use equally valid language) was ‘made man’’.358 However, as Beeley 
notes, the perichoretic interpenetration of divine and human natures in Gregory’s 
Christology renders divine perfection and human passibility entirely coalescent. The 
aforementioned unitive deﬁnition of “nature” as a subject’s reality more common to 
Eastern theology means that the ‘communicatio idiomatum is true at the level of Christ’s 
being’.359 
Despite the diﬀerences with the contemporary debate of Christ’s fallenness, even in 
Gregory establishing the basic premise of the redemptive nature of the Christ’s 
assumption of the mind, it is clear that it is because of the mind’s inﬁrmity that it was 
assumed. It was because the mind held genuine rebellion against God that the Son 
redemptively united it to Himself. ‘The very thing that had accepted the commandment’, 
Gregory exclaims, ‘did not keep the commandment. The very thing that did not keep it 
ventured its transgression. The very thing that transgressed stood in special need of 
salvation’.360 Thereby it is essential for the mind’s restoration, not just for Christ to 
substitute our broken state for His perfection before the Father’s judgement seat, but that 
He assume the mind’s brokenness, so that our mind may be healed and restored, and 
presented to the Father. Anything else would only redeem part of humanity. Here, 
sanctiﬁcation for common humanity, for Gregory, revolves around the theotic exchange 
 Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 39.13357
 Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 29.18358
 C. A. Beeley, The Unity of Christ: Continuity and Conflict in Patristic Tradition (New Haven: Yale 359
University Press, 2012) 189-190.
 Gregory Nazianzen, Ep. 101.9.360
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that Christ become what we are in fallenness, for the express purpose that we become 
like Him in righteousness.361 Gregory states, ‘Let us become like Christ, since Christ 
became like us…He assumed the worst that He might give us the better’.362 
1.3 Cyril of Alexandria 
Cyril of Alexandria (c.375-380-444) sums the Greek Fathers well, inﬂuenced by his 
predecessors but with perhaps the strongest ecumenical inﬂuence presiding over the 
councils of Ephesus (431) and Chalcedon (451).363 He may well have the most in common 
with contemporary fallenness theologians. 
For Cyril, in bearing the imago Dei, prelapsarian humanity reﬂects divine reason, 
freedom, dominion, holiness, incorruptibility (in that, even when Adam came to sin, 
humanity did not cease to exist), and participates in sonship.364 Postlapsarian humanity 
remains unchanged, in some sense, having ‘thrown away none of our essential 
properties’;365 however, the imago Dei within humanity has been tainted where ‘sin 
marred the beauty of the image and Satan befouled the bright visage of humanity’.366 For 
Cyril, postlapsarian humanity is inescapably mortal, corrupt, and became domineered by 
the desires over which we once ruled into captivity of sinful propensities under ‘sin’s 
law’.367 
 What Norris calls the ‘kenosis-theosis’ pattern (Doctrine, 128-148; cf. Winslow, Dynamics, 95-96, 99; 361
Beeley, Gregory, 148-151).
 Gregory Nazianzen, Or., 1.5.362
 F. Young, From Nicea to Chalcedon: A Guide to the Literature its Background (London: SCM Press, 363
1983), 298-304; A. Louth, ‘Cyril of Alexandria’ in F. Young, L. Ayres and A. Louth (eds.), The Cambridge 
History of Early Christian Literature (Cambridge: CUP, 2004), 353-357. For an excellent overview of Cyril’s 
atonement see D. Fairbairn, ‘Cyril of Alexandria’ in A. J. Johnson (ed.), T&T Companion to Atonement 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2017) 457-560.
 W. J. Burghardt, The Image of God in Man According to Cyril of Alexandria (Washington: CUAP, 1957) 364
141-143.
 Cyril of Alexandria, ‘Answers to Tiberius' 10 (Cyril of Alexandria: Select Letters [ed. & tr. L. R. Wickham;365
Oxford: Clarendon, 1983]). All citations of Tiberius, Doctrinal Questions and Answers (Questions) and Ep.
are taken from ibid.
 Cyril, Tiberius, 8.366
 Cyril of Alexandria, Ep. 45, 9 in L. R. Wickham (ed. & tr.), Cyril of Alexandria: Select Letters (Oxford: 367
Clarendon, 1983) 70-84. All citations of Ep. 45 are taken from this translation unless otherwise stated. For 
Cyril on the eﬀects of the fall on Adam’s humanity, see Burghardt, Image, 143-160.
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It was imperative that it be this ﬂesh that Christ assume, as a humanity unlike our 
postlapsarian state would mean Christ would have little to do with us.  In such union, 368
fallen human nature is redeemed internally to the Son’s theandric person. For Cyril, 
commenting on John 1:14, when “the Word became ﬂesh” the mortal fate of humanity to 
return to the dust from which we came (Gen. 3:19) was relinquished, since ’the body that 
fell was united ineﬀably with the Word who gives life to all things’.  To destroy human 369
corruption and ‘curb the innate, the sensual, impulses’ within it, the Son assumed that 
very fallenness, making ‘human ﬂesh, subject to decay and infected with sensuality as it 
was, his own’.  Again, in atoning exchange, He ‘came down into that which was in 370
slavery’ for our freedom, that we might receive riches by His poverty,  as He deiﬁes 371
humanity throughout the course of His life in dynamic progression through each age of 
existence.  In his own articulation of the non-assumptus, Cyril contends that the Son 372
‘united to himself the entire nature of a human being in order to save the whole person. 
For what is not assumed is not healed’. 
373
Cyril does clearly assert that Christ’s humanity had to be unfallen to give life to others. 
As Crisp cites against contemporary fallenness theologians, the condemnation of sin 
‘does not belong to someone with a nature like ours, under the tyranny of sin, an ordinary 
man’.  Indeed, Cyril goes to great lengths to separate Christ from sin. No sin could be 374
 Cyril of Alexandria, On the Unity of Christ (tr. J. A. McGuckin; Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 368
2000) 64. All citations of Unity are taken from this translation. Grillmeier contends that younger Cyril, pre-
Nestorian controversy, only held that Christ’s ﬂesh was soteriologically signiﬁcant and the soul was not 
especially important (A. Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition: From the Apostolic Age to the Council of 
Chalcedon (451) [tr. J. Bowden; Atlanta: John Knox, 1975] 415-416). Welch, however, convincingly contends 
that Cyril’s holistic deﬁnition of sarx denies any dualism between the soul being healed in separation from 
the ﬂesh (L. J. Welch, ’Logos-Sarx? Sarx and the Soul of Christ In the Early Thought of Cyril of Alexandria’, 
St Vladimir's Theological Quarterly [1994], 271-292).
 Cyril, Joannis, 1.139.369
 Cyril, Ep. 45, 9.370
 Cyril, Joannis, 1.141.371
 D. A. Keating, The Appropriation of Divine Life in Cyril of Alexandria (London: T&T Clark, 2004) 185-190.372
 Cyril, Joannis, 8.118. For the signiﬁcance of the maxim in Cyril, see Meyendorﬀ, Byzantine, 152-159, 373
163-164.
 Cyril, Unity, 60, cited in Crisp, Divinity, 90.374
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found in Christ’s ﬂesh (actual or original),375 Christ’s being “numbered among the 
transgressors”, “becoming sin” or “likeness of the ﬂesh of sin” can only be sin’s 
imputation to Him, not sinfulness of ﬂesh itself,376 and to claim that Christ's sacriﬁce 
was actually for Himself would implicate His sinfulness.377 Yet Cyril directly continues 
beyond Crisp’s citation that it was such unworthy ﬂesh that was assumed by the Son, 
but this was made worthy in unity with His person; ﬂesh was assumed fallen for 
fallenness to be cast out from within it, so that life could ﬂow to those sharing fallen 
nature. Cyril, quoted in full, says, 
The condemnation of sin does not belong to someone with a nature like ours, 
under the tyranny of sin, an ordinary man. But insofar as it became the body of the 
one who knew no transgression, how rightly it could shake oﬀ the tyranny of sin to 
enjoy all the personal riches of the Word who is ineﬀably united with it in a manner 
beyond all description. Thus it is a holy and life giving thing, full of divine energy. 
And we too are transformed in Christ, the ﬁrst-fruits, to be above corruption and 
sin. 
378
Such apparent contradictions are rife in Cyril as he dialectically distinguishes Christ’s 
divinity and humanity: Christ developed in human wisdom and grace while still being full 
of grace in divine perfection,379 He both received as man and dispensed as God the 
sanctiﬁcation of baptism,380 He both humanly hungered and divinely multiplied food,381 
 Cyril, Tiberius, 13; Adv. Nestorium, 1.3, 3.5. There is diﬃculty in original guilt for Cyril; instead of 375
inheriting Adam’s guilt, we inherit his mortality (Questions, 6; In Romanos, 5.18-19, cited in Burghardt, 
Image of God, 152). Christ’s natural ﬂeshly weaknesses (hunger, ignorance, fear, etc.), though proof of His 
solidarity with humanity, were not considered sinful (John, 8.316; Tiberius, 4; cf. A. Mellas, ‘“The Passions of 
His Flesh” St Cyril of Alexandria and the Emotions of the Logos’, Phronema 29 [2014], 81-99).
 Cyril, Unity, 56, 61; Adv. Nestorium, 4.Pref.376
 Cyril, Ep. 17, 9; Adv. Nestorium, 3.5.377
 Cyril, Unity, 60-61.378
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He was humanly ignorant yet divinely omniscient,382 He was fearful of His human safety 
yet submissively obedient to the Father at Gethsemane,383 and ultimately, He was 
humanly cruciﬁed yet was divinely impassible.384 Against Nestorius, these distinctions 
had to be clariﬁed as divine-human interpenetrations from the unity of the Son’s theandric 
person. God’s power to give life is now considered inseparable from the Son’s ﬂesh and 
is operative within it385 and, on the other hand, elements exclusive to the passibility of 
human existence are now attributable to the impassible Son.386 The human experiences 
of Jesus and the saving work of God, even in these distinctions, cannot be applied 
uniquely to divinity or humanity387 but to the singular reality of the Son.388 Thus the Son is 
impassibly-passible inasmuch as Cyril speaks of Christ as humanly suﬀering and being 
divinely impassible, but does so only from the foundation of this singular reality.389 In the 
sense of atonement, then, the Son is indeed considered divinely holy and humanly fallen, 
but only from the foundation of the singular reality of the Son. 
2. Western Fathers
2.1 Tertullian 
Tertullian (c.155-160—220) provides something of a genesis for Latin theology, his most 
signiﬁcant legacy being his rebuttal of the Marcionite understanding of Christ merely 
having the appearance of ﬂesh, and the Valentinian limitation of salvation to the soul and 
 Cyril, Tiberius, 4.382
 Cyril, Joannis, 4.487; 8.317-318; Adv. Nestorium, 5.3; Unity, 102-104.383
 Cyril, Adv. Nestorium, 1.Pref.384
 Cyril, Joannis, 4.529-531.385
 Cyril, Unity, 107-110. For divine impassibility in Cyril, see R. Lister, God is Impassible and Impassioned: 386
Toward a Theology of Divine Emotion (Nottingham: IVP, 2012) 90-94.
 Cyril, Ep. 17, 12.4.387
 Ibid., 8; note the previous discussion of Christ’s singular nature.388
 Foreseeing being charged with Nestorianism for this, Cyril quips, ‘But wait, he writes, we ﬁnd that you 389
are doing exactly the same thing as us; for you confess that he suﬀered, in so far as you attribute the 
suﬀerings to the ﬂesh, even though you keep him impassible as God. Ah, but we, my friend, have ﬁrst of all 
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impassible as God’ (Cyril of Alexandria, ‘Scholia On the Incarnation of the Only Begotten’, 35 in J. A. 
McGuckin [ed. & tr.], Cyril of Alexandria [Leiden: Brill, 1994] 294-335).
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subsequent separation of Christ from materiality. This legacy remains valuable despite his 
later inﬂuence from (and possible defection to) the Phyrgian heresy Montanism.  He is of 390
particular interest since, as mentioned, he is held most culpable by Torrance for the “Latin 
Heresy”.

Tertullian's anthropology is constituted in one soul and two natures. The human soul is 
a rational entity reﬂecting the rationality of the Creator, yet irrationality intrudes at the fall 
and grows inherently within the soul. Though, as a work of Satan, irrationality remains 
external to God, despite this intrusion the soul is not split in a Platonic sense into two;  391
there is simply a distinction in the soul’s faculties,  its two elements reﬂecting two 392
rational and irrational authors.  Human nature, however, is distinguished in retention of a 393
good nature which continues to reﬂect the goodness of God and in the constitution 
(through Adam’s sin) of a ‘second nature’ that shrouds the ﬁrst with corruption, ruled over 
by Satan and corrupted with sinful propensities.  Humanity, in its two natures, is thus a 394
blend of ‘inherent goodness and adherent evil’.  In this sense the imago Dei is lost and 395
must be restored by grace,  and more than a moral exemplar is required to cleanse this 396
evil that has infected Adam’s progeny.  Human ﬂesh, within this, is not intrinsically sinful 397
of its own accord, as it has no capacity for ‘advising or commanding sin’ in the same 
 R. L. Wilken, ‘Tertullian’, Encyclopædia Britannica website (https://www.britannica.com/biography/390
Tertullian; accessed 20th August 2018); R. E. Heine, ‘The Beginnings of Latin Christian Literature’ in F. 
Young, L. Ayres and A. Louth (eds.), The Cambridge History of Early Christian Literature (Cambridge: CUP, 
2004) 131-141; E. Osborn, Tertullian: First Theologian of the West (Cambridge, CUP, 1997) 7;  D. Rankin, 
Tertullian and the Church (Cambridge: CUP, 1995) 27-51.
 Tertullian, An., 16. Humanity had the capacity to deny the irrationality of Satan and remain true to God 391
but transgressed in disobedience (Tertullian, Marc. 2.2, 6).
 Tertullian, An., 14.392
 Osborn, Tertullian, 164.393
 Tertullian, An., 16, 39-41; Osborn, Tertullian, 164-167. As Adam and Eve are the source of human sin 394
(Tertullian, Marc., 1.22.8, 2.2.7) there is a physical continuity of souls from Adam (An., 27) by which family 
resemblance of sin is transmitted (An., 25).
 Van Kuiken, Humanity, 131.395
 Tertullian, De Baptismo, 5 (Tertullian’s Homily on Baptism: Edited with an Introduction, Translation and 396
Commentary, ed. & tr. E. Evans; London: SPCK, 1964). All citations of Baptismo are taken from this 
translation unless otherwise stated.
 Tertullian, De Testimonio Animae, 3 (On the Testimony of the Soul, tr. Q. Howe; Faulkner University 397
Patristics Project website [http://www.tertullian.org/articles/howe_testimonio_animae.htm; accessed 21st 
August 2018]).
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sense as the soul, it is merely the cup by which sin is tasted.398 Yet, it is still considered 
sinful by association with the soul.399 
This cleansing of adherent evil is achieved by Christ assuming not just the ﬁrst good 
nature but the second nature so to discard the shroud that obscures God’s handiwork. 
The sin in our nature is ‘brought to nought’ through such assumption.400 Tertullian implies 
that Christ assumes fallenness from Mary to (in Irenaen fashion) recapitulate what had 
been deﬁled in Eve. Eve had borne Satan’s seed of death; a virgin deﬁled by mortality. 
Thereby Mary, under that same condition of death, was impregnated with the seed of 
life. For Tertullian, ‘that which through that sex had gone astray into perdition should 
through the same sex be led back again into salvation…for the salvation of man Christ 
must needs come forth from that organ into which man already under condemnation had 
entered’.401 Indeed, if it had been any other ﬂesh that Christ assumed, His solidarity with 
us would have little soteriological signiﬁcance: 
[I]t would not suit Christ's purpose, when bringing to nought the sin of the ﬂesh,
not to bring it to nought in that ﬂesh in which was the nature of sin: neither would it
be to his glory. For what would it amount to if it was in a better kind of ﬂesh, of a
diﬀerent (that is, a non-sinful) nature, that he destroyed the birthmark of sin?402
Tertullian does say that Christ bearing the “likeness of sinful ﬂesh” (Rom. 8:3) means 
Christ’s ﬂesh is ‘itself not sinful’ being only ‘the like of that to which sin did belong’, 
solidary with Adam in ‘species but not in defect’.  However, Tertullian’s meaning here is 403
 Tertullian, An., 40.398
 Ibid., 40. Conversely, the imago Dei is not borne in the ﬂesh as no human physicality can encapsulate 399
the divine image, so can only be tainted by association in this sense as well (Tertullian, Marc., 2.5).
 Tertullian, Carn., 16.400
 Ibid., 17; cf. 17-23. Tertullian’s use of Irenaen recapitulation extends to Christ redeeming ‘our nativity by 401
his own nativity, and thus also loose the bands of our death by his own death, by rising again in that ﬂesh in 
which he was born with intent to be able to die’ (Marc., 3.9).
 Tertullian, Carn., 16.402
 Tertullian, Carn., 16; cf. Hatzidakis, Jesus, 342.403
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simply that Christ does not sin from within the same nature within which common 
humanity sins; ‘in Christ that same ﬂesh exists without sin which in man did not exist 
without sin’.  Expecting that ascribing our same ﬂesh to Christ would invite charges of 404
Christ being sinful, Tertullian writes, ‘[B]y clothing himself with our ﬂesh he made it his 
own, and by making it his own he made it non-sinful’.  Here, Torrance’s claim that 405
Tertullian perpetuates the Latin Heresy, separating the work of Christ from His person by 
externalising atonement, is certainly questionable. Though Tertullian is certainly more 
cautious than his Eastern counterparts with explicitly naming Christ “fallen”, or having 
“sinful ﬂesh”, any forensic or juridical elements are couched ﬁrmly within what Christ 
achieves in redemptive assumption of humanity. Though Christ takes to Himself ‘ﬂesh of 
the ancient seed without the agency of the ancient seed’, Christ must still have ‘expelled 
its ancient deﬁlements’ by sacriﬁce of His passion to ‘reshape it with new (that is, 
spiritual) seed’.  Though Christ is not touched by sin (original or actual) He assumes 406
mortality for its resurrection,  and though the accursedness of cruciﬁxion is not Christ’s 407
own He is solidary with the common condition of all who would be hung on a tree.  Van 408
Kuiken sums Tertullian well, saying that he places Christ ‘amid sin and evil but does not 
identify him with them; instead, from out of their midst he renders redemption’. 
409
2.2 Augustine 
Augustine of Hippo (354-430), writing rhetorically in the face of controversy (notably, 
against the Manichaeans and Pelagius) and in broader corpus, has shaped Western 
 Tertullian, Carn., 16.404
 Ibid., 16.405
 Ibid., 17.406
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 Tertullian, Marc., 5.3.408
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theology more than any other,  and thus serves well to sum the Latin perspective. He 410
too is of particular interest since, alongside Tertullian, he is held most culpable by 
Torrance for the “Latin Heresy”.

Augustine’s postlapsarian anthropology consists of a composite of an immortal soul 
and degenerative body, subject to death.  The soul, though immaterial (contra 411
Manichaeism),  animates and reigns over the body.  However, the soul, even in its 412 413
prelapsarian state, was distinct from its Creator in its mutability, and thereby capable of 
moral change.  From this, postlapsarian humanity and the eﬀects of original sin over the 414
will, mind and body, for Augustine, are largely circumscribed by concupiscence—the 
perversion of desire, often sexual, but generally, our ‘lust against the Spirit’.  All Adam’s 415
progeny are born into this rebellion; as we reproduce by means of concupiscent desire, 
concupiscence carries over to the next generation, continuing the transmission of original 
sin. 
416
 J. J. O'Donnell, ‘St Augustine’, Encyclopædia Britannica website (https://www.britannica.com/410
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In his earlier work, Augustine separated Christ from this fallen existence. Salvation 
was attained simply by humanity following ‘a pattern of living, that is, a sure way by which 
we might reach God’,  set by the example of Christ’s moral perfection in place of our 417
moral failures, His kenotic humbling contrasting our attempts of self-exaltation in 
disobeying the Father’s will. Where Torrance contends that Christ’s work was 
ontologically paradigmatic for common humanity by His cleansing through assumption of 
our shared fallenness in which we then share by the Spirit, young Augustine presents a 
moral paradigm, though claiming that ‘the same nature had to be taken on as needed to 
be set free’,  it was a neutral humanity that was assumed to give ‘a lesson in morals’ 418
that evil may not touch a humanity that remains obedient. 
419
Even in his mature work, Augustine goes to great lengths to separate Christ from a 
“ﬂesh of sin”. Christ is exempt from the transmission of original sin as the concupiscence 
from which common humanity is born is bypassed with His virginal birth, thus ‘he took 
only the ﬂesh from Adam, he did not assume his sin’.  Unlike the Eastern Fathers, 420
Augustine consciously avoids postlapsarian language, that though Christ had the likeness 
of sinful ﬂesh, ‘there was not the sinful ﬂesh’.  Lacking concupiscence, Christ’s 421
soteriological work was never for His own sake, but He received the baptism of a servant, 
not for His bonds of sin but our own, to serve us with salvation, that we might attain it by 
following His example.  Even the mortality He assumed from Mary  was not actualised 422 423
in death but by His own free choice, as the soul (or spirit) only leaves the body unwillingly 
when it has ‘willingly abandoned God’ in sin,  thereby His cry of Godforsakenness was 424
 Augustine, Fid. et Sym., 4.6.417
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one of empathy for our condition, not for His own abandonment.  It is in this separation 425
of the Son from fallen humanity that Augustine seemingly moves farthest away from 
internalised ontological atonement towards the judicial categories so criticised in the 
“Latin Heresy”. He does not necessitate that we choose between humanity being healed 
by power or judicial innocence, yet he does require that justice precede power. Since 
Satan (and fallen humanity who imitate him) strives after power, and thereby hates God’s 
justice, ‘the devil was to be overcome, not by the power of God, but by His justice’.  In 426
Christ’s humanity, Satan is not conquered by the power of divinity being bound to human 
fallenness in healing union, but by Satan wrongly inﬂicting suﬀering and death on an 
innocent man, thereby losing his legal claim to humanity. Power is only a subsequent 
divine act, as Christ is raised by power only once Satan’s grip is released in justice. 
427
Yet, despite these juridical categories and denial of postlapsarian references to Christ, 
Torrance’s claims that Augustine neglects the signiﬁcance of internalised ontological 
redemption are overstated. Indeed, that the “Latin Heresy” manifests in the separation of 
redemption from Christ’s humanity seems dubious with Augustine’s proclamation: ‘Let the 
human race take hope and rediscover its own nature. Let it see what an important place it 
occupies among the works of God’.  Though Christ’s humanity was not tainted by 428
concupiscence nor original sin, the Son ‘[took] upon Him man through whom to conquer 
the enemy of the human race from the race itself that had been conquered’.  Here, more 429
credence is given by Augustine to humanity’s emancipation from Satan’s grasp only being 
possible by Christ taking a humanity not without human parentage, as with the ﬁrst 
Adam, but aligning Himself with the continuity of Adam’s descendants. The human nature 
deceived by Satan is brought to submission to the Father’s judgement at the cross, 
 Ibid., 4.3.6.425
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whereby the Enemy is exorcised from it.  The divine-human union is seen to be 430
inherently redemptive, where pride, avarice, anger, and ungodliness are cured by the 
Son’s humility, poverty, patience, and charity. Augustine rejoices: ‘O Medicine, making 
provision for all: deﬂating what is distended; renewing what is wasting away; cutting away 
what is superﬂuous; preserving what is necessary; restoring what has been lost; curing 
what is corrupted!’  
431
Augustine, amongst the Fathers, is certainly furthest away from Christ having 
postlapsarian humanity. The signiﬁcance of Christ being medicine to our humanity, 
Augustine continues, is that ‘human nature was preserved intact amid violent 
persecution’, thereby no wickedness is found in those who make ‘the object of [their] 
contemplation, love and striving’ the ‘pattern of life’ set by the Son.  Yet atonement is 432
not exclusively externalised despite juridical conclusions, meaning Christ is certainly not 
prelapsarian either. Atonement is internalised in the sense of Christ assuming the human 
contagion of mortality (even if death is actualised by choice not captivity) and bringing 
from within it these juridical and exemplary outcomes, expelling guilt and the punishment 
of death from the ﬂesh and actualising within it the Father’s justice and divine 
righteousness as a pure sin oﬀering and a moral example to which we strive. He 
‘transferred to His own ﬂesh not sin, as the poison of the serpent, but He did transfer to it 
death, that the penalty without the fault might transpire in the likeness of sinful ﬂesh, 
whence, in the sinful ﬂesh, both the fault might be removed and the penalty’.  It was so 433
this oﬀering should come from within the most feeble states of human weakness that 
Christ came as an infant—though infancy is most rife with the weaknesses of sin in its 
absolute helplessness, so much so that Augustine anticipates Christ’s assumption of 
such stark weakness would raise questions of His sinlessness (despite being born of a 
 Augustine, Agon., 1.1; Trin., 4.13, 13.17; Io. Ev. Tr., 3.13.430
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virgin), Augustine contends that Christ did not come as a fully mature adult but as an 
infant so sin could be condemned within the internal reality of immaturity in the ﬂesh. 
Despite not bearing any sin, Christ coming in the likeness of sinful ﬂesh still meant 
atonement was wrought from within the feeblest instance of human puerility by Christ 
internalising that weakest human reality. Augustine writes, ‘[O]ur answer is as follows: 
Adam was not created in such a state, because, as no sin from a parent preceded him, he 
was not created in sinful ﬂesh. We, however, are in such a condition, because by reason 
of his preceding sin we are born in sinful ﬂesh. While Christ was born in such a state, 
because, in order that He might for sin condemn sin, He assumed the likeness of sinful 
ﬂesh’.434 Keech sums well the soteriological signiﬁcance of the incarnation for Augustine, 
that ‘[i]n order for it to be salviﬁc, Christ has to assume a post-Adamic humanity, which is 
neither the pristine nature enjoyed by Adam at his ﬁrst creation, nor fully conformed to 
sinful nature, as in the case of the rest of postlapsarian humanity’.435  
3. Torrance and the Latin Heresy: Historically Erratic Schismatic?
Through surveying a selection of Patristic material, three points of signiﬁcance can be 
recognised.
Firstly, Torrance’s reading of the Eastern Fathers is imbalanced in the isolation of their 
language of Christ’s “sinful ﬂesh”. He fails to recognise that, as Van Kuiken highlights, 
postlapsarian terminology is balanced with an (approximately) equal use of prelapsarian 
terms.436 However, Crisp, in contending that Christ assumed an exclusively prelapsarian 
humanity and that no Patristic evidence to the contrary exists, is guilty of the opposite. 
Secondly, Torrance’s reading of the Latin Fathers is also imbalanced, as, though it is 
only the Eastern Fathers who ascribe fallenness terminology to Christ’s humanity and 
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take up maxims such as “the unassumed is unhealed”, both Eastern and Western Fathers 
certainly have an element of internalised atonement. Torrance is not presenting anything 
ground-breaking in suggesting that the crux of atonement is the Son’s healing touch of 
divinity upon His humanity in the hypostatic union and is perhaps overly schismatic 
between East and West to claim the Latin Fathers directly rejected this (by means of 
neglect) with judiciary conclusions.437 There is something to be said for the inﬂuence of 
Augustine’s judiciary conclusions and tendencies for Christ to be a moral exemplar being 
carried through to much of Medieval atonement, yet losing the nuance of being grounded 
internally to Christ’s humanity. In Torrance’s language of substitution and representation, 
Anselm, viewing the Son’s ransom of humanity from Satan’s clutches to be the historical 
focal point of atonement but in need of reprioritisation around the monarchy of God over 
any rights of Satan, contends the incarnation to only be necessary to atonement 
exclusively in substitutionary terms, where the Son must become human to settle an 
honour debt to God, albeit in superabundance.438 Peter Lombard, in turn, asserted that 
sanctiﬁcation was never for Christ’s own humanity, but ours.439 The incarnation was 
necessary, not for any atoning work to occur internally to Christ but simply because 
common humanity did not deserve to loose itself from Satan’s grasp. Freedom would 
have been taken unconscionably, not ‘by justice, but by violence’;440 thereby the 
 Such a black-and-white view of East vs. West is being increasingly challenged in modern scholarship. 437
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incarnation was required for a diﬀerent, more worthy substance, to satisfy the juridical 
exchange. Aquinas, following this, formalises Anselm’s framework of satisfaction. Though 
moving away from Christ settling an honour debt to appease a wrathful God, instead 
asserting the restoration of a state of divine-human harmony disrupted by sin,  he also 441
excludes any meaningful signiﬁcance of fallen humanity being represented so to be 
healed internally to Christ by healing union with divinity. Where for Augustine it is Christ’s 
humanity itself that is medicinal to our own nature, for Aquinas it is simply the exchange 
of punishment that is considered redemptive, externalising atonement more absolutely.  442
In this Medieval isolation of substitution, Christ’s humanity is simply instrumental, and 
fairly charged of the “Latin Heresy”, the non-assumptus certainly in need of recovery. For 
the Latin Fathers, however, it has been demonstrated that Torrance’s notion is 
problematic. Although the explicit language of fallen human nature is not used, atonement 
is still very much internalised to Christ’s humanity. This shows that for both East and West 
at this period, God was understood to be ontologically inseparable from the content of 
His own work of redemption. Despite diﬀerences in lapsarian terminology, Van Kuiken 
recognises that ‘conceptually both Latin and Greeks concur that Christ’s humanity was 
fallen in his mother and regained in the Incarnation a sinlessness which is prelapsarian in 
the sense of reﬂecting Edenic innocence, yet still postlapsarian in the sense of suﬀering 
from many of the Fall’s eﬀects’. 
443
Thirdly, the signiﬁcance of this Patristic study for more clearly deﬁning what is meant 
by Christ’s assumption of fallen human nature, is that Christ seems to be physically 
corrupt in the ﬂesh, but not necessarily morally corrupt. Van Kuiken contends that the 
Fathers unanimously assert ‘Christ’s assumption of a real humanity like ours and, with it, 
sinless inﬁrmities, but exclude every manifestation of sin - whether sinful impulse or sinful 
 Aquinas, Summa, 2.113.2441
 Ibid., 2.87.8.442
 Van Kuiken, Humanity, 159.443
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action’.  This is mostly fair, as hunger, tiredness, and sickness are all seen to be eﬀects 444
of the fall that must be conquered internally to Christ’s humanity. Yet, for all but 
Augustine, even concupiscence is assumed, meaning the propensities, impulses and 
desires (in the diverse range of meaning held by the term) are also conquered internally, 
and are not considered inherently morally reprehensible. In either sense, Crisp's 
contention that only the symptoms (or appearance) of fallenness are assumed has little 
Patristic support. On the other hand, it is in this consideration that it may well be beyond 
the intention of the Fathers to consider (i) with Federal theology, that the propensity to sin 
is inherently morally reprehensible, and (ii) with Torrance, that Christ assumes this mantle 
vicariously, but it is not an unnatural extension.

Torrance does not make this leap in his earlier work, separating Christ from the moral 
reprehensibility of original corruption.  However, in his mature work, Torrance extends 445
the non-assumptus to Christ becoming vicariously morally corrupt in the assumption of 
original sin to redeem it. Here, the attribution of fallenness to nature and sin to person is 
enlightening. That the physical eﬀects of the fall are healed in physical restoration 
(ultimately in resurrection), while the will, as an element of nature but only operative by the 
person, is restored by Christ’s bringing the perfection of His person which pre-exists the 
damaged nature into healing operation within it, elucidates the Patristic unanimity of 
Christ’s weaknesses and desires being restored internally to His sinless person.
Given these points of signiﬁcance, the question remains as to whether this Patristic 
conceptual unity and nuanced use of prelapsarian and postlapsarian terminology, can be 
a point of common ground amongst both fallenness and unfallenness theologians.

 Ibid., 156.444
 He here follows H. R. Mackintosh’s critique of Edward Irving in distinguishing between Christ being 445
‘corruptible’ in physical subjection to death and ‘corrupt’ in moral depravity (Mackintosh, Doctrine, 
277-278).
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4. Common Ground
4.1 Isolation of Natures 
As we have seen, the contentions made by Crisp and others in our last chapter—that the 
weaknesses of Christ’s humanity are merely symptomatic—are not only problematic 
logically but also historically. Although, as Crisp states, the weaknesses of Christ’s human 
nature for the Fathers may well be ‘for all practical purposes, obliterated’ by His divine 
origin,446 the Patristic witness is ubiquitous in that intricate care is taken to maintain the 
integrity of these weaknesses for the purposes of their conquering being internal to 
Christ’s humanity.  
However, the motive by which Crisp contends Christ’s weaknesses to be merely 
symptomatic, and his defence that these weaknesses are more than just a facade, is 
where common ground might be found. In Christ’s temptation, Crisp concedes that 
Jesus’ time in the wilderness and later troubles in Gethsemane were a genuine pull on His 
conscience, meaning His humanity is like our own. On the other hand, Christ is unlike us, 
since, in the strength of the Son’s divinity, it was entirely inevitable that holiness would 
win out. Were Christ’s human nature ever to draw near to giving in to temptation, His 
divine nature would intervene to prevent sin.447 As a result of this inevitability, for Crisp, 
the Son’s ﬁght against temptation is not necessarily the same as our “fallen” temptation, 
because the Son could never give in. However, despite the inevitability of Christ’s denial 
of temptation, he accepts that temptation must still be actively denied. The analogy is of 
an invincible pugilist who, though he may never lose, must still ﬁght his opponents.448 
Crisp goes on to concede that when the human nature of the Son is viewed in isolation 
from His divine nature, that nature may indeed have the same capacity to sin as our fallen 
humanity. He writes, ‘Christ’s human nature may have the disposition or capacity to sin (in 
 Crisp, God, 125.446
 See ibid., 124–32.447
 Ibid., 133.448
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abstraction from the incarnation, as it were, and yet be rendered incapable of sinning by 
being in personal union with his divine nature’.449 
Darren Sumner’s excellent recent work has highlighted that this theotic role of the 
Son’s divinity in divinising His humanity may provide the foundation for dialogue in this 
debate,450 and though his is not a historical work, we would suggest that such common 
ground may prove a contemporary return to the conceptual unity of the Fathers. Here, 
does Crisp not hold the very same intention as advocates of the fallenness view? Crisp 
has rightly contended that Classical Christology holds within it the peccability of the 
Son’s humanity that is made impeccable in unity with His divinity.451 Yet is it right to 
contrast this with the intentions of advocates of the fallenness view? 
Unfortunately, Crisp rejects this shared motive as a resolution, instead suggesting this 
‘poses problems for defenders of the fallenness view’, as such similarity makes the 
attempt to uphold the integrity of Christ’s temptation redundant as a theological 
motivation.452 More broadly, it shows the inadequacy of the fallenness view in 
distinguishing itself from classical Christology.453 Since Christ’s human posse peccare is 
overridden by His divine non posse peccare, it is useless to ever describe Christ as 
anything but impeccable.  
 Ibid., 132–3.449
 D. O. Sumner, ‘Fallenness and Anhypostasis: A Way Forward in the Debate over Christ’s Humanity’, SJT 450
67 (2014), 195–212.
 Citing medieval habitual grace, ‘One traditional account of the Incarnation suggests that the Divine Son 451
of God assumes a sinless but peccable human nature, which, by virtue of being united to the Son, is 
rendered incapable of sin. If this is right, then this strand of classical Christology has the resources to deal 
with the ‘no-capability to sin’ objection that is raised by the advocates of the sinlessness view’ (Crisp, God, 
127; cf. D. Bathrellos, ‘The Sinlessness of Jesus: A Theological Exploration in the Light of Trinitarian 
Theology’ in P. L. Metzger (ed.), Trinitarian Soundings in Systematic Theology [New York: T&T Clark, 2015] 
113-126, 115).
 Crisp, Divinity, 106.452
 Crisp, God, 133. This is surely, in some sense, needless rhetoric. One would struggle to ﬁnd an 453
advocate of the fallenness position out to intentionally set themselves apart from classical Christology for 
the sake of argument. Torrance, for example, has simply sought to reclaim what has been neglected in Latin 
theology, to internalise to the constitution of the Mediator what has been made instrumental.
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However, this approach towards fallenness advocates such as Torrance signiﬁes, what 
Cameron and Deddo have dubbed, an ‘aloneness thesis’.454 Deddo writes that such 
‘habits of mind almost inevitably regard relationship as extrinsic, as accidental to who and 
what God, God’s creation and creatures are…Everything that can be said to have being is 
essentially what it is without being related to anything else’.455 In this, Crisp misrepresents 
the fallenness position in viewing the fallen humanity of the Son in isolation from the 
redemptive union of His theandric person. The central contention of the fallenness view is 
that Christ’s human nature must never be regarded apart from His divine nature, thereby 
never apart from redemption,456 yet for His human nature to always be regarded as 
distinct from His divine nature, so to understand the redemptive quality of the union.457 
What both sides of this debate may be able to agree to is that the Son’s humanity is, at 
the very least, anhypostatically fallen. The nature that the Son assumes is in need of 
sanctiﬁcation—even if the battle may inevitably be won, the battle must still be fought. 
4.2 Communicatio Gratarium 
Sumner contends that this common motive may be best expounded through shared 
foundations of the communicatio gratarium. The basic premise that Christ received an 
impartation of divine grace to His human nature is generally common ground between 
various theological traditions. Within this, it is as Christ’s humanity bears some level of 
divine properties in unity with God that, all would agree, Christ’s humanity is 
fundamentally and necessarily alike and unlike our own. Christ’s humanity is most 
signiﬁcantly unlike our own in sinlessness, yet most alike our own in being kept from 
 D. J. Cameron, Flesh and Blood: A Dogmatic Sketch Concerning the Fallen Nature View of Christ's 454
Human Nature (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2016) 46.
 G. Deddo, ‘The Realist and Onto-Relational Frame of T. F. Torrance’s Incarnational Trinitarian Theology’, 455
Theology in Scotland 16 (2009), 105-133, 121.
 This “onto-relationality” is precisely Torrance’s central motive in separating Christ in fallenness from 456
personal sin: that Christ’s assumption of fallenness be considered dynamically, not statically; that fallenness 
is never left in the state in which He takes it throughout the process of redemption, thereby never 
actualising sin. See Torrance, Incarnation, 63f, 85f, 204ﬀ.
 Sumner, ‘Fallenness’, 201-203.457
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sinning, or that sinning was made impossible, by the impartation of grace to His human 
nature. Though this communication of grace may take diﬀerent shapes amongst 
traditions, it is in this similarity that common ground may be found in Christ being 
anhypostatically fallen. 
458
In the Catholic tradition, the human nature of Christ is endowed with a divine habitus, 
inherited from His own holy Mother. All grace and virtue intrinsic to divinity are naturally 
borne in Mary, passed to Christ, human nature being infused with the perfection of divine. 
As Aquinas states, ‘Christ had grace and all the virtues most perfectly…the ‘fomes’ of sin 
was nowise in Him’.  The Son’s humanity is like ours yet diﬀers as, in unity with God, it 459
naturally bears within itself divine sinlessness. Anhypostatically, Christ’s (and Mary’s) 
humanity as distinct from the endowment of such habitus would be fallen, in need of 
redemption.

In Lutheranism, Christ’s sinlessness is located in the genus maiestaticum—that in the 
hypostatic union, Christ’s humanity is so closely bound to His divinity that it gains divine 
attributes.  This humanity is like ours yet diﬀers as, through the hypostatic union, it 460
bears the sinlessness of the divinity it is bound to. Anhypostatically, Christ’s humanity as 
distinct from such union would be fallen, in need of redemption.

In distinctly Protestant works, the Spirit sanctiﬁes the Son’s nature assumed from 
Mary,  either at conception where the Spirit ‘keeps every speck of sin away from the 461
 Much of the following elaborates on ibid., 207-210.458
 Aquinas, Summa, 3.15.2, cf. 3.7.1,5,7. Here, Aquinas details the graces and gifts naturally habitual to 459
Christ’s human nature. Barth denies that such attributes would be naturally habitual, instead contending 
that such graces are communicated by God in the actuality of the incarnation. ‘[G]race is a divine giving and 
human receiving’, meaning it can only be ‘had’ in the Son’s humanity within His temporal reception of them; 
they are not habitually present in our humanity that the Son takes for His own (Barth, CD IV/2, 90).
 M. Chemnitz, The Two Natures in Christ (tr. J. A. O. Preus; St Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1971) 460
251. In distinction from the transferral of attributes in the genus maiestaticum, less signiﬁcant gifts are given
in “communicated grace”. External to the hypostatic union, the humanity of Christ is given ﬁnite gifts that
prime His human nature to be a ﬁtting tool for His broader redemptive work. His humanity receives ‘such
supernatural gifts in order that it can be the fully and properly prepared instrument with and through which
the deity of the Logos exercises and carries out its activities’ (Chemnitz, Natures, 252).
 H. Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics (ed. E. Bizer, G. T. Thomson; London: George Allen & Unwin, 1950) 461
424–427, contra the Catholic contention that Jesus’ sinlessness was inherited from the perfection of His 
own holy Mother.
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humanity of Jesus in the Virgin’s womb’,  or continuously throughout Jesus’ life, as with 462
Irving.  The Son’s humanity is like ours yet diﬀers as, through pneumatological 463
sanctiﬁcation, the nature borne from Mary is cleansed. Anhypostatically, Christ’s humanity 
as distinct from the pneumatological healing of the nature assumed from Mary would be 
fallen, in need of redemption.

Especially emphasised in Reformed theology, the sinlessness of Christ is indeed 
naturally habitual, but by special dispensation of the Spirit to Christ’s humanity. The 
graces habitual in Christ’s humanity, including impeccability, ‘were of course imparted to 
the humanity of Christ without measure, since they are the highest gifts of the Spirit which 
a creature can receive at all’.  This could resolve issues with the genus maiestaticum 464
that, logically speaking, if the Son’s humanity is sinless as it is bound to His divinity within 
His hypostasis, surely all that is true of the Son’s divinity should be present in His 
humanity (leading to problematic concepts of physical omnipresence in the incarnation). 
This Reformed pneumatological communication of graces is more selective in detailing 
the divine attributes present in Christ’s humanity by moving beyond simply attributing 
them to His inherent divinity or the hypostatic union. The Son’s humanity is like ours yet 
diﬀers as, by communication of the Spirit, it is endowed with divine sinlessness. 
Anhypostatically, Christ’s humanity as distinct from this pneumatological dispensation 
would be fallen, in need of redemption.

With Spirit Christology, the Son’s sinlessness is located in His obedience enabled by 
submission to the Spirit and the empowerment of the Spirit’s presence. The Son’s 
humanity is like ours yet diﬀers as, by the guidance of the Spirit, the Son is led to stay 
 Heppe, Dogmatics, 426.462
 Dorries, Christology, 360–361.463
 Heppe, Dogmatics, 434.464
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sinless.  Anhypostatically, Christ’s humanity as distinct from pneumatological 465
empowerment would be fallen, in need of redemption.

For the deﬁnition of the communicatio gratarium used in this thesis, Barth’s treatment 
of the communicatio gratarium is most constructive for this study, being most formative of 
Torrance’s own theology and, more broadly, being the most comprehensive in 
encompassing the dynamism of the divine life that is being communicated in human 
reception of grace. He takes up the Reformed position but departs from each extreme of 
previous static formulations. Though Christ’s sinlessness is a grace communicated to His 
humanity by the Spirit, this is not communicated to the human nature to be received as 
an external beneﬁt. Rather, it is ‘the total and exclusive determination of the human nature 
of Jesus Christ by the grace of God’.  In this way, Christ’s humanity, even in the 466
trappings of the fall, is still entirely determined by absolute divine freedom. As that 
freedom is communicated to and received by fallen humanity, it is thus truly free of sin 
itself.

Sumner’s contribution, developed here, should present to each of these traditions 
something of worth in recognising Christ’s humanity to be anhypostatically fallen, not in 
separation from the redemption that will thus occur and guarantee the spotlessness of 
the Saviour, but in distinction, so to recognise the true extent and value of the redemption 
achieved. 
 Habets, ‘Fallen’, 36-37, cf. E. Irving, The Collected Writings of Edward Irving (5 volumes, ed. G. Carlyle; 465
London: Alexander Strachan, 1864) 2:98; J. Owen, The Works of John Owen: Volume 3, Pneumatologia (ed. 
W. H. Goold; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1863) 170.
 Barth CD IV/2, 88.466
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Conclusion 
In dogmatic dialogue with T. F. Torrance, it can be seen that the Son’s assumption of 
fallen humanity is intelligible under the soteriological concern—that the “unassumed is 
unhealed”, where divine-human union is an essentially redemptive bond. This has been 
neglected in the “Latin Heresy”, where a dualism between the Son’s person and His work 
has instrumentalised Christ’s humanity, rendering it bereft of inherent soteriological 
signiﬁcance, leaving the ontological depths of human fallenness untouched by 
redemption where atonement occurs on or to, not within, our nature.

In Torrance’s contextualisation of atonement to Christ’s humanity, redemption is not 
isolated to the singular moment of judiciary satisfaction at the cross but spans the entirety 
of the incarnation. In the dialectic synthesis of distinct elements of the Son’s atoning 
work, fallen human nature is restored both “once and for all” as the Son initially takes it to 
Himself at the virgin birth, and in “continuous union” throughout Christ’s temporal 
existence. 

At the virgin birth, the Son’s redemptive union with fallen humanity is veiled beneath 
His ﬂesh, to be revealed and authenticated at the resurrection where the atoning work is 
brought to fruition. In turn, atonement is shown to be contextualised to Christ’s humanity 
(i) where the virgin authenticates His physical reality and therein enables redemption to be 
shared with those of solidary nature; (ii) in that God Himself is at work within fallen nature, 
and is the sole cause of its redemption, as Christ’s birth is an exclusively monergistic 
divine act of kenosis; (iii) in that redemption is a creation “ex virgine”, not “ex nihilo”, that 
is, a restoration of fallen matter, not a replacement of the old; and (iv) in that Christ aligns 
Himself with the continuity of Adamic fallenness, yet sets aside sinful human autonomy.

In the continuous union, Torrance grounds the contextualisation of atonement to 
Christ’s humanity by restating the common Christological foundation of the homoousion, 
hypostatic union, and an/enhypostasia. 
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The homoousion articulates Christ’s dual consubstantiality with both God and fallen 
humanity, ontologically authenticating His being and act as both, substantiating His 
revelatory and reconciliatory work as “very God” and, against the instrumentalist of the 
“Latin Heresy”, securing genuine human involvement within it. Epistemologically, in 
Christ’s prokope, He grows in wisdom from within the fallen state, therein removing the 
obstacles of human ignorance and attaining knowledge of God within our modes of 
thought and speech, providing the axis of divine revelation and human receptivity in His 
consubstantiality with both.

The hypostatic union, in turn, is dynamically restated so to contextualise atonement to 
Christ’s humanity. Divine-human union in the “mystery of Christ” is not simply the 
interrelation of humanity with the transcendent God (mustērion) but this unity is set forth
into the fallen state (prothesis) whereby fallen humanity can participate in the divine life 
(koinōnia). The essentially redemptive eﬀect of divinity on humanity is brought into 
contact in the dyophysitical interrelations of Christ’s person; where the “two ends” of the 
homoousion are brought together, the revelation and reconciliation authenticated by 
Christ’s dual consubstantiality are actualised as divine self-knowledge is translated into 
human modes of form and speech and the ultimate telos of reconciliation of divine-human 
union is wrought within Christ’s own person. Restating the Chalcedonian adverbs, 
Christ’s two natures interrelate inconfusedly, immutably, indivisibly and inseparably. The 
distinction of divinity and fallen humanity is retained in their union with each other 
(inconfuse), even when God Himself enters the turmoil of human suﬀering so to bring it to 
peace (immutabiliter). In this, it is as fallen human nature is indivisible from the divine life 
(indivise) that to isolate any of Christ’s redemptive acts within His continuous union with 
that state would be to place separation within the very life of God (inseparabiliter). It is 
here that, as redemption is actualised within the mechanism of dyophysitical 
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interrelations, dualism between Christ’s person and work is refuted, and atonement 
becomes who Christ is, not what Christ has done.

The anhypostatic-enhypostatic couplet details (i) the Son’s anhypostatic assumption 
of generic fallen humanity, with no individual persons added to the Son’s hypostasis and 
can thereby refer to our universal fallen substance distinct from personhood, and, (ii) the 
Son’s enhypostatic instantiation of particular fallen humanity, personalising a fallen 
individual in His own hypostasis. The couplet contextualises atonement to Christ’s 
humanity in three ways. Firstly, it does so by securing the universal involvement of fallen 
humanity in reconciliation while still considering it a pure act of God, in Christ’s 
anhypostatic assumption of generic fallen substance and enhypostatic personalisation of 
fallen individuality in His divine hypostasis. Secondly, it does so by rendering Christ a 
sinless fallen human, as despite His anhypostatic universal solidarity with generic fallen 
humanity, He enhypostatically instantiates fallen existence as the sinless God, therein 
setting aside the division of sinful personhood to unite fallen nature in redemption within 
Himself. Christ lives within the continuity of Adam’s progeny as a perfectly obedient fallen 
individual in a level of communion with the Father that has not previously been achieved 
within that state, within which those of solidary nature can participate. Thirdly, the couplet 
secures the ontologically generic and epistemologically personal union of God and fallen 
humanity within Christ. Where anhypostasia ensures redemption occurs universally within 
the ontic depths of fallenness, enhypostasia secures the Son’s noetic bond with fallen 
humanity (included and predicated in the ontic union), wherein Christ reconciles humanity 
and God within the context of personal relations, providing a positive personal response 
to divine revelation, paradigmatic for common humanity.

While grounded in the homoousion, hypostatic union, and an/enhypostasia, the 
redemption of fallen humanity in continuous union with Christ is actualised in the perfect 
obedience of Christ’s vicarious humanity, where the Son acts on behalf of fallen humanity 
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in every instance of divine-human interaction. Christ’s substitution for fallen humanity is 
not at the expense of our involvement and thereby entirely instrumental; He acts as a 
genuine representative of the postlapsarian condition. In active and passive obedience 
the Son acts positively in every instance where sin should arise and accepts the Father’s 
judgement on the cursed state He assumes. By this, while bearing the concrete likeness 
of sinful ﬂesh, the Son condemns sin in the ﬂesh (Rom 8:3), actively bending the fallen will 
back into communion with the Father and passively bearing the curse of our humanity to 
overcome it, vindicating our guilt by His innocence within our fallen state.

The cross and resurrection, in turn, bring the redemption of fallen humanity in 
continuous union with Christ to fulﬁlment. As the crescendo of the non-assumptus, the 
darkest moment of human fallenness—our Godforsakenness in death—is assumed by 
the Son to be restored. The Son internalises the root conﬂict of divine enmity against sin 
and human rebellion against God in their furthest extents and settles it within Himself.

Torrance therefore provides an excellent framework for atonement contextualised to 
Christ’s humanity, showing the soteriological necessity of doing so where the unassumed 
is unhealed and the signiﬁcance of Son’s assumption of fallen human nature for 
redemption.

Chapter two sought to address the conceptual ambiguity of the debate by more 
clearly deﬁning key terms. Fallenness, ﬁrstly, was established as a contingent 
anthropological property and therefore assumed not by necessity but by God’s free 
choice in His self-deﬁnition as Redeemer. Fallenness was understood in terms of original 
corruption and guilt. In original corruption, Crisp contends, Christ cannot assume even a 
“weak” corruption of internal propensity to sin, as this alone would be morally 
reprehensible to God, whereby fallenness would have to be predicated to a secondary 
Nestorian subject. In original guilt, Edwards’ contends that guilt is not merely imputed 
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from Adam to his progeny merely by consubstantiality of nature, but, concurrent to this, 
our personal concurrence with his sin.  
In response to Crisp’s critique, the attribution of fallenness to nature and sinfulness to 
person was discussed. Nature, while retaining an element of substantialism, was deﬁned 
as the holistic reality of a human individual, rather than a concrete individual or an 
abstract set of properties. Person, meanwhile, was deﬁned as the individual personalising 
force, the hypostasis wherein nature is instantiated. With McFarland, where the will is an 
element of nature only operative in person, the hypostatic identity of humanity as “sinner” 
is manifest within nature by the will. Sin, thereby, is not attributed to nature as the will is 
indeterminate apart from person; that is, human nature cannot control that it desires sin—
it is person that is the causal agent of sinful desire. Fallen nature and sinful person are 
inseparable for common humanity, whereby the hypostatic identity of “sinner” inevitably 
renders sin within the individual’s nature. In Christ, however, where the hypostatic identity 
of the Son preexists His fallen nature; it is not sin that is manifest within His human will 
but divine perfection, actualised in perfect obedience. 
With clearer deﬁnitions established, the integrity of the Son’s suﬀering and 
temptations if His humanity was unfallen was explored, concluding that, had the Son 
assumed merely the symptoms of fallenness or only select portions of our humanity, this 
would leave the root cause of those symptoms unredeemed and His humanity quasi-
Docetic with genuine materiality but illusory weakness. 
In other dogmatic concerns, Chiarot’s critique of the simultaneity of redemption within 
temporal sequentiality were resolved with Barth’s doctrine of eternity. In the simultaneity 
of God’s own pre-, supra-, and post-temporality, redemption—as the interrelation of God 
in transcendence with creation—is freed from the separation and distance of our own 
temporal restrictions. 
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Further critique that Torrance is inconsistent in applying the non-assumptus—as sinful 
persons are not said to be assumed but are still redeemed—is resolved in Torrance’s 
notion of participation. Though the Son anhypostatically assumes common nature and 
enhypostatically excludes sinful persons, those persons may pneumatologically 
participate in the redemption achieved within the Son’s hypostasis, entering into the 
communion of the divine life.

Chiarot again criticises that the imputation of righteousness of “Federal” theology is 
not as instrumental as Torrance perceives, as it is still an imputation of the achievements 
from within Christ’s neutral humanity. Torrance, in turn, is seen to slip into instrumentalism 
himself, as Christ’s fallen will also relies on external divine assistance. This, however, 
misrepresents Torrance’s understanding of instrumentalism, as what is instrumental is not 
whether the Son graciously humbles Himself to a place of desolation but whether or not 
fallen humanity is genuinely involved in the redemptive process.

Finally, pneumatological concerns of the non-assumptus were addressed, avoiding 
the two extremes of the Spirit being entirely neglected from the Son’s redemptive union 
with fallen nature and thereby powerless to recreate that redemption within common 
humanity and, conversely, that the Spirit separates the Son from causal operation of His 
own humanity. The Spirit’s mediation of the Son to His humanity is not to the exclusion of 
the Son’s agency but is in fact what constitutes incarnation. This mediative involvement, 
in turn, grounds the Spirit’s recreation of the redemption of the Son’s fallen humanity in 
believers.

With these conceptual obstacles resolved, chapter three addressed Torrance’s 
historical reading and the legitimacy of the “Latin Heresy”. It was shown that the Eastern 
and Western Fathers are more conceptually united than Torrance would give credit for. 
Though the shape of atonement diﬀers, and Augustine in particular shifts his emphasis to 
more juridical conclusions, atonement is still certainly internalised to Christ’s humanity 
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and is therefore certainly not considered absolutely prelapsarian. Several conclusions 
were drawn. Firstly, Torrance is guilty of isolating the Eastern Father’s postlapsarian 
terminology, neglecting their balanced use of prelapsarian language to describe the 
aﬀectations of redemption. Conversely, Crisp's claim that there is no historical grounding 
for Christ’s humanity to be considered postlapsarian, is also groundless. Secondly, in this 
conceptual unity, the “Latin Heresy” misrepresents the Western Fathers. However, the 
development of Latin theology in the Medieval tradition, through the Reformation into 
contemporary Evangelicalism, adopts the juridical conclusions (predominantly of 
Augustine but neglects the nuances of atonement internalised to Christ’s humanity. 
Augustine still regarded Christ’s humanity itself to be intrinsically medicinal, whereas 
Aquinas considered merely the exchange of punishment to be redemptive, thereby 
externalising atonement more absolutely. Thirdly, the Fathers considered Christ to be 
physically corrupt but not necessarily morally corrupt. Physical weaknesses are not 
inherently morally wrong, so they can be internally redeemed by Christ without question. 
However, for all but Augustine, even concupiscence is assumed by the Son, meaning that 
fallen desires, passions and temptations are internalised and are not considered to be 
inherently morally reprehensible in the Patristic witness. It may well be beyond the 
intention of the Fathers to consider, with Federal theology, that the propensity to sin is 
inherently morally reprehensible and, with mature Torrance, that the Son becomes so 
vicariously, but it is not an unnatural extension. 
These observations led to the conclusion that this Patristic conceptual unity 
elaborated on Sumner’s suggestion that the Son’s anhypostatic assumption of fallen 
human nature may provide common ground for the progression of the debate. In the 
ecumenically universal notion of the communicatio gratarium, all can agree that Christ 
receives grace within His humanity for means of redemption. It is this assertion, that 
Christ’s humanity was considered postlapsarian to be redeemed into prelapsarian state, 
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that was common to the Fathers, and it should provide synthesis of intentions for the 
contemporary debate. Christ’s humanity is not considered simply fallen but our humanity 
is redeemed in Him. 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Appendix 1 - Suggestions for Biblical Research: The Virgin Birth in the Non-
Assumptus 
This thesis, as a dogmatic dialogue with T. F. Torrance, did not engage heavily in biblical 
research. However, suggestions for biblical research can be made, to further progress the 
debate of the Son’s assumption of fallen human nature. Firstly, the biblical significance of 
the virgin birth in the non-assumptus.
1. Virgin Birth in Synoptics and Johannine Literature
In detailing the soteriological significance of the virgin brith within the contextualisation of 
atonement to Christ’s humanity, Torrance’s sees the non-assumptus as present in the 
Synoptic Gospels and Johannine literature, in his interpretation of the Matthean genealogy 
of Jesus; the often overlooked account of John 1:13 as a reference to the virgin birth; and 
the correlation between Christ’s virgin birth and the spiritual rebirth of believers.
Torrance’s contends the Matthean genealogy testifies to Christ’s absolute solidarity with 
His fallen ancestry, that in unbroken continuity ‘Jesus was incorporated into a long line of 
sinners’.  The virgin birth commences the actualisation of the Son’s displacement of the 467
continuity of sin, ‘summing up in himself our sinful stock’ to restore it.468
Turning to the Johannine literature, one of Torrance’s most contentious interpretations is 
of John 1:13, “who were born”, not as a plural term for believers reborn in Christ, but a 
singular reference to Christ at the virgin birth, better translated “who was born”.  469
However, even if one were to concede to the plural interpretation, Torrance asserts that 
“who were born” would be ‘an extended reference to the virgin birth’ since John has used 
the term ανδρος (andros, “man”) in a singular reference to a male or husband, over and 
 Torrance, Mediation, 41.467
 Torrance, Mediation, 41.468
 Torrance, Incarnation, 90. Torrance here cites Patristic support for interpreting John 1:13-14 in the 469
singular, namely, Tertullian, Irenaeus, Justin Martyr, Epistola Apostolorum, Hippolytus, and Clement of 
Alexandria, and slightly more contemporarily, he cites Harnack, claiming his judgement to be ‘increasingly 
followed by scholars’. Torrance, Incarnation, 90; A. Harnack, The Date of the Acts and of the Synoptic 
Gospels (J. R. Wilkinson [tr.], London: Williams & Norgate, 1911) 148.
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above using ἄνθρωποu (anthrópou, “humankind”) as a general reference to all 
humanity.470
The singular interpretation of John 1:13 is highly debated, though Kulandaisamy finds 
the interpretative weight, from the end of the nineteenth century up to present scholarship, 
to be with the singular over the plural.  The singular interpretation, as with Torrance, finds 471
John to be speaking not simply of the spiritual rebirth of believers, but of the incarnation. 
Although readings vary as to the strength of John’s intentions to emphasise the virgin birth, 
almost all of these singular interpretations, at the very least, read the virgin birth as a 
background assumption in this reference to the incarnation.  472
What is of significance to Torrance’s reading, however, is that some plural interpreters 
would accept his contention of an extended or secondary reading of John 1:13 as a 
reference to the virgin birth. This becomes particularly apparent as the connection is 
commonly made amongst plural interpreters, between the spiritual rebirth of the believer 
and the physical birth of Christ. For example, Le Frois highlights that John’s plural 
reference to the rebirth of believers is articulated in the same terms that describe the virgin 
birth, thereby conceptually linking the two.  Barrett, though also denying v13 to be a 473
direct reference to the virgin birth, contends John’s use of language implies Christ’s birth to 
be paradigmatic of the believer’s rebirth, as both share an exclusively divine origin.  474
Crossan, following Barrett, asserts that John intentionally alludes to the virgin birth to 
 Torrance, Incarnation, 90.470
 D. S. Kulandaisamy, The Birth of Jesus or the Birth of Christians? An Inquiry into the Authenticity of John 471
1:13 (Rome: Marianum, 2015) 46-86.
 Loisy is the odd exception to the singular interpreters, since, though he affirms v13 to refer to the 472
incarnation, he directly denies the virgin birth. Braun comments of him, ‘[to Loisy,] the birth of the Incarnate 
Word in time was as foreign to the role of a human mother as to the action of a father according to the flesh. 
In the Evangelist’s eyes, he felt, Jesus was an ordinary man, conceived according to the natural process. But 
John paid no heed to that, for what was important in his eyes was the divine sonship of the Saviour—
understood almost as the Gnostics understood it, as a descent of the divinity upon Jesus as on the occasion 
of the Baptism at Jordan’, F. M. Braun, Mother of God’s People (New York: Alba House, 1967) 39.
 Le Frois, B.J., ‘The Spiritual Motherhood of Mary in John 1:13’, in Catholic Biblical Quarterly 13 (1951) 473
422-431. 
 C. K. Barrett, The Gospel According to St. John: An Introduction With Commentary on the Greek Text, 474
(2nd Edn., Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1956) 137-138.
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shape the reader’s understanding of Christian rebirth, that ‘the virgin birth of Jesus from 
Mary was archetypal forever of the baptismal rebirth of Christians’.  Of particular interest 475
to Torrance’s singular interpretation is the dismissal of the reading by his Doktorvater Karl 
Barth. However, despite his contention that John’s words should not be directly interpreted 
as referential to Christ in the singular, Barth sympathetically adds that John may well have 
included suggestive language to conceptually echo Christ’s birth. Barth writes, ‘In the light 
of the virgin birth it is natural to speak of Christ in the phrases of this verse without thinking 
that this is the real meaning’.476
Torrance interpretation renders the same theological conclusion, that such reference to 
the virgin birth—whether explicit or extended—reveals our own rebirth from death into life 
to be directly correlative to Christ’s own birth. Torrance highlights in John’s first epistle that 
a believer’s denial of sin as one ‘born of God’ is held and sustained by Christ as he himself 
is ‘born of God’ (1 John 5:18). Thus, it is not unthinkable John’s gospel directly correlates 
the believer’s being born ‘from above’ (John 3:7) with Christ’s being born ‘of God’ (John 
1:13). John’s message, Torrance perceives, is that ‘it is upon Christ’s unique birth once 
and for all that our birth depends and in his birth we are given to share’.477
The significance of our rebirth relying on Christ’s birth in this way, to Torrance, is the 
soteriologically necessary role of Christ’s vicarious virgin birth within the non-assumptus. 
As Christ vicariously assumes the act of human birth, he redeems it, and as such, our own 
rebirth is secured as we come to share in his birth. Our own spiritual rebirth is simply a 
participation in the paradigm of redemption achieved in Christ’s own act of assumption—
without his physical birth, we would be without the paradigm that proleptically enables and 
conditions our own rebirth. To Torrance, John testifies that in the moment of human rebirth, 
 D. Crossan, ’The Marian significance of John 1, 12-13’, in Maria in Sacra Scriptura. Acta Congresus 475
Mariologici-Mariani anno 1965 celebrati, vol. V: De Beata Virgine Maria in 
Evangelio S. Ioannis et in Apocalypsi, (Rome: Pontificia Academia Mariana Internationalis, 1967, 99-107) 
107. 
 K. Barth, Witness to the Word: A Commentary on John 1 (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2003) 80-81.476
 Torrance, Incarnation, 91.477
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‘there takes place in us the birth of Jesus, or rather, we are in a remarkable way given to 
share through grace in his birth… Just as he was born from above of the Holy Spirit, so we 
are born from above of the Holy Spirit through sharing in his birth’.478
2.Virgin Birth in Paul
Torrance’s reading of the non-assumptus continues in his interpretation of the virgin birth in 
Pauline literature, in Paul’s presentation of the virgin birth as an assumptive act that 
qualifies Christ for human representation within his Adamic Christology; the correlation 
between the believer’s status as children of God and the virgin birth referred to in 
Galatians 4:4-5; and, concurrent with John, the significance of the virgin birth in enabling 
the rebirth of the believer through participation in Christ’s birth.
The non-assumptus is particularly prominent throughout Torrance’s reading of Paul’s 
Adamic Christology. Christ’s virginal conception is an assumption of the same type of birth 
as the first Adam—the first human birth of Eden is replicated as the birth of Jesus is 
brought about exclusively by divine initiative. In assuming this same birth, the Son is 
qualified for His representative capacity as the second Adam, bringing life through the 
same birth within which the first Adam brought death.  Torrance sees Christ’s virginal 479
conception in this Adamic Christology utilised most explicitly in Paul’s language of human 
generation. In Galatians, when Paul refers to Christ’s generation, Paul refuses to use the 
verb γεννάω (gennaō, “to be born”, Gal. 4:23, 24, 29), ubiquitously used throughout the 
New Testament for regular human generation. Instead, Paul uses the verb γίνομαι 
(ginomai, “to become”, Gal. 4:4), only ever used in reference to Adam and Christ. This 
distinction in Adamic Christology between regular human generation and Jesus’ 
generation is, to Torrance, Paul’s ‘strongest disavowal of birth by ordinary human 
 Torrance, Incarnation, 101, 91.478
 Torrance, Incarnation, 92, here citing 1 Cor.15:22 to this end.479
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generation in regard to the birth of Jesus’.   To apply this to the redemptive terms of the 480
non-assumptus, if Adam’s birth is not assumed by Christ, Adam’s descendants remain 
unhealed.
Torrance goes on to interpret Paul’s Adamic Christology in a manner similar to the 
Johannine literature, finding a clear correlation between the virgin birth of Christ, and the 
spiritual rebirth of believers. Torrance interprets Paul’s language of Christ’s sonship in 
Galatians 4:4 as a reference to the believer’s adoption declared in Galatians 3:26-27, that 
the believer’s status as a child of God in 3:26-27 is explained by and reliant upon the 
Christ’s own sonship in 4:4. In this, the Son was sent to become the child of a woman so 
that humanity might become children of God (4:4-5); as the Son was commissioned by the 
Father to assume the act of human birth for the very purpose of our sonship, our status as 
children of God becomes entirely reliant on Christ’s own birth.481
We would criticise Torrance here, that reading γίνομαι ἐκ γυνή (ginomai ek gynē, “born 
of a woman”, 4:4) as a direct reference to the virgin birth has been largely rejected by 
biblical scholars throughout his career.  What can be affirmed of Paul’s intention in this 482
passage, however, is not that Paul links the nature of Christ’s conception to His 
redemptive work, but that it is of central soteriological concern that the Son be in absolute 
solidarity with those He came to redeem, by sharing in a genuinely human birth.  It is 483
necessary that the Son assumed the same processes of human birth of those He came to 
redeem, for the sake of their salvation. Despite denying Galatians 4:4 as a direct reference 
to the virgin birth, Dunn draws similar conclusions to Torrance of Paul’s Adamic 
 Torrance, Incarnation, p93.480
 Ibid.481
 E. D. W. Burton, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians (Edinburgh: T&T 482
Clark, 1921) 217; W. Hendriksen, A Commentary on Galatians (London: Banner of Truth, 1968) 158; F. F. 
Bruce, The Epistle to the Galatians, (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans, 1982) 195; R. Y. K. Fung, The Epistle to 
the Galatians (Grand Rapids: W.B Eerdmans, 1988) 182; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians (Waco: Word Books, 
1990) 171; J. D. G. Dunn, The Epistle to the Galatians (London: A&C Black, 1993) 215; J. L. Martyn, 
Galatians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (New York: Doubleday, 1997) 390.
 Fung, Galatians, 214; Dunn, Galatians, 215-216.483
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Christology. Here Paul contrasts ‘the ordinary humanness of God’s Son in his mission, and 
the adoption of ordinary human beings to divine sonship’,  a correlation that reveals the 484
heart of Adamic Christology, that ‘Christ [is] the man who retrieved the course of Adam 
through his fallenness to death (cf. Rom. viii.3)…in order that those in him might share in 
this completion of the divine purpose for creation’.485
Although Torrance goes beyond the intention of the passage by reading the virginal 
nature of Christ’s conception, he still grasps the significance of the text. As Christ 
genuinely shares in the act of human birth, there is a direct correlation between human 
spiritual rebirth and Christ’s physical birth. As with John, Christ’s assumption of human 
birth is paradigmatic for being born into sonship and daughtership of God, a paradigm in 
which we participate in our own rebirth. Torrance states, Christ can bestow participation in 
parentage of God ‘because of his own coming into existence of a woman, as a real man. 
So Paul can say, like John, when Christ was born I was born a son of God, for I partake of 
Christ in his Spirit of sonship’.486
Torrance’s exegesis of the virgin birth is certainly worthy of further biblical exploration, of 
great importance to the non-assumptus. Questions should be asked of the correlation 
between Christ’s assumption of human birth and the believer’s spiritual rebirth in 
Johannine and Pauline literature, and the role of the non-assumptus undergirding it. 
 Dunn, Galatians, 215484
 Dunn, Galatians, 215-216.485
 Torrance, Incarnation, 93. The non-assumptus is made explicit in Torrance’s reference to Christ’s work in 486
the place of humanity under the law. ‘Because Christ came into existence under the law, he can redeem 
those that are under the law’, (Torrance, Incarnation, 93).
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Appendix 2 - Suggestions for Biblical Research: Christ’s Vicarious Humanity and the 
Pistis Christou Debate 
A further area for biblical research relevant to the contextualisation of atonement to 
Christ’s humanity, is the interpretation of pistis Christou as either an objective genitive, 
referring to the faith of believers (as Christ is the object of faith), or a subjective genitive, 
referring to Christ’s personal faith in the Father. As stated in our thesis, Christ’s vicarious 
humanity is soteriologically signiﬁcant, but before one can assert that Christ’s faith is 
subjectively eﬃcacious for believers, our own faith participating in His, it must ﬁrst be 
proven that Christ had faith at all. Clarity of pistis Christou would be most constructive to 
this element of Christ’s redemptive assumption of fallen humanity.

1. Torrance’s Hebraic Reading of Pistis 
Torrance does not explicitly advocate either the subjective or the objective reading of the 
genitive, but he was inﬂuential, alongside A.G. Hebert,  in popularising the Πίστις 487
Χριστοῦ debate in 20th century biblical scholarship in his lexical approach to the use of 
pistis in the translation of the Hebrew term ‘emeth in the LXX. Where the common 
translation is aletheia, widely meaning “truth”, on occasion the LXX uses a form of the 
term pistis instead (Proverbs 3:3, 14:22, Jeremiah 32:41; 33:6). In this, Torrance believes 
the Hebrew emphasis of divine faithfulness—as opposed to an act of human belief—in 
the terms ‘emeth and ‘emunah, must be brought into our New Testament understanding 
of pistis. He writes,

The usual translation of ‘emeth in the LXX is aletheia, but aletheia is not used to signify 
abstract or metaphysical truth, but what is grounded upon God’s faithfulness, i.e., 
truth not as something static, but as active, eﬃcacious reality, the reality of God in 
covenant-relationship…There is no doubt that again and again where we have the 
words pistis and dikaiosune in the New Testament we must see behind them the 
Hebrew words, ‘emeth and ‘emunah, and where in the New Testament we have 
aletheia we must understand that not simply as a Greek word, but in the light of the 
Biblical inclusion of pistis and dikaiosune in the concept of truth. 
488
This, in essence, grounds Torrance’s view of Christ’s vicarious faith within atonement. By 
reading the Hebraic understanding of ‘emeth into Greek lexicon, Torrance contends that 
 A.G. Hebert, ‘“Faithfulness” and “Faith”’, Theology 58 (1955), 373-379.487
 Torrance, ‘One Aspect of the Biblical Conception of Faith’, The Expository Times 68 (1957), 111–114, 488
112.
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pistis predominantly pertains to the faithfulness of God, but involves and includes within it 
the faithfulness of man—that to say that “the righteousness of God is revealed from faith 
(pisteos) to faith (pistin)” (Romans 1:17), is to say ‘man’s pistis is his implication in the 
Divine pistis’.  In this Hebraic understanding, the phrase pistis Iesou Christou (Romans 489
3:21-25; Galatians 2:16, 20; 3:22) is not simply an isolated reference to either Christ’s 
faithfulness or an human act of belief in response, but the term is ‘a polarised expression’ 
of the inclusion of responsive human faith in Christ within the Son’s own vicarious faith, 
as ‘even within itself the faithfulness of Christ involves both the faithfulness of God and 
the faithfulness of the man Jesus’.  In this use of pistis, Christ embodies the Hebraic 490
understanding of divine faithfulness twofold, manifesting both the perfect faithfulness of 
God towards humanity, and the perfect faithfulness of humanity in response. In Him is the 
‘the steadfastness of God the Word revealing Himself to man, and the steadfastness of 
man believing and trusting in His Word and living faithfully upon it…He is from the side of 
man, man’s pistis answering to God’s pistis, as well as from the side of God, God’s pistis 
requiring man’s pistis’. 
491
James Barr refuted Torrance’s reading of Hebraic understanding into the Greek,  after 492
which Torrance never publicly wrote on this lexical approach again. Barr accepts that, on 
occasion, both pistis and dikaiosune are used in the LXX as alternate translations of 
‘emeth in place of aletheia. However, the scarcity and contexts of these examples means 
neither pistis nor dikaiosune should be seen to universally appropriate the underlying 
connotations of divine faithfulness in the Hebrew term ‘emeth in their other uses 
throughout the New Testament. Barr writes,

The cases of ‘emeth translated by pistis are therefore so special and particular, so 
associated with particular books and their translation techniques, that they certainly 
can not be used as evidence for a general realisation of a relation of pistis to ‘truth’; 
and still less can they demonstrate that in the exegesis of the New Testament ‘again 
and again’ the presence of the Hebrew ‘emeth is to be detected behind pistis. 
493
 Torrance, ‘Aspect’, 113.489
 Torrance, ‘Aspect’, 113. Before Torrance, Barth translates Romans 3:22 as ‘through his [God’s] 490
faithfulness in Jesus Christ’, yet fails to substantiate this reading (Barth, K. The Epistle to the Romans, (tr. 
Edwin C. Hoskyns), London: Oxford University Press, 1933), 96-97.
 Torrance, ‘Aspect’, 114.491
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Beyond this, Barr criticises both Torrance and Hebert for eisegetically bringing their 
philosophical and theological concerns into their interpretation of the New Testament, 
neglecting the interpretative signiﬁcance of the social context from which these terms 
were borne.

 

The whole argument here presupposes that the sense of words is determined 
predominantly by their metaphysical or theological usages… What is lacking from this 
discussion is any idea of a word as a semantic marker, indicating an essential 
diﬀerence from another word and having the ability to mark that diﬀerentia in any one 
of a number of contexts; not becoming intrinsically infected by any particular one of 
these contexts, and having its sense as a marker sustained and determined not by 
metaphysical or theological usage but by a general social milieu, in which the 
language has its life. 
494
On the precedent of other Greek and Jewish writings, Barr contends that ‘neither Greek 
metaphysics nor Hebrew conceptions of the reality of God are built into the intrinsic 
semantic function of the word ἀλήθεια’.  Torrance, to Barr, is guilty of manipulating the 495
lexicon to suit his broader theological purposes, his ‘whole theology becomes the 
characteristic semantic marker-function of the word ‘truth’’.  More broadly, Barr 496
questions whether Torrance’s claim that runs through the heart of his doctrine of vicarious 
faith of pistis Iesou Christou being a ‘polarised expression’ of both divine faithfulness and 
human faithfulness being united in the eternal Son, is not in fact two diﬀerent ‘alternative 
meanings’ that Paul uses when appropriate. Torrance has, in creating a ‘polarised 
expression’ where there should simply be distinction in these alternative terms, has 
‘integrated them in a theological reciprocity system, [and] is now simply trying to force 
upon each particularise the entirety of that system’. 
497
Although Torrance’s lexical approach has been left behind since Barr’s criticisms, the 
debate as to the interpretation and signiﬁcance of pistis Iesou Christou still rages on, with 
many supporting Torrance’s conclusions on other exegetical grounds. 
498
 Barr, ‘Faith and Truth’, 188.494
 Barr, ‘Faith and Truth’, 190495
 Barr, ‘Faith and Truth’, 191.496
 Barr, ‘Faith and Truth’, 204.497
 See bibliography in R. B. Hays, The Faith of Jesus Christ: The Narrative Substructure of Galatians 3:1–498
4:11 (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans, 1983), 147.
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2. Key Points of the Πίστις Χριστοῦ Debate 
The debate as to the translation of pistis Christou continues amongst biblical scholars, 
asking whether these instances of faith—or faithfulness—are references to Christ, or the 
human believer. Indeed, if πίστις Χριστοῦ can be read as Christ’s faith, either exclusively 
or in part, the phrase remains pregnant with implications for the soteriological signiﬁcance 
of Christ having vicarious personal faith. Here, key points on either side of the debate are 
detailed.

2.1 Faith or Faithfulness?

The preliminary question of the pistis Christou debate is whether pistis should be 
translated “faith” or “faithfulness”? Does Christ or the Christian oﬀer up a response of 
belief, or steadfastness and constancy? 

Advocates of the objective genitive necessarily contend “faith” to be the proper 
translation, indeed, the centrality of human faith in Christ is the true signiﬁcance of an 
objective genitive rendering of pistis Christou. Amongst those who favour the subjective 
genitive, however, there is slightly more ambiguity as to whether Christ himself can be 
said to have taken on the act of human belief. For example, Caneday and Choi, despite 
aﬃrming the subjective genitive, contend for “faithfulness” as they simply don’t deem 
Christ’s faith to be a signiﬁcant theme for Paul. 
499
2.2 Objective Genitive 
2.2.1 Definite Article 
In contention for the objective or subjective interpretation, perhaps the most common 
defence of the objective genitive is the appeal that, if pistis lacks any attachment to a 
deﬁnite article, then the default reading should be of Christ as the object of believer’s 
faith. The genitive should only be subjective in the presence of a speciﬁc article.  500
 A. B. Caneday, ‘Galatians 3:22ﬀ—a Crux Interpretum for ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ in Paul’s Thought’, (in Papers 499
Presented at the 47th National Conference of the Evangelical Theological Society, Philadelphia, PA, 
November 16-18, 1995, Evangelical Theological Society papers, Portland: Theological Research Exchange 
Network, 1999), 10; H. S. Choi, ‘ΠΙΣΤΙΣ in Galatians 5:5–6: Neglected Evidence for the Faithfulness of 
Christ’, (Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol. 124, [2005], 467-490), 471.
 A. J. Hultgren, ‘The Pistis Christou Formulation in Paul’, (Novum Testamentum 22, 1980, 248-63) 253; J. 500
D. G. Dunn, ‘Once More, ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ’, (in E.E. Johnson and D.M. Hay (eds.), Pauline Theology Volume 
4: Looking Back, Pressing On, Atlanta: The Society of Biblical Literature, 1997), 64-66; G. Fee, Pauline 
Christology: An Exegetical-Theological Study (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2007), 224-225; S. E. Porter and  A. 
W. Pitts, ‘Πίστις with a Preposition and Genitive Modiﬁer: Lexical, Semantic, and Syntactic Considerations 
in the Πίστις Χριστοῦ Discussion’, (in M.F. Bird and P.M Sprinkle (eds.), The Faith of Jesus Christ: Exegetical, 
Biblical, and Theological Studies, Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2009, 33-53), 49-51.
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However, scholars on both sides of this debate have rejected this claim,  as objective 501
advocate Silva writes, ‘the presence or absence of the deﬁnite article is of no help 
whatever in determining the force of the genitival construction… The presence or 
absence of the article is motivated by other factors (sometimes inscrutable) and is no clue 
to the semantic import of the genitival relationship’. 
502
2.2.2 Objective Genitive: Common Greek? 
One of the main defences of the objective genitive is that the expected formulation for 
“faith in Christ”, πίστις ἐν Χριστοῦ (pistis en Christou), is simply not a Pauline idiom. Thus, 
πίστις Χριστοῦ read in the objective genitive would have been the common phrase for 
Greek speakers at the time.  Harrisville, contends that the common Patristic 503
grammatical interpretation was the objective reading, and when the subjective genitive 
was used with pistis it was not in pistis Christou, but pistis autou (‘his faith’).  Harrisville 504
does concede, however, that as the Patristics indeed varied in their use of both the 
objective and subjective genitive, a universal standard cannot be placed onto Paul in 
every instance of his use of them.  Later, Harrisville scours formulations of pistis and its 505
derivatives pre-dating the Christian era, to deem whether the use of objective genitive 
alongside pistis is ‘good greek’.  It was, in fact, the dative which was most common 506
throughout ancient Greek writings for expressing a personal faith or reliance, but both the 
objective and subjective genitive would still be regularly accepted.  In fact, it may be 507
 R. B. Hays, ‘ΠΙΣΤΙΣ and Pauline Christology: What is at Stake?’ (in E.E. Johnson and D.M. Hay (eds.), 501
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found that a single author may use both the objective or the subjective within one work, 
so again, a universal standard cannot be placed on each instance of a genitive. 
508
In further historical literature, we see the grammatical ambiguity of the Greek continued 
into Patristic scholarship. While the explicit references to the objective or subjective 
genitive are few amongst the Patristics, it must be said that the objective seems to be 
preferred.  However, the question must be asked, for what reason? In Wallis’ 509
examination of the Fathers, he ﬁnds that the subjective genitive was most common, but 
under the looming threat of Arianism, the objective became more prevalent in defending 
the divinity of Christ—that Christ could have had faith at all is disputed by on the grounds 
that faith is an exclusively human act.  Elliott, on the other hand, contends that any 510
move towards the subjective reading would simply be done ‘despite the evidence of the 
witness of the tradition of Christian theology’.  In any sense, such ambiguity also makes 511
placing any universal standard onto the biblical and Patristic use and interpretation of 
genitive an impossible task.

2.2.3 “Eis Christon Iēsoun episteusamen” in Galatians 2.16 Illuminates Pistis Christou 
Another point from advocates of the objective genitive, is that Paul’s use of the phrase 
εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐπιστεύσαμεν (eis Christon Iēsoun episteusamen, ‘we believed in 
Christ Jesus’ (Gal. 2:16), reveals his use of genitive in the same verse—διὰ 
πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (dia pisteōs Ihsou Christou) and ἐκ πίστεως Χριστοῦ (ek pisteōs 
Christou)—to be objective.  Subjective advocates have responded, criticising that few 512
have even attempted to justify that eis Christon Iēsoun episteusamen should be read as 
an explanation on the two surrounding genitives,  and assumptions of such weight 513
cannot be made in a debate such as this. 

We would also add that, in terms of content, it would not be beyond the realms of 
possibility to suggest that Paul could speak of the Christian’s “belief in Christ Jesus”, 
 Harrisville, ‘Before Πίστις Χριστοῦ’, 356.508
 R. B. Matlock, ‘Saving Faith: The Rhetoric and Semantics of πίστις in Paul’, in M.F. Bird and P.M Sprinkle 509
(eds.), The Faith of Jesus Christ: Exegetical, Biblical, and Theological Studies, Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 
2009, 73-90), 87.
 Wallis, Early Christian Traditions, 200-212.510
 Elliott, M.W., ‘Πίστις Χριστοῦ in the Church Fathers and Beyond’, (in M.F. Bird and P.M Sprinkle [eds.], 511
The Faith of Jesus Christ: Exegetical, Biblical, and Theological Studies, Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2009, 
277–89), 289.
 J. Murray, The Epistle to the Romans (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1968), 371; Hultgren, ‘The Pistis 512
Christou Formulation’, 255; T. Schreiner, Romans (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1998), 185; Silva, ‘Faith 
versus Works of Law’, 232; Fee, Pauline Christology, 224; Matlock, ‘Saving Faith’, 83-86.
 A. B. Caneday, ‘Galatians 3:22ﬀ’, 12; Campbell, The Deliverance of God, 1145-46.
513
Only Matlock oﬀers up a case for such a reading, ‘Saving Faith’, 83-86.
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directly conjoined with a statement of the faith of Christ. Again, no universal standard of 
Paul’s use of genitive can be established from this context in Galatians. Moreover, as 
discussed, the use of one grammatical function does not instantly rule out varied use of 
other functions, even within the same text, more so in other works—the use of objective 
genitive in one passage does not create a universal standard that we can expect of Paul.

2.2.4 Law Contrast 
Some on the objective side contend that, as Paul often contrasts works of the law with 
pistis (Rom. 3.28, 4.5, 4.13-16, 9.32, 10.4; Gal. 2.16, 3.2, 3.5, 3.11-12, 3.23-26; Eph. 2.8; 
and Phil. 3.9), pistis Christou can be seen to prescribe a human response of “faith in 
Christ” to counter the human failure in works of the law.  However, this is generally 514
countered by advocates of the subjective genitive that the truly signiﬁcant contrast, for 
Paul, was not between two types of human action, but between human action and divine 
action. Markus Barth writes, 

It is unlikely that the alternative preached by Paul to perverse, external, optimistic 
works-righteousness consisted of nothing better than a supposedly healthy, inverse, 
passive self-assertion. If Christ’s own faith counted nothing, and if men were totally 
delivered to the sincerity, depth, certainty of their own faith—how could any man ever 
be saved? Doubts about himself and his own honesty would trouble him without end. 
But there is no doubt about the perfect faith of Jesus Christ. 
515
2.2.5 Abraham’s Faith 
Another argument for the objective reading is Paul’s use in Romans and Galatians of 
Abraham as an example of faith (Rom. 4.3; Gal. 3.6). As Abraham is counted righteous 
because of his faith—not simply his faithfulness—pistis Christou, when objectively 
rendered ‘faith in Christ’, presents those believing in Christ as the New Testament 
 Murray, Romans, 365-67; Hultgren, ‘The Pistis Christou Formulation’, 258-59; Dunn, ‘Once More, ΠΙΣΤΙΣ 514
ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ’, 80-81; Fee, Pauline Christology, 226. 
 M. Barth, ‘The Faith of the Messiah’, (The Heythrop Journal 10, 1969, 363-70), 368-69. See also, M. D. 515
Hooker, ‘Πίστις Χριστοῦ’, (in M.D. Hooker [ed.], From Adam to Christ: Essays on Paul, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990, 165-186), 180, 186; A. B. Caneday, ‘Galatians 3:22ﬀ’, 20; Wallis, Early 
Christian Traditions, 74, 110-111, 119-20; J. L. Martyn, Galatians (New York: Doubleday, 1997), 271; Choi, 
‘Galatians 5:5–6’, 480.
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continuation of the framework of justiﬁcation by faith established in Abraham’s ‘faith in 
God’.  
516
However, the signiﬁcance of this continuation of justiﬁcation by faith from Abraham to 
the New Testament believer need not be weakened by the subjective reading. Simply, 
Christ would be counterpart to Abraham’s belief,  oﬀering vicarious faith within which 517
those who believe participate. Hays, bluntly, believes the strength of this link between the 
faith of Abraham and the faith of Christ to be ‘a fatal embarrassment for all interpreters 
who seek to treat Ίησοϋ as an objective genitive’. 
518
2.3 The Subjective Genitive 
2.3.1 Repetition 
From the subjective camp, a poor—yet often used—criticism is that the objective genitive 
creates unnecessary repetition from Paul in Romans 3:22; Galatians 2:16; 3:22; and 
Philippians 3:9.4.  However, repetition need not mean redundancy in Paul’s writing. 519
Dunn contends that, though the practice may seem strange to modern eyes, Paul’s 
repetition of the same point, even within the same sentence, may have been the 
grammatical normality for emphasising a matter of signiﬁcance.  Some from the 520
subjective side have called for this argument to be dropped. 
521
 J. D. G. Dunn, ‘Faith, Faithfulness’, in K.D Sakenfeld (ed.), The New Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible 516
Vol 2: D–H (Nashville: Abingdon, 2007, 407-23), 418-19; ‘EK ΠΙΣΤEΩΣ: A Key to the Meaning of ΠΙΣΤΙΣ 
ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ’, in J.R. Wagner, C.K. Rowe and A.K. Grieb (eds.), The Word Leaps the Gap: Essays on Scripture 
and Theology in Honor of Richard B. Hays, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 351-66), 361; H. W. Johnson, H.W., 
‘The Paradigm of Abraham in Galatians 3:6-9’, (Trinity Journal 8, [1987], 179-99), 192.
 K. Schenck, ‘2 Corinthians and the Πίστις Χριστοῦ Debate’, (Catholic Biblical Quarterly 70, 524-37), 517
533-537.
 Hays, ‘What is at Stake?’, 47 518
 M. Barth, ‘Jews and Gentiles: The Social Character of Justiﬁcation in Paul’, (Journal of Ecumenical 519
Studies 5, 1968, 241–67), 247; Hays, ‘What Is at Stake?’, 46; R. Longenecker, ‘The Obedience of Christ in 
the Theology of the Early Church’, in R. Banks (ed.) Reconciliation and Hope: New Testament Essays on 
Atonement and Eschatology, (Exeter: Paternoster, 1974, 142-52), 147; P. T. O’Brien, The Epistle to the 
Philippians: A Commentary on the Greek Text (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 249; S. Tonstad, 
‘πίστις Χριστοῦ: Reading Paul in a New Paradigm’, (Andrews University Seminary Studies 40, 2002, 37-59), 
54.
 J. D. G. Dunn, Romans 1–8 (Word Biblical Commentary, Volume 38A, Dallas: Word Books, 1988), 166.520
 D. A. Campbell, The Quest for Paul’s Gospel: A Suggested Strategy (London: T & T Clark, 2005), 521
221-222; The Deliverance of God, 1093, 1146; ‘The Faithfulness of Jesus Christ in Romans 3:22’, 66.
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2.3.3 “Faith in”: Wrong Use of Genitive? 
Another point from the subjective side is that it would have been incorrect grammar for 
Paul to have used a genitive attached to pistis to refer to faith in that ﬁgure.  Howard 522
notes that, outside of pistis Christou, Paul attaches pistis to a subject twenty-four times 
to express that subject’s faith,  and that it would have been ‘inappropriate to the 523
Hellenistic Jewish mentality to express the object of faith by means of the objective 
genitive’.  This, however, has been soundly refuted by biblical scholars,  with 524 525
commonly cited biblical examples of faith in a ﬁgure articulated with pistis being attached 
to an objective genitive in Mk 11.22, Acts 3.16, Jas 2.1, Rev. 2.13 and Rev. 14.12.

2.3.4 Habbakuk 2:4 
One key point for the subjective reading is the interpretation of Paul’s quotation of 
Habbakuk 2:4 in Romans 1:17 and Galatians 3:11. Instead of “the righteous (one)” being 
read as a plural reference to all who have faith, this is to be read as a messianic title for 
Christ himself establishing divine righteousness by his faith/faithfulness. 
526
In the context of Romans 1:17, Cranﬁeld criticises that it would be unlikely that Paul’s 
readers would assume that “the righteous one” is a reference to Christ. Christ has not 
been mentioned since 1:8-9, whereas the plural body of believers are mentioned directly 
before the Habbakuk quotation (1:16), making them the far more obvious object of the 
statement.  However, if Hays and Campbell are correct in their claim that the 527
synonymity of Christ and “the righteous one” was so engrained into the mindset of the 
early Judaeo-Christian community,  then the notion that Paul’s reader may have read 528
1:17 as Christ’s righteousness through faith/faithfulness is certainly tenable.

 G. Howard, ‘Notes and Observations on the “Faith of Christ”’, (Harvard Theological Review 60, 1967, 522
459-84), 460-461; D. W. B. Robinson, ‘“Faith of Jesus Christ”—a New Testament Debate’, (Reformed 
Theological Review 29, 1970, 71-81), 78-79; Williams, ‘Again Pistis Christou’, 434; Wallis, Early Christian 
Traditions, 88.
 Howard, ‘Notes and Observations’, 459.523
 G. Howard, ‘Faith of Christ’, (in D.F. Friedman (ed.), Anchor Bible Dictionary Vol. 2: D–G, [New York: 524
Doubleday, 1992, pp758-60]), 758.
 D. Moo, The Epistle to the Romans (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 225; C. E. B. Cranﬁeld, On 525
Romans and Other New Testament Essays (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1998), 84-85; Fee, Pauline Christology, 
224-225.
 Hays, The Faith of Jesus Christ, 132-41; D. A. Campbell, ‘Romans 1:17-A Crux Interpretum for the πίστις 526
Χριστου ̑Debate’, (Journal of Biblical Literature 113, 1994, 265-85), 281-84; The Deliverance of God, 613-16; 
‘The Faithfulness of Jesus Christ in Romans 3:22’, 64-66; Wallis, Early Christian Traditions, 110-111.
 Cranﬁeld, Romans, p88.527
 R. B. Hays, ‘Apocalyptic Hermeneutics: Habakkuk Proclaims “The Righteous One”’, (in R. Hays [ed.], 528
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2.3.5 The Coming of a Singular Pistis 
Finally, some advocates of the subjective genitive appeal that Paul’s use of pistis Christou 
in Galatians 3:22 is illuminated by His exclamation in 3:23 that the causal factor in 
breaking human bondage to the law, is the arrival of a singular pistis.  Dunn contends 529
that this arrival of pistis, to Paul, is simply a shift from a time of bondage into a new era of 
faith, that Christ as the true seed of Abraham has necessitated a human response of faith 
in return, a ‘complement to the coming of the seed’.  However, this wouldn’t make 530
sense in Paul’s immediate context. Christ is the sole seed of Abraham to whom “the 
promise” comes (Galatians 3:16), the law shall stand until the seed comes to whom the 
promise has been made (3:19), and now pistis has come, the bondage of the law has 
ended (3:23). In this context, instead of the promise being given by “faith in Christ” to all 
who believe, surely it makes much more sense in the context of Christ being the seed 
who bears the promise, that the promise be given “by the faith of Jesus Christ” to those 
who believe. Thus the breaking of the law by the coming of a singular pistis, is easily 
attributable to Christ in the immediate context. It would be too signiﬁcant a suspension of 
disbelief, for Campbell, to suggest that the coming pistis and Christ as the coming seed 
are references to two diﬀerent subjects. 
531
3. A Diﬀerent Path? 
One thing that is clear of the pistis Christou debate, is that there are no clear resolutions. 
Some, from this ambiguity, have looked for a diﬀerent path, other than the binary choice 
between the subjective and objective genitive.

A largely unsuccessful approach to an alternative resolution, is to shift the emphasis in 
interpreting pistis Christou towards the adjectival function of the genitive. Though this 
gives deeper respect to the theological signiﬁcance of the term, an adjectival reading still 
largely requires one to choose between the objective or the subjective. For example, on 
opposite sides of the debate Hultgren and Williams translate the term ‘Christic faith’ and 
‘Christ-faith’, respectively.  Though each translation rightly emphasises the 532
Christological foundation and Christocentric nature of all Christian faith, each still regards 
 Hays, Faith of Jesus, 139; Wallis, Early Christian Traditions, 87-88, 113; Choi, ‘ΠΙΣΤΙΣ in Galatians 3.5-6: 529
Neglected Evidence for the Faithfulness of Christ', (Journal of Biblical Literature 124, 2005, 467-490), 475; 
Campbell, The Quest, 196, 225-230; The Deliverance of God, 869-874.
 Dunn, ‘EK ΠΙΣΤEΩΣ’, 364.530
 Campbell, The Deliverance of God, 869531
 Hultgren, ‘The Pistis Christou Formulation’, 257; Williams, ‘Again Pistis Christou’, 437532
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Paul to be exclusively referring to one particular individual ﬁgure or group who exercises 
this pistis, in a singular objective or subjective interpretation.

Here we recognise the true signiﬁcance of Torrance’s interpretation of pistis Christou, 
as a "polarised expression". Such an interpretation seeks to transcend the impasse of the 
objective and subjective, bringing the signiﬁcance of both types of genitive into the 
phrase. However, Debbie Hunn suggests that overburdening the phrase in such a way 
crosses the line of plausibility for both Paul’s authorial intentions and his intelligibility for 
the reader;

To read πίστις Χριστοῦ as both subjective and objective…means that in each 
occurrence of the phrase we are to read of both Christians and Christ expressing 
πίστις and to track these parallel meanings through the text as Paul continues his 
argument. Overloading a phrase with theology overloads the reader’s mind as 
well.  
533
Firstly, for Hunn to dismiss a particular interpretation simply because of its complexity is 
simply bad practice, particularly since a term holding layers of meaning is not exactly 
outside the realms of plausibility. Torrance exempliﬁes the contention of some 
grammarians, that one genitive in isolation may be insuﬃcient for the portrayal of the 
intended message. For Zerwick, to choose between the objective and subjective is to 
‘sacriﬁce to clarity of meaning part of the fullness of the meaning’.  Secondly, however, 534
Torrance does indeed deserve criticism for his exegetical ambiguity, as his emphasis on 
the polarity of Christ’s faith and the Christian’s faith in pistis Christou may mislead one to 
the conclusion that these two poles of subjective and objective genitive must be lexically 
present in every instance of the term. The presence of multi-faceted meaning in a 
genitive, still may require one to say that one of these is not present in the sentence. 
Hooker salvages the signiﬁcance of Torrance’s work, resolving his antithesis by amending 
his phrase to be a ‘concentric expression’.  That although the subjective and objective 535
genitive are not lexically present in every instance of pistis Christou—thereby references 
to Christ’s faith and the Christian’s faith may indeed be distinct—the meaning of one may 
 D. Hunn, ‘Debating the Faithfulness of Jesus Christ in Twentieth Century Scholarship’, (in M.F. Bird and 533
P.M. Sprinkle (eds.), The Faith of Jesus Christ: Exegetical, Biblical and Theological Studies, Milton Keynes: 
Paternoster, 2009, 15-32), 25. 
 M. Zerwick, Biblical Greek Illustrated By Examples, (Rome: Biblical Institute, 1963), 8; see Osborne, 534
G.R., The Hermeneutical Spiral: A Comprehensive Introduction to Biblical Interpretation, (Downers Grove: 
IVP, 1991), 55-56.
 Hooker, ‘Πίστις Χριστοῦ’, 184.535
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be included in the presence of the other, and still point towards the theological 
inseparability of the two. To Hooker, ‘[t]he lexica’s diﬀerent deﬁnitions [of πίστις] reﬂect 
what is in fact a hen-and-egg situation. Our trust/faith is founded in the trustworthiness/
faithfulness of God, but those who trust in him become like him, trustworthy in their 
turn’. 
536
In her exegesis of Romans 3:21-26—one of the most contentious passages in this 
debate—Hooker recognises the dual emphasis of Christ’s faith and Christian faith within 
Πίστις Χριστοῦ. Within the narrative of Romans, the phrase sits between Paul’s initial 
presentation of the gospel in 1:2-4 and the upcoming gospel summaries in 4:24–5, and 
5:6–11, in which we begin to see the running theme of human faith being grounded in the 
faithfulness of God,  a theme that continues into 3:22. As only God has remained 537
faithful (3:2), a fact revealed (3:5) in the universality of human sinfulness (3:10), God’s 
righteousness is to be made known apart from the law (3:21). Clearly, it is to Christians 
that this righteousness will be made known (πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας [pantas tous 
pisteuontas], ‘all who believe’ [3:22b]), so Paul is to provide explanation as to how this 
revelation will occur. So, continuing the theme of human faith being grounded in God’s 
faithfulness, Paul presents righteousness coming through Christ’s own πίστις. To Hooker, 
it is obvious that ‘God’s righteousness is revealed through Christ himself, not in our 
response to him’.  This is not to neglect the prominence of Christian belief as recipient 538
of revelation, but to acknowledge that this manifestation of divine righteousness is 
grounded upon Christ’s own pistis.

Does this, however, mean that Christ himself has faith, or does He share the divine 
faithfulness? Hooker recognises both in Paul’s writings. When later contrasting the 
obedience of Adam to Christ, Paul thrice emphasises that it is God who is at work 
through the obedience of Christ (Rom. 5:15-17).  Paul uses the same logic in 3:25, as 539
righteousness is made known because God works through the obedience of Christ—
Christ is put forward as a ἱλαστήριον (hilastērion, ‘a mercy seat’) through his faith/
faithfulness. As Christ is obedient unto death, we see both the faithfulness of God at 
work, actualised through a genuine display of human faith in Christ’s obedience. To 
 M. D. Hooker, ‘Another Look at πίστις Χριστοῦ’, (Scottish Journal of Theology 69, [2016], 46–62), 53.536
 Paul opens by establishing that the Gentiles come to share in the ‘obedience of faith’ as saints 537
belonging to Jesus Christ (Romans 1:5-7), which is outworked in the gospel of the resurrected Son of God 
born of the line of David (1:3-4), while ultimately grounded on the faithfulness of God in his promises to 
Israel (1:2).
 Hooker, ‘Another Look’, 59.538
 Cf. Paul’s emphasis in 2 Corinthians 5:19, that God at work through Christ reconciles humanity to 539
himself.
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Hooker, ‘redemption was achieved both through the action of God and through Christ’s 
trust in him’. 
540
In this, Paul’s theme of human participation in Christ extends to acts of human faith 
being participative in Christ’s own faith. Those led by the same Spirit of Christ have come 
to share in his divine parentage (Rom. 8:14–17), by such participation becoming 
conformed to his image (8: 29), coming into the same ‘obedience of faith’ (1:5) of which 
the Son is the ﬁrstborn in his perfect and sinless obedience within human nature, that has 
fulﬁlled the expectation of the law on his human kin (8:4). Hooker sees no coincidence 
‘that every occurrence of the phrase πίστις Χριστοῦ is found in a context which speaks of 
the faith of Christians, for through death and resurrection his faith becomes theirs’.  541
Continuing this theme throughout his other works, Paul writes to the Galatians that, as 
the Son is born of Mary, under the law, to set humanity free from the law into the 
parentage of God (4:4-5), we too have died to the law, as we live by faith because of the 
obedience of Christ who now lives in us (2:20).  To the Philippians Paul writes that, as 542
Christ assumes our nature and is obedient to the point of death cross, those ‘in him’ 
share his resurrection in conformity to his glory (Phil. 3:11, 21), because those ‘in Christ’ 
participate in the righteousness attained through Christ’s own pistis (Philippians 3:9). 
543
The subjective genitive includes within it the objective genitive, not in a linguistic sense 
that every instance of one also includes the other, but in a theological sense, that in every 
reference of human faith in Christ, one must remember that such faith is participative and 
reliant upon other references to Christ’s own faith. Hooker states, 

[The] answer to the question ‘Does this phrase refer to Christ’s faith or ours’? may 
be ‘Both’. Nevertheless, that faith/faithfulness is primarily that of Christ, and we 
share in it only because we are in him. Although all the passages where the phrase 
πιστις ´ Xριστοῦ is used refer to our faith in Christ, it would seem that this faith is 
possible only because it is a sharing in his. In Christ, and through him, we are able 
to share his trust and obedience, and so become what God called his people to 
be.  
544
 Hooker, ‘Another Look’, 60.540
 Hooker, ‘Another Look’, 61.541
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Though much work has been done in the pistis Christou debate, further biblical work in 
this area would show Torrance’s integration of this dual usage into one holistic system of 
reciprocity in the interpretation of pistis Christou to be completely understandable. To do 
so is simply to recognise the inseparability of the term’s distinct uses that points towards 
a larger structure of the incorporation of human faith into the personal faith of the eternal 
Son. 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